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 ABSTRACT 
Arising out of a concern for the perceived devaluing of social pretend play 
in both formal early-years educational environments in particular and in 
wider western society as a whole, this research seeks to identify and 
categorise some of the potential developmental benefits of this kind of play 
activity. It locates and describes five areas of development in particular 
within which sociodramatic play is seen as having an especially positive 
effect; these are – cognition, linguistic development, social understanding, 
identity construction/emotional and moral development, and 
humour/pleasure. Some of the interconnections and overlaps between these 
various areas of development are also explored. The research adopts an 
essentially “naturalistic” approach – collecting, collating and analysing 
fundamentally qualitative data. It seeks to describe the sociodramatic play 
of four and five year olds within formal educational settings using both 
video and audio recordings, as well as semi-structured interviews with some 
of the relevant personnel. The report also endeavours to theorise about 
certain elements of social pretend play utilising the five areas of 
development noted above to help structure and inform its analysis. This 
work seeks to contribute to an “agenda of concern” about the downgrading 
of social pretend play, concluding that this kind of activity does assist 
development in the cognitive, linguistic, emotional, moral and social 
domains. 
 
 
 
(Statement providing explicit justification for the element of originality 
in this research: 
To the best of my knowledge and ability, the work contained within this 
dissertation is my own original work. Where I have utilised the work of 
others, these sources have been explicitly referenced on each and every 
occasion.) 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Questions being addressed 
Having been a professional actor and theatre director for more than twenty 
years, I am continuously impressed – on an almost daily basis – by the 
extent to which the arts in general and drama in particular appear to assist 
human beings in understanding both themselves and the social world in 
which they live. Paradoxically perhaps, immersion in the “unreal” world of 
pretence and the arts seems to aid and abet our understanding of ourselves 
and others in the “real” world. As playwright Arthur Miller would have it: 
“Nothing is quite so real to us, so extant, as that which has been made real 
by art” (1965, p. 233). Art, apparently, helps us “to explore the reality of the 
immense variety of the human condition” (Best, 1992, p. 201).Thus, while 
working on a soliloquy from Hamlet in the rehearsal room, for instance, I 
am forced to grapple with a whole series of fundamental facets of being 
human (life, death, endurance, consciousness, etc.) as well as to consider a 
kaleidoscope of moral, philosophical and ethical implications: to be or not 
to be, to think or not to think, to act or not to act, to take revenge or not to 
take revenge, to commit suicide or not to commit suicide, and so on. What is 
more, the beauty, artistry, humanity and complexity of both the language 
and the theatricality all help to ensure that such issues are encountered and 
explored not only with significant cognitive impact but also with 
tremendous emotive potency as well. 
 
It may seem a long way from the multi-layered riches of the workings of 
Hamlet’s mind to a pair of five year olds playing at cooking and eating 
together. However, the two kinds of activity – both, notice, forms of role 
play – have always seemed more similar than different to me: in the way 
that humans quite naturally and spontaneously engage in this kind of 
activity without needing to wonder why; and also in the immense pleasure 
and sense of fulfilment which both types of role play (the relatively simple 
and the highly sophisticated) regularly seem to engender. Indeed, it was 
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precisely this sense of pleasure and fulfilment which was my main 
motivation – and the motivation of so many of my colleagues – in deciding 
to work in the theatre: precisely the same motivation, notice, as to why, as a 
youngster, I so eagerly engaged in pretend play. The sociodramatic play of 
children and good theatrical performance, then, seem somewhat analogous 
in the way they each allow participants to engage with “unreality” as though 
it were “reality intensified” (Fischer, 1973, p. 8). Aspects of living which 
are so often unconsciously taken for granted in the hurly-burly of life-as-it-
is-actually-lived, become the conscious focus and object of our feelings and 
attention when placed under the microscope provided by pretence and role 
play. The task of observing and analysing young children engaged in 
sociodramatic play, consequently, has not been so very different from my 
role as theatre director when observing and analysing the work of actors. 
Both have called for a kind of “arm’s length” distancing from the “heat” of 
the person-to-person engagement and a persistent resort to very basic 
questions: “What is happening here?”; “Why is this person saying/doing 
that?”; “What are the consequences of such words/actions upon the ‘giver’ 
and the ‘receiver’?”; “What meanings are being 
explored/experienced/extended/communicated by such interactivity?” Thus, 
while being a professional theatre practitioner might have denied me some 
of the insights and understandings into children’s play available on a regular 
basis to, say, an early-years practitioner, it might also have afforded me the 
informed and practised perspective of one who is well-versed in 
deconstructing the meanings and significances of humans engaged in make-
believe. 
 
However, whilst a day hardly goes by when both the importance and the 
“naturalness” of engagement in acts of pretence fail to strike me, my work 
in the theatre also constantly impresses upon me the relatively low political 
profile and status afforded to the arts in this country. Cultural priorities 
implicitly and repeatedly seem to restate the “importance” and “value” of 
areas such as science and technology within our society; the arts meanwhile 
are relegated to the rather frivolous and eminently dispensable position of 
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“entertainment or enjoyment” (Best, 1992, p. xii). The broader “mission” of 
much of my professional work, then – above and beyond the parameters of 
this study – is to argue persistently for the value to human society of all 
areas of the arts, be that as diverse as the plays of Shakespeare in the theatre 
or the social pretend play of children in school. 
 
Might children’s sociodramatic play, I wonder, like theatre and the arts, be 
thought to have been similarly marginalised in western society? Or, put 
rather differently, why might research into sociodramatic play be deemed to 
be educationally relevant and/or important? Initially, of course, such a 
research focus might seem far removed from the realities and practicalities 
of everyday classroom experience, but there is a valid argument that the 
potential importance of sociodramatic play to child development (like the 
value of the arts to human development) has been drastically overlooked by 
politicians, policy-makers and a large swathe of educationists in general in 
recent years (Potter, 1996; Vassilopoulou, 2000). Moyles (1989) probingly 
asks: “. . . how far is play truly valued by those involved with the education 
and upbringing of young children?” (p. ix) and notes with concern that in 
1988 children in top infant classes in 33 London schools researched were 
found to spend less than one per cent of their day in “free” play activities 
(Tizard et al, cited in Moyles, 1989, p. 87). It may persuasively be argued, 
then, that in recent years play has become “ghettoised” (Hadley, 2002, p. 
11). This is manifestly at odds with reports issued in the first half of the last 
century which endeavoured to give a high profile to the arts in general and 
drama in particular on the curriculum – especially that of primary schools 
(see, for instance, the Report of the Consultative Committee on the Primary 
School, 1931, and Primary Education: A Report of the Advisory Council on 
Education in Scotland, 1946 [cited in Raynor et al., 1989, pp. 282 and 295-
6]). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the perceived importance of play 
was also advocated in the USA: “Between 1890 and 1920, one hundred 
million dollars was spent on playgrounds in America. Where none had been 
contrived before, now they were regarded as essential” (Sutton-Smith, 1980, 
p. 2). Even as recently as the 1970’s, over 200 scholarly articles and dozens 
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of research books were published on the subject of play during that decade 
alone (Sutton-Smith, cited in Mellou, 1993, p. 2) and in 1973 the 
Department of the Environment felt able to comment, “The realisation that 
play is essential to development has slowly but surely permeated our 
educational system and cultural heritage” (cited in Smith, 1977, p. 130). 
Play was regularly recognised as having important developmental and 
adaptive functions, not only in humans but also in many higher-order 
animals (e.g. Feitelson, 1977, pp. 7-12; Suomi and Harlow, 1976, p. 491; 
White, 1977, p. 19). Currently, however, it may be argued that statutory 
educational provision is being straight-jacketed to deliver a curriculum 
which is (supposedly) vocationally- and technologically-orientated, 
“literacy”- and “numeracy”- driven, and almost Gradgrindian in its 
emphasis on utilitarianism (Soler and Miller, 2003; Wragg, 1999). Put 
crudely, play today – although often acknowledged as being an important 
part of out-of-school learning – is seen as being too haphazard, too 
unplanned and too arbitrary to warrant serious and lengthy inclusion in the 
curriculum. Its relaxed and enjoyable nature does not encourage the child to 
develop “the grit and perseverance to pursue a difficult goal with sustained 
effort. It is all too easy, too much time is wasted in play,” (Guha, 1988, pp. 
62-3. Note: this viewpoint is not Guha’s own; this is her summary of the 
arguments of others). Arguably, the current situation is even worse for 
young children in England than in various other countries (with the possible 
exception of the Slovak Republic where, similarly, the prioritising of so-
called “academic” areas of knowledge has led to the marginalisation of 
social pretend play [Gmitrova & Gmitrov, 2004, p. 275]). The Desirable 
Outcomes for children’s learning on entering compulsory schooling 
document for England (SCAA, 1996) emphasises “early literacy, numeracy 
and the development of personal and social skills” (p. 1, cited in David, 
1998, p. 61). Similarly, Margaret Hodge MP in her foreword to the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority’s Curriculum Guidance for the 
Foundation Stage (2000) advocates analogous educational objectives for 
this age group: “The foundation stage is about . . . developing early 
communication, literacy and numeracy skills that will prepare young 
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children for key stage 1 of the national curriculum” (2000, p. 2). No 
reference is made, notice, to the desirable development of children’s 
emotions at this stage nor to the importance of the affective domain within 
educational progression. Compare, however, the Welsh document for the 
“desirable outcomes” of early years education published in 1996. This 
quotes Gerallt Lloyd Owen’s epic poem, Afon (The River) where he longs 
for the magic of early childhood. The Welsh document tells us that this is 
the time of life “when the world is there to be explored and the adventure of 
discovery is all around” (Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales, 
cited in David, 1998, p. 61). Moreover, the Welsh paper contains a specific 
section on “the importance of play” advocating play’s significance for 
desirable development in early childhood. The English guidelines contain 
only a few passing references to play (David, 1998, p. 61). Tricia David 
sums up the differences in attitude towards play and child development on 
either side of Offa’s Dyke very poignantly and pertinently: “It would seem 
that being under five in England is to be less joyful, less celebrated, less 
imaginative, less romantic, more pressurised, more rigid, more directed – 
especially towards literacy and numeracy – than early childhood in Wales” 
(1998, p. 61). David’s line of argument is in disagreement with that 
propounded by Bennett et al (1997) who contend that research does not 
provide support for the developmental benefits of adult-less play and that, 
consequently, its right to be included in the formal educational curriculum 
deserves to be questioned: “The value of play to young children’s learning 
is not borne out by empirical evidence and, in spite of its continued 
endorsements, its place in the curriculum remains problematic” (1997, p. 1). 
This in spite of the fact that a variety of research evidence indicates that a 
child-centred curriculum in the early years is more likely than a teacher-
directed, more formal approach to have positive and lasting benefits for 
child development (see Guimaraes and McSherry, 2002, p. 87) and that play 
forms the basis for such a child-centred pedagogy: “Play is the natural way 
in which children go about the business of learning,” (Fisher, cited in 
Guimaraes and McSherry, 2002, p. 87). Indeed, Bennett et al themselves – 
within four pages of the above quotation – confess, “There is substantial 
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evidence for the benefits of fantasy or sociodramatic play” (1997, p. 5). In 
order for play to attain and sustain a more secure and more highly valued 
position in formal educational settings, then, the children must be exposed 
to a philosophy of education – comparable to that espoused by John Dewey 
in the early decades of the twentieth century – which permits them, at least 
in part, to explore, experiment with and construct their own learning 
situations (Soler and Miller, 2003, p. 59). This kind of environment is rather 
less likely to be found in a political climate which argues, to quote Chris 
Woodhead, the former H. M. Chief Inspector of Schools in England, that, 
“Direct teaching is, however, crucial at this age [i.e. early years] as it is at 
every other age” (cited in Guimaraes and McSherry, 2002, p. 86). In the 
face of such dogma, we perhaps should not be surprised – if no less alarmed 
– that both Johnson (2000) in England and Guimaraes and McSherry (2002) 
in Northern Ireland concluded that certain early years environments – 
namely reception classes – offered a curriculum based mainly on direct 
instruction in which most of the activities were structured and initiated by 
adults (cited in Guimaraes and McSherry, 2002, pp. 92-3).  
 
However, even though reception class teachers in England regularly 
complain about a curriculum overcrowded with initiatives such as the 
Literacy and Numeracy Hours, leaving little room for more “creative” 
endeavours (Broadhead, 2003), some might argue that the importance of 
play in early years education has recently come to be emphasised once again 
in English political thinking. Such people might cite the replacement of the 
previously-mentioned Desirable Learning Outcomes with QCA’s 
Foundation Stage Curriculum spanning the period from three years of age to 
the end of the reception year (in spite of the emphases given by Margaret 
Hodge MP – and referred to above – in her foreword to the QCA 
document). This document – Curriculum Guidance for the Foundation 
Stage (QCA, 2000) – contains a specific section devoted to “Play” and the 
developmental, semiotic, intrapersonal, communicative, co-operative, 
emotional, creative, problem-solving and therapeutic benefits of play 
outlined in the document are all features which I – and many early-
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childhood practitioners – would wish to endorse and support (Soler and 
Miller, 2003, p. 61). Furthermore, examples of how play – and, often, role 
play in particular – can assist learning and teaching within all six areas of 
“an appropriate curriculum” are detailed. These include specific illustrations 
within personal, social and emotional development; communication, 
language and literacy; mathematical development; knowledge and 
understanding of the world; physical development and creative 
development. The presence of play remains recurrent and explicit in the 
QCA documentation which has supplemented the Curriculum Guidance for 
the Foundation Stage (2000). Both Planning for Learning in the Foundation 
Stage (QCA, 2001) and Foundation Stage Profile (QCA, 2003) contain 
specific, detailed guidance on the importance of play and ways in which 
practitioners might optimise and assess its effectiveness. Perhaps even more 
heartening (and surprising) is the news that government ministers are not 
ruling out the possibility that elements of the “new, play-based Foundation 
Stage” might be extended into Year 1 of the National Curriculum (Ward, 
2003, p. 7). It remains to be seen whether such recent political initiatives 
will be successful in helping to re-establish the importance and the centrality 
of play within the Foundation Stage and beyond. For this to be achieved, 
teachers themselves must feel willing and able to incorporate appropriate 
practice within their crowded and initiative-laden curriculum, and teacher-
training itself, of course, must include and emphasise the importance and 
utility of play (Broadhead, 2003). Moreover, in spite of the promises 
inherent in the new English Foundation Stage Curriculum, it continues to 
lay emphasis on more formal teaching and assessment approaches and, in 
comparison with early childhood curricula in countries such as New 
Zealand and Italy, play might still be deemed to be relatively “marginalised” 
(Soler and Miller, 2003, p. 66). Indeed, Ofsted itself reports how some 
headteachers in England would like to include more play-based learning for 
their six year olds but feel unable to do so “because of anxiety that this 
might jeopardise hard-won gains in standards in the core subjects” (2003, p. 
8). This is in contrast to the levels of independence in deciding appropriate 
provision experienced by headteachers in Denmark and Finland, where 
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curricula are less rigidly prescribed and professional autonomy is more 
“highly prized” (Ofsted, 2003, p. 5). In the meantime, however, it is hoped 
that a work such as this will assist in further underlining for politicians and 
practitioners alike the potential (and potent) benefits of, in particular, 
sociodramatic play for the early-years age range. 
 
In the light of the perceived curricular “downgrading” of pretend play, then, 
the questions central to this research will not only include ones which ask 
what kinds of development are nurtured through young children’s 
sociodramatic play and how they interrelate, but also how do these various 
“strands” of development manifest themselves in the social pretend play of 
children? What do they look like? What forms do they take? What evidence 
can be obtained from the naturalistic observation of children’s 
sociodramatic play that various, complementary strands of development are, 
in fact, taking place? Bearing all these points in mind, it may be possible to 
refine these diverse areas of concern and curiosity into three essential 
questions forming the basis of this research and providing its prime raison 
d’être: 
 
1. What types of development are nurtured through children’s 
sociodramatic play? 
2. How do these aspects of development manifest themselves during 
sociodramatic play? 
3. How might these various types of development interrelate during 
sociodramatic play? 
 
It may be worth commenting at this point on the apparent anomaly that 
research which places such emphasis on “development” is not longitudinal 
and examines only one particular age group at one particular point in time. 
However, developmental research which is not longitudinal is by no means 
uncommon (Schaffer, 1996, p. 3) nor is it without value and validity: “Such 
work is . . . essential to any effort to arrive at a developmental formulation, 
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for if we are to make statements about change we need to know just what it 
is that changes” (Schaffer, 1996, p. 3). 
 
It will come as no surprise in the light of what has already been said that, 
although the intention is for the research to be primarily descriptive in 
character, it will also contain passages of explanation, as well as attempts to 
evaluate the learning processes and theorise about the data – the ultimate 
aim being, as previously stated, to help create an “agenda of concern” 
(Tizard and Hughes, 1991, p. 36) about the ways in which pretend play has 
been “downgraded” (in both specific curricular terms and also in wider 
political perspectives) in recent years. The proposed audience for this 
research, therefore, as well as including practitioners themselves, will also 
ideally incorporate politicians and policy-makers. 
 
Main Literature Sources identified, read and referred to 
As will be detailed in due course, my reading and my field work have led 
me to compartmentalise the purported benefits of children’s sociodramatic 
play into five (albeit overlapping, complementary and, arguably, 
transactional) categories. (Please note: in the writing of this report I use the 
first person, emphasising the “researcher-as-instrument” position [Ball, 
1993, p. 46]). It is perhaps worth saying that no readings that I have come 
across use precisely this form of categorisation. Sutton-Smith (1980, p. 9), 
for instance, identifies four developmental areas located within play theories 
– specifically: autonomy, cognition, affect and communication – areas 
which can be seen as having similarities with, but which are not identical to, 
the five categories I have identified. 
 
It is to be noted that, in order to try and produce as coherent and convincing 
an argument for the benefits of sociodramatic play as possible, I initially 
endeavoured to reproduce broadly similar categories for investigation as 
those outlined by Sutton-Smith – namely, the cognitive, the linguistic, the 
social and the emotional. I decided not to investigate other potential areas of 
benefit – such as the physical (Broadhead, 2003) – in the belief that, in 
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formal curricular terms at least, such spheres were afforded a similarly low 
political profile as that given to social pretend play. However, my field work 
– even from as early as the pilot project in 1999 – refused neatly to conform 
to my proposed structure and, as will be discussed in detail later, it was 
especially the rather thorny issue of sociodramatic play and humour which 
repeatedly insisted on making its presence felt. As a result of these 
multifarious considerations, the five categories I eventually utilised (and 
which proved to be of particular assistance in addressing my three research 
questions) may be described as: 
 
1. Sociodramatic play and cognitive development. 
2. Sociodramatic play and language development. 
3. Sociodramatic play and perspective taking/social cognition. 
4. Sociodramatic play and identity construction/emotional and moral 
development. 
5. Sociodramatic play and humour/pleasure. 
 
My reading, therefore, has involved exploration of these five broad areas of 
development both with and without regard to their possible connection with 
children’s pretend play. The texts I have read and used are all, of course, 
detailed in the References section. However, it should also be noted that I 
have not given equal attention to all five categories but, rather, have chosen 
to focus, as my research has progressed, on those areas which have emerged 
as being of most significance and interest within my findings and 
subsequent discussion and which I consider to make the most original 
contribution to the existing literature. My research, as a result, has paid 
particular attention to linguistic and social and emotional development as 
well as to the relationship between sociodramatic play and humour/pleasure. 
 
The utilisation of these five categories has also informed the way I have 
structured the actual writing of this work. The Literature Review, in effect, 
is sub-divided into 5 separate, but overlapping, accounts of each of the 
developmental domains under scrutiny. Each of these sub-sections has, in 
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turn, been sub-divided again to include, initially, an overview of the domain 
in question before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the relationship 
of the particular domain to sociodramatic play itself. The Field Work 
chapter is sub-divided into a number of sections detailing a variety of 
methodological and ethical issues connected with this research. This is 
followed by a Discussion of my findings in which the analysis and the 
discussion of the data have been conflated in the hope that the material will 
be more readily understandable and accessible to the reader. Lastly, the 
overall findings and recommendations of this research are detailed and 
summarised in the Conclusion. Examples of research instruments I have 
used are included as Appendices.
15 
 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before attempting to analyse and evaluate the major readings I have 
undertaken, it may be helpful to use the literature to attain acceptable 
definitions of some of the central concepts of this research which can then 
be operationalised during the field work. Many writings attempt to define 
“play” per se (e.g. Bax, 1977; Tan-Niam, 1998) but perhaps the most useful 
parameters to determine what constitutes play are provided by Garvey 
(1990). She sees play as having certain characteristics which are partially 
typical of states other than play: it is pleasurable; its goals are entirely 
intrinsic – it serves no obvious utilitarian purpose; it is spontaneous and 
voluntary; and it involves some active engagement on the part of the player. 
The final item Garvey includes in the inventory is perhaps what most helps 
to give play its unique quality (and which is, possibly, also the easiest to 
overlook) – that is, “play has certain systematic relations to what is not 
play” (pp. 4-5). Play, in other words, is integrally related to aspects of life 
which are “non-play”. 
 
“Sociodramatic play” is, of course, a subtype of “pretend” or “fantasy” play. 
As Mellou (1993) observes, pretend play can be either solitary or social in 
nature – whereas sociodramatic play, arguably, can only occur when two or 
more people are playing together. This may, of course, involve play 
between adult(s) and child(ren) (i.e. play within asymmetrical relationships 
[Open University, 1999, p. 92]) but, for the purposes of this study, I have 
chosen to concentrate upon play between two or more children (i.e. play 
within symmetrical relationships [Open University, 1999, p. 92]; see below 
for the reasons behind this decision). Sociodramatic play, furthermore, is not 
only a subtype of pretend play per se but also, of course, a subtype of social 
pretend play necessitating, as it does, the adoption of dramatic roles and the 
utilisation of plot-lines by participants (Garvey, 1990, p. 79). Other types of 
social pretend play might involve no such role-playing but might include, 
for instance, children engaging in joint pretence through the use of dolls or 
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vehicles (Feitelson, 1977, p. 6). (This is not, of course, to imply that dolls, 
vehicles and other objects are not a frequent, and very important, feature of 
sociodramatic play.) But perhaps the prime defining characteristic of 
sociodramatic play (as opposed to other forms of imaginary play) is not that 
it simply requires two or more people to participate in symbolic play 
simultaneously, but that they must assume complementary roles and they 
must co-operate together in developing a single scenario. Successful 
sociodramatic play is a shared, co-ordinated activity, necessitating moment-
by-moment co-operation at both communicative and metacommunicative 
levels (Garvey, 1990, pp. 128-130). 
 
However, surely Mellou (1993) is incorrect to assert that sociodramatic play 
usually refers to the adoption of roles from real life (i.e. the play has 
leanings towards “social realism”) whereas “dramatic play” also includes 
imaginary or fantasy settings (p. 22)? How can one make a distinction in 
children’s play between situations taken from “real life” and those taken 
from “imaginary or fantasy settings”? Are not all their fictitious settings, to 
some degree, fantastical? When does anyone observe children’s play which 
is located wholly within their “real-life”, immediate, current, first-hand 
experiences (Garvey, 1990, p. 60)? When, for instance, does one observe 
nursery school children in a nursery school playing at being nursery school 
children in a nursery school? In my pilot study in 1999 I observed four 
children playing in a fictitious home setting with two of the girls taking on 
the maternal, caring roles. Would Mellou regard this as sociodramatic, 
rather than dramatic, play? This hardly holds up to scrutiny because the two 
boys involved were both pretending to be puppy dogs – are these to be 
classed as roles from “real life” or as “fantasy” roles? Surely, then, the chief 
distinction between sociodramatic and dramatic play does not lie in the 
source material for these types of play as Mellou asserts, but in the fact that 
sociodramatic play is necessarily: (i) social, and (ii) mutually achieved. 
 
The second phrase in the title of this work requiring definition and 
clarification is, of course, “child development”. This can be categorised as 
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something more than just “change”.  It also infers that development is 
“progressive, moving the child towards a greater state of competence, 
maturity and stability” (Open University, 1991, p. 8). Rather more 
problematic, however, is the paradigm of development which one adopts in 
seeking to clarify how learning occurs and how development might best be 
understood. A “behaviouristic” approach may be seen as inadequate due to 
the priority it places on the learning conditions rather than the individual 
learner’s feelings, experiences and understanding (Open University, 1994a, 
p. 44). Likewise, a “constructivist” perspective on development may be 
useful in the emphasis it lays on the child as an active “constructor” of 
knowledge but its utility to the present purposes may well be lacking as it 
subordinates the roles of language and social interaction (both, of course, 
fundamental to sociodramatic play) to predetermination by the child’s stage 
of cognitive development (Wood, 1998, pp. 24-5). Our most useful 
perspective on child development, therefore, is probably the “social 
constructivist” as exemplified by the likes of Vygotsky (1991) and Bruner 
(1989, 1991). The centrality which this approach affords to language, social 
interaction and cultural practices in shaping human development (Pollard, 
1994, p. 13; Wood, 1998, p. 39) may well be the most pertinent, as well as 
the most persuasive, to the dictates of this particular piece of research. The 
following social constructivist notions need thus to be borne in mind: 
 
1. The direction of learning passes from the social to the individual, from 
the interpersonal to the intrapersonal. 
2. Speech is the realisation as well as the encapsulation of pre-existent 
thinking. 
3. Individuals are assisted across their various zones of proximal 
development by the “scaffolding” provided by more expert others. 
 
These elements of social constructivism should all adequately map on to, as 
well as help provide the necessary tools to analyse, the research area I am 
exploring (Wood, 1998, pp. 26-39; Open University, 1994a, pp.49-52). 
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1. Cognitive Development 
Various paradigms of cognitive development (such as both the constructivist 
and the social constructivist referred to a moment ago) characterise it as the 
progression from “concrete” thinking which is embedded within the 
immediate tangible realities surrounding the child, to “higher”, more 
esoteric, “disembedded” forms of thought. Cognitive development is 
conceptualised as a movement away from unconscious interaction with the 
physical and the “at hand”, towards mental operation within the realms of 
the abstract and conceptual. It is a development which progresses, in 
Donaldson’s words, “beyond the bounds of human sense” (1978, p. 123). 
Donaldson’s view is ultimately based on Piaget’s constructivist critique of 
intellectual development which sees the mind as developing through a 
predictable sequence of stages until a fourth and final period is reached 
where the adolescent is able to think conceptually, in a way that is “no 
longer limited exclusively to dealing with objects or directly representable 
realities, but also employs hypotheses” (Piaget, 1991, pp. 10-11). 
Hypothetical thinking (involving, as it does, conscious rather than 
unconscious mental operation) can, at times, be characterised as “thinking 
about thinking” which Bruner defines as “metacognition” (1985), or as “like 
the mind turning back upon itself” (1989, p. 44). 
 
What essentially distinguishes the constructivist approach to cognitive 
development from the social constructivist, though, is not so much the 
nature of that development (in both cases it is from concrete thinking 
towards the more abstract) but rather the direction in which that 
development takes place. For Piaget, intellectual progression is a result of 
the individual dynamically acting upon his/her immediate environment – 
learning, in a sense, is seen as emanating outwards from the individual to 
the world at large. For the social constructivist, however, the direction of 
development is reversed – learning is something which initially occurs “out 
there” and which is then “internalised”, its direction is from the 
interpersonal to the intrapersonal (Wood, 1998, pp. 26-39; Open University, 
1994a, pp. 49-52). According to Mead (1934), one of the earliest proponents 
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of what we now label social constructivism, the very act of thinking is 
something which is socially constructed, thinking is the assimilation of 
common, social, cultural meanings. Indeed, it is claimed by Mead that the 
accomplishment of higher, conceptual thinking occurs through the adoption 
of the social perspective: “In abstract thought the individual takes the 
attitude of the generalised other [in other words, ‘society’]” (p. 155). 
 
So, if one deems cognitive development to be characterised not only by the 
progression from concrete to disembedded thinking but also by its socially-
constructed nature, what are the implications of this for the analysis of 
shared pretend play and intellectual development? Is there any evidence to 
suggest that sociodramatic play assists in the internalisation of 
understandings originally acquired in external, social situations? Or, in 
Light and Perret-Clermont’s terms, that shared meanings are established 
during play interaction leading, ultimately, to the development of 
internalised thought (1991, p. 137)? It is worth bearing in mind in this 
context that at least one reputable study (Johnson et al, 1982, cited in Smith 
et al, 1998, p. 197) concluded that whilst “constructive” play (for example, 
building with “Duplo” bricks) was indeed “positively and significantly 
correlated with intelligence scores”, “sociodramatic” play, significantly, was 
not. Are the cognitive benefits to be gained from other forms of play, then, 
not to be accessed through participation in social pretend play? 
 
1a. Sociodramatic Play and Cognitive Development 
We unashamedly confess to entertaining the plausible hypothesis 
that the evolution of play might be a major precursor to the 
emergence of language and symbolic behaviour in higher primates 
and man [sic]. 
(Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 21) 
 
This short quotation encapsulates two essential features of this literature 
review: the first is that play is frequently seen as preceding, and possibly 
even precipitating, both language development and symbolic behaviour. For 
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instance, Bates et al (1975) noted that referential speech emerged only a few 
weeks after the first instances of symbolic play and the capacity for 
internally representing absent objects (cited by Rosenblatt, 1977, p. 41). The 
second pivotal aspect of the above quotation is that the emergence of 
language and symbolisation are inextricably inter-related and, one might 
add, ultimately help facilitate the development of abstract, conceptual 
thinking. With regard to the latter feature, Garvey (1990, p. 42) sees 
linguistic and symbolic development as almost being part and parcel of the 
same thing: just as the child becomes able to represent an object or an event 
with a word, so the symbolic mode of representation likewise enables the 
child to use an object to “stand for” another object. (The importance of play 
for language development will be investigated later.) 
 
The notion that play, by fostering linguistic and symbolic development, 
actually helps engender the onset of abstract, conceptual thinking must be 
elaborated further. This complementary spiral of development – involving 
pretend play, symbolisation, language and hypothetical thinking – is 
particularly conspicuous throughout the second year of life as the child 
learns to engage in make-believe (Garvey, 1990, p. 44). In attempting to 
understand the interconnectedness of play/representational 
thinking/language development/conceptualisation – and thus to address my 
third research question: “How might . . . various types of development 
interrelate during sociodramatic play?” – it is imperative to acknowledge 
that to engage in pretend play is to operate on two levels of reality 
simultaneously: the concrete, immediate world and the hypothetical, 
conceptual world (Bretherton, 1984, p. xi; Moyles, 1989, p. 6; Piaget, 1962, 
p. 98). Fantasy play, that is, involves movement from the here-and-now to 
symbolic enactment (Perlmutter and Pellegrini, 1987). If I use a stick to 
represent, say, a rifle I am still aware that the stick is a stick; however, I am 
also engaging in an “as if” situation and am hypothesising (or pretending) 
what could be enacted if I were actually holding a rifle. To use Vygotsky’s 
terminology, I am using the stick as a “pivot” “in order to sever the meaning 
of the action from the real action” (1976, p. 548). Smith (1977) makes the 
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same observation: “A child is not just tearing up pieces of paper; he [sic] is 
making bus tickets . . . Fantasy play . . . seems to rely on an awareness of 
the symbolic or intentional value of action” (p. 124). In utilising the pieces 
of paper as bus tickets the child is not, it must be noted, using the paper as 
symbols per se but, rather, as props which enable the child to participate in 
imaginative activity (as opposed to detached, abstract thinking). Hence 
Potter’s (1996) observation that: “. . . the child’s use of substitute objects 
[during pretend play] is a first step in the transformation of the perception of 
objects of action to objects of thought or ideas” (p. 13). The use of the stick 
as a rifle, then, or the pieces of paper as bus tickets are “a step towards 
symbolisation but not actually symbolisation, . . . a pivot towards abstract 
thought but it is not yet clear abstraction,” (Vassilopoulou, 2000, p. 56). D. 
W. Winnicott (1971) makes a similar observation when analysing small 
children’s use of “comfort” items, or what he terms, significantly, 
“transitional objects”: “It is true that the piece of blanket (or whatever it is) 
is symbolical of some part-object, such as the breast. Nevertheless, the point 
of it is not its symbolic value so much as its actuality” (1971, p. 7). This 
distinction is critical for Vygotsky. We must not, he cautions, regard the 
child playing imaginatively as “an unsuccessful algebraist who cannot yet 
write the symbols on paper, but depicts them in action” (1976, p. 540). 
Rather, play functions as a transitional stage (1976, p 547) in the child’s 
progress towards more esoteric, disembedded ways of thinking and 
operating. Vygotsky cites the example (1976, p. 547) of an adult who can 
put down a match and state, “This is a horse”. Here, the adult is operating 
entirely within the realm of the symbolic. A young child cannot do this. A 
child must be able to use the prop, in play, in order to sever the meaning 
from the object during action1. Thus, a postcard cannot be a horse in play, 
but a long stick can (1976, p. 547). With regard to the transitional function 
1 Wolf and Grollman (1982) have argued that a child’s preference for using a tangible prop 
rather than a word or gesture to help create a fictive world is symptomatic of cognitive style 
rather than the developmental level of functioning (cited by Bretherton, 1984, p. 21). This 
would appear difficult to determine and would also be at odds with Vygotsky’s claim that 
the concrete “pivot” is an integral feature of transitional development towards independent, 
higher-order, detached thinking. 
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of object play, it is worth noting that, as the child cognitively matures, s/he 
becomes less dependent on the perceptual and physical properties of objects 
in promoting pretend play (Garvey, 1990, p. 96) – the child, for instance, 
when using a torch to represent a gun (rather than a pretend gun itself) may 
already be regarded as progressing towards more abstract, less embedded, 
ways of thinking and behaving (Rosenblatt, 1977, pp. 36-38). 
 
One can see the relevance of a social constructivist (as opposed to a 
constructivist) approach to development here, as detailed above. The 
learning experience initially occurs “out there” through the child interacting 
with objects in a non-literal manner. Only later is this understanding 
internalised. As Freire observes, “The act of knowing involves a dialectical 
movement that goes from action to reflection and from reflection upon 
action to a new action” (1989, p. 48). Lunzer (1989) likewise notes how 
“performance generally precedes awareness” (p. 30).Vygotsky makes a 
similar point with specific reference to play: “Play is converted to internal 
processes at schools age, going over to internal speech, logical memory, and 
abstract thought” (1976, p. 548). To return to the example of the horse in 
play, whilst one would hesitate to claim that the child is unable to imagine a 
horse-ride until s/he has fictitiously enacted such an event, it would be good 
advice to remember Vygotsky’s guidance that, “It is nearer the truth to 
claim that imagination in adolescence and later is ‘make-believe play 
without action’ than it is to claim that make-believe play in young children 
is ‘imagination in action’” (Britton, 1989, p. 212). 
 
The severance of meaning from actuality during pretend play, then: (i) 
occurs in congruence with language development, (ii) is a precursor to the 
dawn of symbolisation and, (iii) ultimately helps engender the ability to use 
abstract, conceptual thought. Thus, whilst accepting that not only symbolic 
play, but also “deferred imitation, mental images, drawing . . . and, above all 
language itself” (Piaget, 1991, p. 9) are all examples of representational 
thinking, one can hardly accuse Vygotsky of hyperbole when he states that: 
“Play is the source of development and creates the zone of proximal 
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development. . . . [Play is] the highest level of pre-school development. The 
child moves forward essentially through play activity” (1976, p. 552). 
 
A second significant benefit arising out of the conjunction between pretend 
play and cognitive advancement (which also connects with issues of social 
development) has been argued for as well. It can persuasively be claimed 
that our representational understanding of the world occurs not so much in 
“taxonomic structures or classification hierarchies”, as Piaget claimed, but 
rather in terms of “event schemata or scripts that are skeletal frameworks of 
everyday events” (Bretherton, 1984, p. 5). “A schema is an organisational 
form for the knowledge we have about a particular concept” (Andre, 1989, 
p. 68). Another mode of understanding this way of mentally representing 
experience is to see the schemata as “stories” or “narratives” which help 
shape and structure our view of the world. That is, arguably, we make sense 
of what we do and what happens around us by ordering and presenting these 
occurrences to ourselves in terms of narrative, plot, drama. Thus our 
propensity for making sense of social events through a form of mental 
“script-writing” can be conceived of as a major link between our sense of 
self and the social world of which we are a part: “Life could be said to 
imitate art” (Bruner, 1989, p. 46; see also Fox, cited in Open University, 
1994b, p. 90). Bretherton makes the same point; these narratives “are 
figurative in that they represent spatio-temporo-causal links among agents, 
recipients, and objects and are in this sense isomorphic with reality” (1984, 
p. 5). 
 
The fact that our understanding of the world is organised into “scripts” 
means, of course, that not only can we recreate those same scripts and 
understandings in our pretend play but, more crucially, we can alter, refine, 
distort, reshape them as well (Bruner, 1989, p. 43). As Piaget (1962) has 
claimed, in play children go beyond the confines of the perceptual field and 
thus can refigure reality according to their wishes and subordinate it to the 
ends they wish to achieve (cited in Bretherton, 1984, p. 36). Sutton-Smith 
(cited by Moyles, 1989, p. 165) describes how play “schematises life”: 
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children are able to create and master their own narratives and thus begin to 
gain some control over their own realities. He goes on to state that, “It has 
been a great mistake of Western theorising to see play as simply an 
imitation of life” (cited by Moyles, 1989, p. 165). For Vygotsky (1976), 
children’s ability to reconfigure reality in play was an essential function of 
make-believe activity: “The creation of an imaginary situation is not a 
fortuitous fact in a child’s life; it is the first effect of the child’s 
emancipation from situational constraints” (1976, p. 548). Play, he argued, 
“is invented at the point when unrealisable tendencies appear in 
development” (1976, p. 538). And thus play enables children to create 
symbolic alternatives to reality (Bretherton, 1984, pp. 32 and 38). This 
ability can be seen as synonymous with the ability “to engage in ‘serious’ 
mental trial and error” and thus to create mental alternatives prior to action 
(Bretherton, 1984, p. 36). It can persuasively be claimed that this ability – to 
manipulate symbolically narratives prior to their actual commencement – is 
of fundamental importance to human beings. Before a job interview, for 
instance, how often do we mentally “replay” a whole host of possible 
scenarios, thus helping to ensure our preparedness prior to the interview 
itself? Once again, then, the necessity of play to the development of 
decontextualised thought can be argued for. Not only is play important for 
the engendering of the semiotic ability, allowing for the development of 
both abstract thinking and linguistic functioning, but it is also of use in 
allowing children to structure and reshape event schemata and create 
hypothetical “other worlds”. This ability connects with the therapeutic 
potential of pretend play which shall be discussed in the section on Identity 
Construction/Emotional and Moral Development. Through acquiring some 
mastery over their own narratives, children are likely to benefit from 
increased control over their environments and thereby profit from improved 
self-esteem. As Broadhead (2004) notes, role play allows children to engage 
“in a personally controlled way, with events that have made them fearful, 
anxious, angry” (p. 17). Thus cognitive, linguistic and emotional 
advancement may all be seen to interrelate positively during sociodramatic 
play – and this must go some way towards answering my third research 
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question concerning the interconnectedness of social pretend play and 
different strands of development. 
 
Many writers (e.g. Clark, Griffing and Johnson, 1989; Garvey, 1990; Guha, 
1988; Hutt and Bhavnani, 1976; Mellou, 1993; Moyles, 1989; NACCCE, 
1999) have linked the ability to “play” with another aspect of cognitive 
development – namely, creativity: “Lieberman (1977) . . . and others have 
found some evidence that playfulness, and a disposition for pretend play, 
correlate with creativity” (Smith, 1988, p. 194). Early unplayfulness, on the 
other hand, has been linked with a lack of originality in later life (Bruner, 
Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 17). Bruner stresses that all forms of play are 
potential sources of novelty (cited in Sylva and Lunt, 1982, p. 169). In play, 
the child can explore, experience flexibility and take advantage of the 
materials and opportunities at hand in order to create new combinations and 
novel situations: “Through creating new objects, paintings, models, shapes, 
[and, one might add, sounds and words – see the section on language 
development below], a child takes his [sic] first steps towards creativity” 
(Sylva and Lunt, 1982, p. 169). 
 
“Creativity”, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to define. It may be 
thought of as possessing various component parts including the ability to 
think divergently, to be ideationally fluent, to be good at solving problems, 
and so on. On the other hand, there is the “common-sensical” assumption 
that creativity is linked with a dearth of rigorous, logical thought and a lack 
of structure and formal command of the medium in which one is working. It 
is, rather, associated with a sense of “letting go” (NACCCE, 1999, pp. 7 and 
10). Many writers, however, have been concerned to demonstrate that, far 
from being removed from rigour in knowledge and understanding, creativity 
is, in fact, inherently linked to the ability to think fluently, inventively, 
experimentally and effectively (e.g. Best, 1992; Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 
1976; Clark, Griffing and Johnson, 1989; Garvey, 1990; Hutt and Bhavnani, 
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1976; Mellou, 1993; Moyles, 1989; NACCCE, 1999)2. The results of 
Wallach and Kogan’s study (1965) found creativity to be characterised by 
divergent thinking consisting of ideational fluency and unique responses. 
Convergent thinking, on the other hand, was identified as thought directed 
toward producing a single answer to a difficulty (cited in Vandenberg, 1980, 
p. 60). 
 
Significantly, the empirical work of Sylva, Bruner and Genova (cited in 
Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 16) demonstrated the link between 
playfulness and problem-solving (which can be viewed as one aspect of 
“creativity” [Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 15]). The researchers worked 
with children aged three to five who had the task of fishing a latched box 
out of reach. To do so, they had to extend two sticks by clamping them 
together. The children were divided into four groups and each group was 
given a different “training” procedure before embarking upon the task. One 
group was given a demonstration of the principle of clamping two sticks 
together, another was afforded practice in fastening clamps on single sticks, 
and another was given the opportunity to watch the experimenter carry out 
the task. The fourth group was simply allowed to play with the materials. 
This final group “did as well in solving the problems as the ones who had 
been given a demonstration of the principle of clamping sticks together and 
better than any of the other groups” (Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 16). 
Smith and Dutton (1979) used a modified form of Sylva, Bruner and 
Genova’s task with four year olds and similarly concluded that play can 
help promote insightful tool-use and problem-solving (cited in Vandenberg, 
1980, p. 58). 
 
2 What appears problematic to some writers (e.g. Hutt and Bhavnani, 1976, p. 219; Moyles, 
1989, p. 80) is the notion that “creativity” can take various guises and appear in a variety of 
knowledge domains: “How do we correlate the inventive activities and output of a famous 
scientist [and] a famous artist?” (Moyles, 1989, p. 80). One might hypothesise that, just as 
understanding and development can occur, often quite discretely, in a number of 
intellectual domains (or “intelligences”), then so might creativity be fostered (or not) in 
separate realms of understanding – hence, the creative footballer, the creative writer, the 
creative mathematician, the emotionally creative person, and so on (see Gardner, 1994). 
27 
                                                 
 
In a broadly comparable study with animals, Birch (1945) discovered that 
four- and five-year-old chimpanzees that had been raised in a laboratory 
and, consequently, had had no prior experience of playing with sticks, were 
unable to use a hoe to rake a banana from outside their cage to within their 
reach. The chimpanzees were then allowed to play with sticks for three days 
and were subsequently re-tested. Even though they never used the sticks in 
the specific manner required for the task solution during their play, they 
were all able to solve the problem with little difficulty during the re-test. 
Birch concluded that: “play provided the chimpanzees with the opportunity 
to develop a generalised schema of action with the object . . . which was 
then mobilised in the specific way required for the task” [my emphases] 
(cited in Vandenberg, 1980, p. 51). Whilst one would necessarily wish to be 
cautious in drawing associations between the behaviour of young children 
and that of chimpanzees, all three of these empirical studies (i.e. those by 
Sylva, Bruner and Genova; Smith and Dutton; and Birch) would appear to 
support Bruner, Jolly and Sylva’s claim that play has the effect not of 
providing practice in particular behaviours of problem-solution but, rather, 
of “making possible the playful practice of sub-routines of behaviour later to 
be combined in more useful problem-solving” (1976, p. 15). 
 
Clark, Griffing and Johnson (1989) are able to cite a whole range of 
empirical studies (Lieberman, 1965, 1977; Dansky, 1980; Dansky and 
Silverman, 1973, 1975; Li, 1978; Pellegrini, 1981, 1982, 1984; Pellegrini 
and Greene, 1980; Pepler and Ross, 1981) supporting the notion that “the 
freedom and fluidity of symbolic play in the activity domain [is] related to, 
and perhaps facilitative of, ideational or associative fluency [arguably, 
another aspect of “creativity”] in the cognitive domain” (p. 77). Garvey 
similarly observes how “. . . engaging in make-believe appears to contribute 
to the flexibility with which a child can approach situations and tasks” 
(1990. p. 97). The aforementioned studies include Lieberman’s (1965) who 
was probably the earliest empiricist to relate “playfulness” to measures of 
creativity, and also the work of Dansky and Silverman (1973, 1975) who 
not only saw play as positively exercising children’s creative thinking 
28 
 
(1976, pp. 652-3) but also, critically, as enabling individuals “to facilitate 
imaginative adaptations to future situations” (cited in Clark, Griffing and 
Johnson, p. 79). In other words, playful activity did not only generate 
creative thinking during the immediate, pretend context, but also nurtured 
and promoted creative cognition successfully in other contexts and over 
time. Similarly, Clark, Griffing and Johnson’s own longitudinal study 
(1988) found early-years symbolic play “to be related to ideational fluency 
at preschool and to measures of flexibility, originality and intelligence, 
administered three years later” (p. 88). These findings lend weight to the 
studies of Hutt and Bhavnani (1976) and Russ (2003) which, likewise, 
support the view of the durability of the relationship between play and 
creativity. 
 
What is rather more problematic to determine, however, is the notion of 
causality between pretend play and creativity. Mellou (1993) appears to find 
little difficulty in glibly stating, “There is a positive correlation between 
dramatic play and creativity, or better [?], the former causes the latter” (p. ii, 
my emphasis). Dansky (1979) also concluded that sociodramatic play 
helped children develop a more generalised “as if” attitude which enhanced 
subsequent performance in creativity tests (cited in Vandenberg, 1980, p. 
64). Garvey, however, advises caution in making claims for causality, 
warning that whilst it is not correct to say that play caused greater creativity, 
“It is true that those children who displayed non-literal or imaginative 
behaviour prior to the task were the best problem solvers” (1990, p. 51). 
There might be, then, an underlying cause of both creativity and the facility 
to play. It is also worth pointing out that, whilst play cannot necessarily be 
claimed to spawn greater divergence of thinking, it can be regarded as 
assisting flexibility and novel solutions because of its intrinsically stress-
free nature (Broadhead, 2004, p. 13). As already noted, play necessarily 
possesses no utilitarian goals or objectives – it is pursued essentially for 
pleasure (Garvey, 1990, pp. 4-5). Paradoxically, therefore, the players in 
Sylva’s (1977) aforementioned study involving sticks and clamps, whilst 
having no explicit goals to achieve, were able to remain more (not less) 
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goal-directed as they were able to “proceed without frustration or fear of 
failure” (p. 71). They were more able to achieve their objectives, in other 
words, because the achievement of these objectives was not the prime 
motivation for their continued activity – having fun was. Bruner (1991) goes 
so far as to argue that the relatively long period of childhood in humans (in 
comparison with other species) evolved precisely to afford maximum 
opportunity for stress-free exploration in play. If the human young are not 
having to worry about their own safety and protection, then they are at 
liberty to indulge in the playful and pleasurable seeking of novelty and the 
exploration of the unknown. The facility safely to take risks within the 
protective parameters of play “leads to the kind of creative flexibility the 
best of human thinking is capable of” (Guha, 1988, p. 68). 
 
Conversely, of course, play cannot occur when the child is feeling stressed 
or pressurised. Play and coercion are incompatible bedfellows as Pip in 
Charles Dickens’ Great Expectations discovers when he first visits Miss 
Havisham: 
 
 “I sometimes have sick fancies,” she went on, “and I have a sick 
fancy that I want to see some play. There, there!” with an impatient 
movement of the fingers of her right hand, “play, play, play!” 
For a moment, with the fear of my sister’s working me before my 
eyes, I had a desperate idea of starting round the room in the 
assumed character of Mr. Pumblechook’s chaise-cart. But I felt 
myself so unequal to the performance that I gave it up and stood 
looking at Miss Havisham in what I suppose she took for a dogged 
manner, inasmuch as she said, when we had taken a good look at 
each other: 
“Are you sullen and obstinate?” 
“No, ma’am, I am very sorry for you, and very sorry I can’t play just 
now. If you complain of me I shall get into trouble with my sister, so 
I would do it if I could; but it’s so new here, and so strange, and so 
fine – and melancholy.” 
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(1861, p. 66) 
 
Even though Pip has significant motivation to play (to avoid the wrath of 
both Miss Havisham and his sister), he is unable to do so because of the 
stress he is experiencing and the complete absence of enjoyment: “Play to 
order is no longer play” (Huizinga, 1977, p. 675). It is not difficult to think 
of many comparable work-based scenarios where one is unable, under 
pressure, to produce a ready solution to a pressing problem. A cup of coffee, 
a laugh with colleagues and a fifteen-minute break later, however, the 
solution “presents itself” with astonishing facility. Similarly, Vandenberg 
(1980, p. 66) cites the broadly comparable “Eureka!” phenomenon of 
Archimedes where the desired “answer” to his problem was discovered in 
the context of an activity that was not directed towards the task and was, 
consequently, stress-free. Once again, then, in connection with my third 
research question, a number of developmental areas under scrutiny can be 
seen to cohere and to overlap: not only are play and creativity inter-linked 
but also conjoined are affective aspects of development (Russ, 2003), 
including pleasure – subjects of sections 4 and 5 of this chapter. 
 
In reviewing the literature on play and creativity, then, one can conclude 
that, at the very least, there is a positive connection between the two and 
that both can be influenced by the environment (context) in which they 
occur (Vandenberg, 1980, p. 62). Moreover, the ability to play will also 
manifest itself as the ability to think imaginatively and creatively over 
different contexts and over time (Moyles, 1989, p. 73). Finally, this 
beneficial correlation between play and creativity can be viewed as just one 
aspect of cognitive development which may be positively fostered through 
sociodramatic play as, indeed, may the ability to think abstractedly and 
conceptually. 
 
2. Language Development 
In attempting to understand the manner in which a child develops the ability 
to use language (both “externally” and “internally”), a social constructivist 
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approach again appears the most useful (e.g. Britton, 1989; Wood, 1998). 
According to this paradigm, as with other aspects of development, language 
can be regarded as initially occurring “out there”, within the social domain, 
only later to be internalised and to become “a vital means by which we 
represent our own thought to ourselves” (Mercer, 1995, p. 4). Vygotsky’s 
notion of “egocentric speech” (i.e. children “talking to themselves”) 
represents the transitional stage from external to internal linguistic facility 
(Open University, 1994a, p. 51). Speech begins as a shared, social activity 
on the part of the child and develops into a principal means whereby 
thoughts are regulated and behaviours are refined: “This is the prime 
example of Vygotsky’s theory of internalisation to achieve consciousness” 
(Britton, 1989, p. 212). Ultimately, of course, these two functions of 
language – the communicative and the cognitive – are not really separate at 
all (Mercer, 1994, p. 4). Moreover, as discussed above, if child development 
is to be characterised, at least in part, as the progression towards higher, 
more abstract, disembedded ways of thinking, then linguistic advancement 
is, necessarily, of fundamental importance to this. For language is central 
not only to thinking, but also to “thinking about thinking,” or metacognition 
(Bruner, 1985). In writing this paragraph, for instance, I am striving to 
encapsulate what I wish to say in written words – language, that is, is not 
merely the transference of my thoughts into words but, rather, the realisation 
of my thinking. My thoughts only become fully-fledged when they are 
“concretised” into language. As Vygotsky would have it, “Language 
structures and directs thinking and concept formation” (Open University, 
1994a, p. 51). Mastery of language, in other words, is essential if one is to 
utilise abstract, hypothetical thinking freed from its embeddedness in 
particular contexts and particular events (Open University, 1994b, p. 89; 
Wells, cited in Moyles, 1989, p. 62). 
 
2a. Sociodramatic Play and Language Development 
As has already been noted, in pretend play we encounter actions, objects, 
people and situations which “represent” other actions, objects, people and 
situations. This phenomenon, we have observed, bears a remarkable 
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resemblance to the phenomenon of language where words are used to 
represent all manner of things (Schaffer, 1996, p. 120). The ability, in play, 
to pretend that a doll is a baby may be linked with the ability, in language 
use, to “pretend” that the word “baby” refers to a baby (Smith, 1988, p. 
187). It can persuasively be argued, then, that “the evolution of play may 
have been an important step in the evolution of communication” (Bateson, 
1976, p. 121). Hulme and Lunzer conclude that “the interaction of play and 
language promotes the elaboration of the former and the development 
towards independence in the latter” (cited by Rosenblatt, 1977, p. 42). 
Indeed, perhaps language and representational play should not be regarded 
as separate and parallel activities, but rather as complementary functions 
(Bretherton, 1984, p. xii).  
 
It may come as no surprise, then, given the interdependence of play and 
language development, that of the twenty children seen by Rosenblatt, those 
whose play matured more rapidly also learned language earlier (1977, p. 
39). Moreover, Dunn and Wooding, in their study of children aged between 
18 and 24 months, found that joint representational activity between 
mothers and their children helped provide optimum conditions for language 
use and development – both in terms of the quality of the verbal interchange 
and the duration of the child’s attention span. Indeed, the fictional world of 
sociodramatic play has been found to provide optimal conditions for 
language use amongst children older than those studied by Dunn and 
Wooding. Goncu and Kessel (1984) commented on the sheer quantity of 
speech in the dyadic play of three and four year olds as well as its increasing 
coherence with age. They noted how linguistic interaction developed “not 
only regarding their interpretation of play reality but also regarding how that 
is represented and expressed” (1984, p. 19). 
 
Pellegrini (1985) examined some of the characteristics of literate, quite 
sophisticated language use in the speech of four- and five-year-old children 
engaged in dyadic play. In complex social pretend play (play in which 
several fantasy schemes were integrated into complex episodes), children 
33 
 
tended to use more literate features in their conversation than when they 
were occupied in either construction play or in other types of social 
interaction. For example, greater sophistication in the use of such linguistic 
elements as pronouns, noun phrases, conjunctions and verbs was found 
during periods of complex sociodramatic play than during other comparable 
episodes (cited in Garvey, 1990, pp. 165-6). 
 
Children’s ability to explore and experiment with language use might also 
be seen to connect with their developing sense of humour and fun (see the 
section below on Sociodramatic Play and Humour/Pleasure). As Weir notes: 
“Just as the pleasure in a joke can be derived from play with words, so does 
the child enjoy play with words” (1976, p. 610). It is perhaps no coincidence 
that, as preschool children become more adept at experimenting with 
componential features of language, they also become more able to utilise 
linguistic play for comic effect. Chukovsky (1963), for instance, reports 
examples of rhyming poems created by 3- and 4-year-old children: 
 
 I’m a whale 
 This is my tail 
I’m a flamingo. Look at my wingo 
 
And by about 4 years of age conceptual incongruity appears humorous: 
 
C., aged 5, said to her mother, “I can play a piano by ear”. 
Then she banged her ear on the piano keyboard and laughed. 
(cited in Smith et al, 1998, p. 185) 
 
Yet again, then, various features of development – in this case, the linguistic 
and the humorous – are seen as operating in playful complementarity. 
 
Indeed, Bruner (and others) see play as having some “deep connection” with 
linguistic development per se (Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 19). The 
structures, conventions and rules of play are seen as part of the child’s first 
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mastery of language – another activity which is governed by structures, 
conventions and rules. The format of play is almost “language-like” both in 
its assignment of turn-taking roles and in its sequencing and signalling of 
“meanings” (Bruner, 1983, p. 46-7) and the rule structure of play sensitises 
the child to the rule structure of language (Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 
19). Of course, these assertions are almost impossible to prove but, 
nevertheless, they remain appealing and persuasive (Schaffer, 1996, pp.114-
5). 
 
Paradoxically, many instances of play, far from exhibiting the rule-governed 
nature of language use, actually depict children wilfully decimating 
language, reconstituting it, repeating sounds, “talking funny” and, generally 
speaking, playing with language (Garvey, 1990, pp. 70-1; Smith et al, 1998, 
p. 186). At times such as these, the meaning of the words may well be 
“secondary or non-existent, and it is only the sound and rhythm that are 
enjoyed” (Garvey, 1990, pp. 62-3). Surely there are parallels here with my 
previous comments about play and divergent thinking: play affords novel 
situations for the child creatively and pleasurably to explore language and 
its constituent features, free from the pressures and constraints of more 
formal language activity encountered during curricular provision such as the 
“Literacy Hour”. Moreover, in play the child can be found taking apart and 
putting together componential aspects and sequences of language that s/he 
cannot consciously isolate or decompose until several years later (Garvey, 
1990, pp. 65-6). Cazden (1976) hypothesises that experimentation with the 
“forms” of language during play contributes more significantly to the 
achievement of literacy (and, ultimately, to metalinguistic capability) than 
does language-use in non-play contexts. This is because, during play, 
language per se can become the object of a child’s attention rather than 
being simply the means to achieving communicative ends (p. 605). Of 
course, it would not be possible to say whether such playing with language 
is essential to normal language development, but it would appear to be more 
than likely (Garvey, 1990, p. 66). 
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Furthermore, in sociodramatic play, children can be seen utilising a far 
greater linguistic range than that which they normally use. They adopt with 
remarkable accuracy the intonation, vocabulary and phraseology of the 
characters they are impersonating: “In role they . . . can assume adult voices, 
and show how much they have learned about different registers from 
listening and from reading” (Barrs, 1994, p. 256). Nelson and Seidman 
(1984) detail a further benefit of social pretend play to linguistic 
development. They argue that, in their play, children explore and expand 
mutually understood “narratives” (or what they term “scripts” – see above 
for the importance of narrative in human understanding). These scripts 
structure the “extended dialogic exchanges of fantasy play” (p. 67) and, 
therefore, consistently provide the framework for more sustained and more 
sophisticated language use than is normally present in “real-life” dialogue 
(p. 68). Once again, therefore, sociodramatic play is seen as being important 
not only to the development of language per se (and, thereby, to the ability 
to engage in abstract thought), but also as being significant in nurturing and 
improving children’s abilities to use language as a cultural and 
communicative tool. 
 
3. Perspective Taking/Social Cognition 
As will have been noted from much of the above discussion, according to a 
sociocultural perspective not only are aspects of development such as the 
cognitive, the social, the affective and the linguistic complementary, 
overlapping and transactional but they are also, in the final reckoning, 
inseparable (Open University, 1998; Schaffer, 1996, p. 1-2). Even when 
language becomes internalised and constitutes the process of thinking, for 
example, it still remains inherently social – the individual has assimilated 
“the attitudes and roles of others implicated in a common social activity” 
(Mead, 1934, p. xvi). The individual, that is, has become encultured 
(Trevarthen, 1998, p. 87). Moreover, social activities (such as collaborative 
play) encompass motivational and affective factors which are also 
“fundamentally cognitive in nature” (Brownell and Carriger, 1998, p. 198). 
Barnes (1989) similarly underlines the importance of this interplay between 
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the affective, motivational and cognitive realms of operation during social 
endeavour: “Feeling and values play an essential role in action-oriented uses 
of intelligence, since in the real world intellectual performance involves 
satisfying one’s own motives” (1989, p. 78). And of course it is our ability 
intellectually to infer what others are thinking and feeling in any social 
exchange which lies at the heart of communication, co-operation and 
competition. Indeed, it is probably the inability of autistic people to “mind-
read” the thoughts and emotional states of others which results in their 
having such great difficulty in understanding social environments (Bailey, 
2002, p. 164). Any adequate definition of “social cognition”, therefore, must 
acknowledge the fact that it is cognitive functions which guide behaviour in 
the social world and that any social action must inevitably be “emotionally 
toned” (Schaffer, 1996, p. 2). If these various areas of development are, 
then, ultimately inseparable, how might we identify advancement in social 
cognition – that is, the gaining of interpersonal understandings about other 
people’s thoughts, feelings and perspectives – in the multimodal realm of 
sociodramatic play? Needless to say, this dichotomy – in identifying the 
particular developmental benefits of sociodramatic play whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging the transactional interconnections across 
areas of development – is one which has to be continuously borne in mind 
when addressing my first and third research questions: 
 
1. What types of development are nurtured through children’s 
sociodramatic play? 
3. How might these various types of development interrelate during 
sociodramatic play? 
 
3a. Sociodramatic Play and Perspective Taking/Social Cognition 
As already stated, sociodramatic play utilises as its raw material scripts or 
narratives drawn (or embellished) from family life, storybooks, television, 
and so on (Bretherton 1984, p. 8). Its constituent features, in other words, 
are essentially those of the social world (Garvey, 1990, p. 79). Play, 
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therefore, can serve as a useful vehicle whereby children learn something 
about the rules and conventions of society and about their own place within 
it (Bruner, 1991, p. 264; Garvey, 1990, p. 88). Of perhaps more importance 
to the child’s developing social understanding, though, is the fact that, as 
previously mentioned, in symbolic play children do not merely “re-present” 
learned narratives but, rather, transform “their affective-cognitive map of 
the social world” (Bretherton, 1984, pp. 7-8). As discussed earlier, children 
can produce through pretend play a variety of “as-if” and “what-if” 
alternatives to everyday reality (Bailey, 2002, p. 168; Bretherton, 1984). 
They not only re-create aspects of the real world, but also create other 
fictive worlds. Thus, during play children are able to expand their existing 
knowledge and social understanding by applying it to new contexts and 
environments (Goncu, 1998, p. 118). 
 
The development of social cognition during pretend play, however, does not 
merely concern children’s understanding and exploration of society’s 
norms, conventions and expectations. Critically, it also involves children’s 
increasing ability to grasp other people’s cognitive and affective states 
(Dockett, 1998, p. 108; Schaffer, 1996, pp. 183-4). During role play, one’s 
“world” can be explored from a completely different vantage point 
(Bretherton, 1984, p. 10): one can, for example, experience something about 
what it is like to be a teacher in a school situation, even when one is still 
only five years old. As we shall analyse shortly, the capacity for role play – 
the impersonating of someone who is not oneself and the adopting of 
intentions and feelings that are different from one’s own – is surely 
symptomatic of a growing understanding of others (Dunn, 1998, p. 108). 
First, though, let it be noted how, during shared pretend play, a degree of 
collaboration and co-operation, and a measure of shared understanding 
(intersubjectivity) is called upon that far outstrips what might have been 
expected from observing the same children in non-fictive situations. This 
co-operation depends on “a sensitivity to the mood of the other . . . on a 
willingness to obey directions within the play context, to negotiate, concede 
to, and co-ordinate with another” (Dunn, 1988, p. 109). Goncu and Kessel, 
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in their study of dyadic imaginative play, noted, “A great deal of consensus 
between the partners on their representation of reality,” (1984, p. 10). The 
topic of adherence to rules – a subject we will be repeatedly returning to – 
may be pertinent here. For during successful sociodramatic play, children 
are not only reproducing societal rules and norms (as referred to above), 
they are also creating, sharing and adhering to the internal rules of the play 
itself: you can only continue to be mother if I continue to treat you as 
mother; the table can only continue to be a secret hideaway if we both 
continue to agree that is what it is. As Guha comments, “The creation and 
sharing of rules may be seen as the most important learning function of 
sociodramatic play” (1988, p. 71). More precisely, complicit agreement has 
to continue on at least three different planes if sociodramatic play is to be 
successful: (i) there has to be agreement on the pretend focus of the activity; 
(ii) there has to be co-operative communication (verbal and otherwise) 
within the play-frame; and (iii) there has to be productive collaboration 
outside of the play-frame, on the metacommunicative level (Goncu, 1998). 
Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that positive collaboration 
between peers and the successful attainment of shared understandings is far 
more likely to occur within episodes of joint pretend play than in other 
“real-life” situations (Dunn, 1988). Failure to appreciate and accommodate 
the perspectives of others not only leads to a breakdown of the shared 
pretence, but also the repeated inability of a child to “read” the verbal and 
non-verbal messages communicated within and without the play-frame is 
frequently indicative of a child who is a “loner” or who is socially rejected 
(Kantor, Elgas and Fernie, 1998, p. 136). Perhaps Loizos is not guilty of 
hyperbole, then, when stating: “Far from being a “spare-time”, superfluous 
activity . . . it may be that play at certain crucial early stages is necessary for 
the occurrence and success of all later social activity” (cited by Moyles, 
1989, p. xii). 
 
Having acknowledged pretend play’s ability to facilitate and perhaps foster 
mutual collaboration and co-operation, let us return to the issue, mentioned 
earlier, of how sociodramatic play is intrinsically related to the child’s 
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perspective-taking ability – that is, the ability to be aware of viewpoints 
other than one’s own. Mead (1934, p. 366) has argued that appreciating 
someone else’s point of view springs from the same capacity as taking on a 
fictitious role – and, through this interpersonal intelligence, notions of 
sympathy and empathy are born (see also Tan-Niam, 1994, pp. 6-7). The 
adoption of a role other than oneself, and the co-ordinating of this (both on 
the communicative and metacommunicative levels) with other people who 
are similarly in role, involves successful perspective-taking ability on three 
levels: (i) the perceptual (understanding what other people, and their 
fictitious characters, are seeing); (ii) the cognitive (understanding what other 
people, and their fictitious characters, are thinking); and (iii) the affective 
(understanding what other people, and their  fictitious characters, are 
feeling) (Tan-Niam, 1994, pp. 6-7). Indeed, a number of researchers have 
come to regard children’s first forays into the world of pretend play as also 
signalling their first attempts at recognising the mental states of other people 
(e.g. Leslie, cited in Bailey, 2002, p. 169) – taking on a role, that is, may 
well be indicative of (and possibly even facilitative of) the ability 
empathetically to “read” someone else’s mind (Bailey, 2002). Yet again, a 
fundamentally social-constructivist approach to development may be useful 
in helping to understand what is going on here. Social pretend play allows 
children to enact what it is like to see the world from a perspective different 
from their own. The social learning that is occurring – just as we noted with 
Vygotsky’s observations concerning language acquisition progressing from 
the interpersonal to the intrapersonal – is initially “out there”, it is 
essentially “intermental”. Later, of course, as understandings about other 
people’s cognitive and affective states are internalised, social cognition 
becomes “intramental” (Bailey, 2002, p. 170). In her empirical study, even 
though she was not seeking to identify causational links, Tan-Niam (1998) 
concluded that children who possessed a “Theory of Mind” (i.e. the ability 
to adopt perspectives other than their own) were more likely to engage in 
prolonged, successful shared pretend play than those who did not. Indeed: 
“The presence or absence of pretend play has become a standard 
developmental marker for normal or impaired development in mind-reading 
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[i.e. understanding the intentionality of others] during infancy” (Baron-
Cohen, cited in Bailey, 2002, p. 169). Moreover, Hickling, Wellman and 
Gottfried (1997) discovered that children of a certain age were actually 
better at understanding the mental attitudes of others during pretence 
situations than they were during their “real-life” counterparts. In her 1994 
study, Tan-Niam even concluded that “the better a child is at taking on 
different roles in fantasy play, the better he/she will be at perspective-
taking” (p. 7). This, however, seems dangerously close to overstatement, for 
surely there are more abilities called upon in successful role-adoption (such 
as issues connected with self-confidence, co-operation skills, popularity, 
linguistic abilities, etc.) than solely the capacity for perspective-taking 
(Bailey, 2002, p. 170). 
 
Nevertheless, it would appear irrefutable that shared pretend play and the 
development of perspective taking/social cognition are inextricably 
interconnected – whether that be in terms of assimilating, mastering and 
exploring society’s conventions and rules, or in collaboratively achieving 
mutual understandings, or in the ability to perceive the world from the 
viewpoint of others (Bailey, 2002, pp. 170-1). Social play and social 
understanding would seem to operate hand-in-glove. 
 
4. Identity Construction/Emotional and Moral Development 
It may seem curious, in a work which has been at pains to stress the 
interconnectedness of the various developmental areas under scrutiny yet 
which has also insisted on rather arbitrarily dividing the examination into 
five domains, that this very same work should also “lump together” in one 
section three apparently self-standing areas of development – namely, the 
construction of the self, emotional development, and moral development. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen, numerous writers (e.g. Berg, 1999; Dunn, 
1988) have found it necessary to discuss development across these three 
domains concurrently. It is hoped that the remainder of this section will self-
evidently demonstrate why it would be unhelpful and, possibly, misleading 
to discuss any of these three areas in isolation. Furthermore, the literature on 
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the construction of the self and emotional and moral development is very 
wide and so, needless to say, the following review limits itself to those 
aspects which relate most closely to sociodramatic play. 
 
To refer back to the Introduction of this work, it would seem that current 
educational practice in the western world – perhaps especially in England – 
tends to perceive and present the learning process as being fundamentally 
cognitive in nature (David, 1998). Children are expected to acquire 
knowledge, understanding and skills in a context where relatively little 
acknowledgement is afforded to the affective and social dimensions of the 
learning process. This section – like the previous one – will endeavour to 
redress somewhat that imbalance. While the first two sections of this 
chapter have, indeed, made a case for the possible cognitive benefits of 
social pretend play, and the third argued primarily for its social import, this 
section will seek to highlight the potential advantages of sociodramatic play 
for emotional, intrapersonal development. Indeed, writers such as Merttens 
(2002) find no problem in glibly asserting play’s “crucial importance for 
children’s emotional and social development” (p. 7). Yet the implicit 
assumption appears to be that these areas of development – and, by 
association, play itself – are rather less consequential than advancement 
along an “ultimately more important progression – a pedagogical hierarchy” 
(Merttens, 2002, p. 7). Merttens appears to limit the cognitive benefits of 
play to the opportunities it affords for curricular reinforcement, “using it as 
a vehicle for invaluable counting, writing, listening, speaking and reading 
opportunities,” (p. 7). However, what must be emphasised in this section is 
the importance of the affective sphere for all domains of learning. After all, 
as already argued, children “often display their most ‘advanced’ levels of 
reasoning in situations that matter to them and that arouse their attention and 
emotions” (Wood, 1998, p. 162). Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence (1996) 
draws upon a wide range of research to underline how children’s cognitive 
progress will be constantly retarded unless they can be helped to understand 
their own feelings and overcome excesses of potentially negative emotions 
such as anger. Other research focuses upon self-esteem – the opinions one 
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has about oneself – and demonstrates how high self-esteem “is a 
prerequisite for becoming a fluent reader” (Roberts, 1995; Raban, 1995; 
cited in David, 1998, p. 63). Sylva (1997) delineates the need for a less 
formal early-years curriculum with greater emphasis on the emotional and 
social aspects of learning, arguing that failure to provide such a curriculum 
“will lead to poorer performance, disincentives to learn and low self-
esteem” (cited in David, 1998, p. 63). So, if feelings do occupy a central 
place within children’s learning in spite of the low political profile afforded 
to them within, in particular, English educational spheres, how do they 
relate to both the child’s developing sense of self as well as an increasing 
awareness of moral issues – that is, the three separate, but related, focuses of 
this present section? 
 
i. Identity Construction 
Let us first begin by investigating how a child constructs a sense of identity, 
an awareness of the self as a distinct entity which, while being far from 
immutable, is also separate from, and different to, the others that surround 
it. In order to progress this investigation, we first need to explore the highly 
plausible notion that a sense of self is intrinsically linked both to a sense of 
others as well as to one’s emotional experiences (Dunn, 1988, p. 78). Freud 
saw knowledge of oneself as key to healthy emotional well-being (cited in 
Gardner, 1993, pp. 238-9) and more recent analysts have underlined the 
pivotal importance of self-awareness: “It enables the individual to adopt a 
particular stance from which to view the world – a source of reference 
which mediates social experience and which organises behaviour towards 
others” (Schaffer, 1996, p. 154). William James would have concurred with 
this view (Gardner, 1993, pp. 238-9) and went on to make a distinction 
which has proved crucial in thinking about the self (1892, cited in Schaffer, 
1996, p. 155). James distinguished between what he termed the “I” and the 
“me”. The “I” may be defined as the subjective self – the active agent 
which, to an extent at least, is continuous over time and which observes and 
interprets experience. The “I” may be thought of as giving each one of us 
our unique, separate identity (Schaffer, 1996, p. 155). The “me”, on the 
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other hand, is the self-as-object – that which we perceive when we observe 
and analyse ourselves. It is the product of our attempts at self-awareness and 
includes all those aspects which we call into play when attempting to define 
ourselves – gender, age, race, physical characteristics, qualities of 
temperament, and so on (Schaffer, 1996, p. 155). Most critically of all, 
James regarded this objective sense of self, this awareness of “me”, as 
arising from an awareness of others (Gardner, 1993, pp. 238-9). 
Significantly, this avenue of thought was taken up and progressed by the 
likes of George Herbert Mead (1934) who further investigated the process 
whereby interpersonal cognition (knowledge of others) developed into 
intrapersonal understanding (knowledge of oneself). It hardly needs stating 
that the direction of this progression – from the social to the individual – 
adheres to notions of social constructivism and so many features of 
development discussed thus far. 
 
An awareness of the self emerges during the second year of childhood with 
infants beginning: (1) to recognise themselves visually; (2) to define 
themselves in terms of attributes such as age, sex, size; (3) to understand 
terms referring to the self such as “I” and “me”; and (4) to say their own 
names (Schaffer, 1996, pp. 156-7). George Herbert Mead’s argument that 
this sense of self arises as a direct result of interaction with other people, 
whilst being difficult to prove (Schaffer, 1996, p. 155), remains highly 
persuasive: “The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a 
social structure, and it arises in social experience” (1934, p. 140). And it 
follows from this, of course, that if our sense of self is socially structured, 
then it will also necessarily be culturally determined (Dunn, 1988, p. 79). 
We are, in other words, products of – as well as contributors to – the culture 
in which we find ourselves (Thyssen, 2003). 
 
In the preceding section on Social Cognition, we noted children’s ability to 
“mind-read” the cognitive and affective states of other people. Dunn (1988, 
p. 79) argues that this ability to adopt the perspectives of others coheres 
with Mead’s theories about the construction of the self. (Once again, notice, 
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there is significant overlap and interchange between the various areas of 
development being scrutinised in this work.) For to have a sense of self – to 
observe objectively the “me” which is at the core of our being – is 
analogous to the “ability to think about oneself from the standpoint of 
another” (Dunn, 1988, p. 79). The foundations of self-awareness lie in 
sensitivity to others and sensitivity to how others respond to and perceive 
oneself. This may well be why some autistic children, for instance, display 
such an impaired sense of self that they have difficulties in correctly using 
the terms “I” and “me”: “Whatever the problem that devastates the autistic 
child, it clearly involves difficulties in knowing others and in using that 
knowledge to know oneself,” (Gardner, 1993, p. 264). For a sense of self to 
arise, then, it would seem imperative to have a sense of others, and a sense 
of others’ perception of oneself (Lefrancois, 1994, p. 244; Open University, 
1999, p. 45) – and we have, of course, noted the potential value of 
sociodramatic play to perspective taking in the previous section. The self-
awareness that begins to develop from the second year of life, in other 
words, is not solely a result of cognitive change, it is also a product of the 
culture, the social environment, in which it is ensconced and which 
contributes to its formation (Dunn, 1988, p. 79). 
 
Gardner progresses this line of reasoning and goes on to posit the theory 
that, if the self is the product of the many and multifarious connections it 
makes with the culture in which it is placed, then the “self” is perhaps more 
helpfully thought of as a variety of “selves”, an “amalgam” (1993, p. 243). 
This line of thought is taken up by Schaffer (1996). In an archetypal post-
modernist manner, he argues that “the self is by no means a simple, unitary 
concept but rather a complex system of different constructs” (1996, p. 155). 
The self is a collection of selves. Moreover, this multi-faceted entity is in a 
constant state of flux: “The self-concept is far from static. It changes as a 
result of the continuous process of self-observation that we all indulge in 
(the ‘I’ watching the ‘me’)” (Schaffer, 1996, p. 159). Furthermore, the 
estimation we have of our selves will also affect our self-concept, especially 
in the light of experiencing various successes or failures and the positive or 
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negative emotions associated therewith (Schaffer, 1996, p. 159). The self, 
then, would appear to be best thought of as a culturally-determined 
constellation of selves which is forever capable of alteration and 
development. (Of course, this notion of a “cast-of-thousands” embedded 
within the single self may well be thought of as ideal “casting material” for 
the many and diverse roles which sociodramatic play demands.) Moreover, 
the intellectual awareness of the self and the emotions which continuously 
help to refine and re-define it would also appear to be inseparable. 
 
ii. Emotional Development 
If a sense of self is commensurate with a sense of others and derives from a 
comparable ability, what is it that drives children to understand the thoughts 
and feelings, the intentions and motivations, of those people with whom 
they come into contact? Dunn (1988) argues that it is precisely the 
“emotional power” which underpins interpersonal relationships which 
encourages children to “read and understand their mothers’ moods or their 
siblings’ intentions” (p. 73). In a line of argument completely at odds with 
Bertolt Brecht’s (1964) views on the deleterious effect of the emotions on 
cognitive reasoning – in brief, he argues that affective, empathetic 
engagement with the subject matter clouds one’s ability to think objectively 
and rationally – Dunn contends that emotional involvement in their 
encounters with other people was exactly what led the children to be extra 
vigilant to the behaviours of others and to remember, reflect upon and learn 
from these exchanges (1988, pp. 80-1). Given this motivational drive for 
cognitive advancement, then, it is hardly surprising that Dunn found, in an 
apparently paradoxical manner, that it was precisely those encounters with 
mothers and siblings where the children expressed distress or anger, which 
“they were later most likely to reason rather than simply protest [about]” 
(1988, p. 80-1). Motivational and emotional processes, that is, were 
intrinsically linked with cognitive achievement (Dunn, 1988, p. 82). 
Wordsworth’s (1802) view of poetry as “emotion recollected in tranquillity” 
(1936, p. 737) might be one way of conceptualising how growth in 
cognition is rooted in matters of affective import. 
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However, it is not only the importance of the emotions to cognitive growth 
which must be emphasised in this section. Also of note is the pivotal role of 
the affective domain in the understanding and construction of the self (the 
subject of our last sub-section) – most notably with regard to both self-
control and self-esteem. I shall deal with the topic of self-control in our next 
sub-section – on moral development. Let us now turn our attention to 
emotional development and self-esteem. 
 
Lewis (1992, cited in Schaffer, 1996, pp. 168-9) has argued that “primary” 
emotions such as fear and anger do not rely upon the capacity for objective 
self-awareness, the appearance of the “me”. They are, therefore, present in 
early infancy. “Secondary” emotions, however, such as pride, shame, guilt 
and embarrassment all require a consciousness of the self. They are, after 
all, emotions which help us to evaluate the self; they are self-referring. The 
estimation of the self, then, the opinion one has about oneself, is “inevitably 
affect-laden” (Schaffer, 1996, p. 168). Thus, whilst a certain level of 
cognitive advancement is an essential prerequisite for evaluating the self, 
the extent to which this is an emotional operation also needs to be 
acknowledged. The concept of self-esteem, in other words, possesses both 
cognitive and emotional features (Schaffer, 1996, p. 169). It is vital to 
remember this when we think back to the research cited earlier in this 
section concerning the importance of self-esteem for academic attainment – 
cognitive advancement is not a purely cognitive process, it is also dependent 
upon affective features such as the feelings one has about oneself. 
Moreover, the intellectual and emotional assessment of the self is not a 
purely personal process – self-esteem is directly and greatly influenced by 
the social domain, the opinions which others hold and express about 
oneself: “. . . at no time can the self function as a wholly closed system; how 
others respond to the individual will affect self-evaluation and esteem 
throughout life” (Schaffer, 1996, p. 170). 
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To conclude this sub-section, let it be restated that emotional development 
can be regarded as critical to growth in cognition. Our intellect is most fully 
stimulated when our feelings are also aroused. Furthermore, our sense of 
self will invariably be emotionally “toned” – what we feel about ourselves, 
and what we believe others feel too, will help forge our estimation of 
ourselves. In true cyclical fashion, self-esteem/self-concept will, in turn, 
affect future cognitive achievement which will further affect how we feel 
about ourselves. And so this transactional cycle continues. Is it any wonder 
that Goleman places such emphasis on the affective dimension in children’s 
learning: “Our passions, when well exercised, have wisdom; they guide our 
thinking, our values, our survival” (1996, pp. xiii-xiv). And it is the manner 
in which “our passions” guide “our values” which is central to the next sub-
section. 
 
iii. Moral Development 
Schaffer (1996) defines what he means by an individual who has been 
successfully socialised and who consequently will act in a socially 
responsible manner as someone who has acquired a sense of morality: “That 
is, he or she will behave in ways that uphold the social order and will do so 
through inner conviction and not because of a fear of punishment” (1996, p. 
290). Fiske (2002), however, wonders what motivates people to forgo 
matters of short-term self-interest and instead to behave in ways which are 
likely to develop and sustain social relationships. Why do we so often act in 
modes which are morally informed and influenced, and which are motivated 
by selfless (rather than selfish) concerns? After all, he notes that the 
temptation to behave in a self-centred, anti-social manner is often extremely 
difficult to resist – we need only think of the urge to keep the £10 note 
which someone has unwittingly dropped to appreciate the point. 
Nevertheless, Fiske also recognises that again and again people behave in a 
socially responsible, culturally constructive manner even though “the 
payoffs for committed co-operation are indefinite: difficult to discern, 
impossible to assess accurately, uncertain and distant” (2002, p. 169). Why 
is this? Fiske concludes that it is because we are motivated by certain 
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“socio-moral” emotions to exercise self-control, thereby promoting co-
operation and enabling us to resist temptation. This would appear to be at 
odds with “commonsensical” assumptions – such as those of Brecht (1964) 
referred to earlier – which view rationality as being responsible for cool, 
detached, objective, socially responsible activity whilst emotion is seen as 
promoting rash, impulsive, unthinking, potentially disruptive behaviour 
(Best, 1992). In this scenario, cognition and emotion are seen as being 
generally antithetical: “Feelings are private and limited. Against that the 
reason is fairly comprehensive and to be relied on” (Brecht, 1964, p. 15). 
But Fiske argues that this is to over-generalise. Certainly those “primary” 
emotions such as anger which we noted earlier may potentially result in 
socially undesirable outcomes (such as fighting) but there are also 
“secondary” emotions – those requiring a sense of self – such as love, 
loneliness, desire for approval, shame and guilt which help engender 
positive, socially-committed behaviour: “Social and moral emotions 
motivate people to act to curb their non-social appetites in the interest of the 
relationships that are so crucial to their survival, reproduction and welfare” 
(Fiske, 2002, pp. 170-4). Feelings guide individual behaviour to act for the 
benefit of long-term, social ends, rather than short-term, personal gains. 
Aspects of self-control, therefore, begin to appear which are not exclusively 
intellectual – the affective domain, as well as the cognitive, is critical in 
achieving socially acceptable, morally informed behaviour. In part at least, 
this is prompted by the basic need to belong to a social grouping 
(Baumeister and Leary, cited in Fiske, 2002, p. 170). However, the urge to 
sustain social relationships is also assisted by the concept of self-esteem 
discussed earlier. The opinions which others hold about oneself help form 
our self-concept – and our sense of self, and the way it is viewed by others, 
is a strong motivational factor in promoting socially-responsible behaviour 
(Fiske, 2002, p. 170). The desire for the approval of others, that is, helps 
produce other-directed, apparently selfless conduct: “I wish to be liked and 
accepted by certain others, therefore I shall behave in ways which are 
acceptable to them even if this means denying myself some immediate 
pleasures.” Seen in this way, the relationship between the self and the wider 
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society of which it is a part can once again be regarded as transactional and 
mutually defining. 
 
Moreover, a sense of self which is – in part at least – socially constructed, 
will also be far from immutable because of the ever-changing nature of the 
relationships it encounters. True, “our genetic heritage endows each of us 
with a series of emotional set-points that determines our temperament” 
(Goleman, 1996, p. xiii) but our behaviour – and its social acceptability or 
otherwise – will also be affected by the feelings that we and others have 
about ourselves. Self-esteem will influence self-conduct. Low self-esteem, 
consequently, will run the risk of generating socially unacceptable activity, 
high self-esteem will be more likely to result in morally responsible 
behaviour. Whichever occurs, it would seem to be the case that our sense of 
self (and the facets this contains such as self-esteem and self-concept) will 
be achieved through a combination of cognitive, affective and social 
influences. 
 
But it is not solely a sensitivity to our own emotional state and sense of self, 
of course, which will help sustain social relationships. Intrapersonal 
intelligence alone will not guarantee interpersonal success. In order to attain 
appropriate interaction with the wider community, one must also possess a 
sensitivity to the emotional landscapes of others: “The less a person 
understands the feelings, the responses, and the behaviour of others, the 
more likely he [sic] will interact inappropriately with them” (Gardner, 1993, 
p. 255). Successful social relationships and socially informed behaviour, 
then, require affective understanding on both the individual and the wider 
societal levels. Both interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences are 
essential for acceptable operation within any given culture (Garner, 1993) 
and the ways in which development in these two domains might be assisted 
by sociodramatic play will later be discussed. 
 
Having examined in some detail the emotional dimension of socially 
appropriate conduct, let us now pay closer attention to how one’s sense of 
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morality – of right and wrong – is socially determined. Once again, George 
Herbert Mead is enlightening on this matter and is able to delineate how the 
social construction of the self also results in the individual assimilating the 
attitudes and values (the “morality”, if you like) of the culture in which it is 
located: “What goes to make up the organised self is the organisation of the 
attitudes which are common to the group. . . . They give him [sic] what we 
term his principles, the acknowledged attitudes of all members of the 
community toward what are the values of that community” (1934, p. 162). 
Dunn (1988) is less generalised, more specific, as to how precisely the 
individual assimilates the moral standpoints of the wider society. She 
comments how, although children do not learn by rote all the rules 
concerning proper and improper conduct (p.67), by the second year of life 
they are nevertheless receptive to the application of rules concerning 
appropriate behaviour across a range of different contexts – they are 
“sensitive to the generality of such rules” (1988, pp. 70-1). She attributes 
this awareness on the toddlers’ parts to the fact that moral rules about 
(un)acceptable conduct are implicitly and explicitly repeatedly reinforced in 
what their mothers both say and do (p. 73). In her study, the moral order of 
the parents’ world was continuously imposed upon the children, cultural 
norms and values were constantly instated (p. 73). Piaget (1976) similarly 
noted society’s ability to pass on its moral code. As we shall see in section 5 
of this chapter, Piaget emphasised the sense of “order”, the importance of 
regularity and rule-governed behaviour in early childhood. And Piaget saw 
this transference of society’s rules, attitudes and values as lying at the heart 
of children’s moral understanding: “All morality consists in a system of 
rules,” (1976, p. 413). 
 
Following on from this, one might ask how precisely children internalise the 
norms and values – the moral code – of the wider society. Surely it is not 
merely a matter of children blindly accepting what adults and other 
authority figures didactically preach to them (Smith et al, 1998, p. 226). 
Rather, in a manner which coheres with concepts of social constructivism 
already discussed, Schaffer (1996) argues that, “Morality is constructed by 
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the child out of social experience” (p. 291). The child is an active, not a 
passive, agent in determining his/her own moral standpoint. What is more, 
the attainment of a socially acceptable sense of morality can be regarded as 
yoking together the three elements of this current section and providing the 
prime raison d’être for discussing the three in consort. For the attainment of 
an autonomous sense of morality – what Schaffer terms a “conscience” 
(1996, p. 291) – is intrinsically linked to both an awareness of the self as 
well as to one’s emotional development. In brief, the “basic prerequisite” for 
moral advancement is “the formation of the self” (Schaffer, 1996, pp. 304-
5). How else can the “I” morally evaluate the “me”: “I am good/I am 
naughty” (Schaffer, 1996, p. 304)? Furthermore, the socio-moral emotions 
already discussed will motivate the child to meet certain standards of 
personal behaviour: “failure to meet them can be very upsetting” (Schaffer, 
1996, p. 305). These “secondary”, self-referring emotions thus provide the 
self-control necessary for morally informed behaviour (Fiske, 2002, p. 169). 
Identity construction, emotional development and moral development are 
consequently seen to be inextricably interrelated. Moreover, they might all 
be positively assisted through engagement in sociodramatic play – the 
subject of our next sub-section. 
 
4a. Sociodramatic Play and Identity Construction/Emotional and Moral 
Development 
As previously commented, the advent of symbolisation in children – the 
ability on which “everything which is distinctively human will develop” 
(Smith, 1988, p. 199) – can be regarded as manifesting itself in activities as 
apparently diverse as language use, perspective taking and pretend play. 
They are all, to some extent and in some sense, “as if” activities requiring 
some form of imaginative leap: what if I “imagine” this word to stand for 
this object? Or if I “imagine” myself to be someone else? Or if I “imagine” 
this stick to be a horse? Viewed in this way, sociodramatic play can be 
regarded as important for the construction of one’s sense of self in that it 
facilitates the imaginative exploration of a wide diversity of roles which can 
thereby act as “markers” by which one’s own identity can be constructed 
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and positioned. The assumption of other identities, that is, allows the child 
to experience something of what it feels like to be someone else and, in so 
doing, to begin to define oneself through correlation with others: “What 
they are and what they are not, what they wish to be and what they’d rather 
avoid” (Gardner, 1993, p. 247). Perhaps many of us can concur with 
novelist Stephen King in acknowledging the strong and lasting influence of 
assuming identities other than our own: “My earliest memory is of 
imagining I was someone else – imagining that I was, in fact, the Ringling 
Brothers Circus Strongboy” (2000, p. 4). In like fashion, my own earliest 
memory is of imagining myself as a cowboy fighting for survival by 
shooting in half the arrows raining down upon me. Fein, using George 
Herbert Mead as her prime influence, thus emphasises how the multiple 
perspective-taking engaged in during sociodramatic play can help form and 
crystallise a sense of self as a distinct human being: “Play, by allowing the 
child to imagine himself as an other, clarifies or consolidates a vision of 
aspects of the self that are either similar or different from others in the 
child’s social world” (1991, p. 342). Rubin (1980) also utilises Mead to 
make the same point: “To establish a separate identity, Mead believed, the 
child must figuratively get ‘outside’ him- or herself and view the self from 
some other perspective. Fantasy play was seen as the prime vehicle for this” 
(p. 74). Similarly, the empirical research of Chafel (2003) argues for the 
effectiveness of play in helping to facilitate the shift from an egocentric to a 
sociocentric perspective, thereby assisting the development of self-identity, 
and “dramatic play” is seen as especially important in this regard (p. 216). 
Although impossible to prove, then, it may be that the attraction of play for 
young children, in part at least, stems from their unconscious desire to 
construct a sense of self, “the need to get a picture of who one is” (Berg, 
1999, p. 13) – and, by implication, who one is not. Thus, in fervently 
portraying a superhero, a knight, a nurse, a mother, a doctor, a Martian, a 
soldier, a witch or a fairy, the child is demonstrating, “An urge for 
crystallising an identity in a social world of infinite roles and possible 
identities. It is an urge for emotional and cognitive growth, probing 
possibilities and trust” (Berg, 1999, pp. 18-9). For – as we noted earlier – to 
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be a human being is not simply to attain a single, immutable, discrete 
identity but, rather, to exist as “a very special unique constellation of 
different identities and roles” (Berg, 1999, pp. 21-2). In true postmodernist 
manner, we are a composite of roles and personae – roles and personae 
which can be inhabited, explored and examined during sociodramatic play. 
 
And just as children can encounter a range of characters and situations in 
pretend play unavailable to them in real life, so they can experience – albeit 
vicariously – a plethora of emotional states otherwise beyond their reach 
(Best, 1992, p. 57). Sociodramatic play affords children opportunities to 
experience what expressing and dealing with their own and other people’s 
feelings actually feels like (Hadley, 2002, p. 15). To quote Gloucester in 
King Lear, social pretend play allows understandings to be gleaned in the 
affective, as well as the cognitive, domains – children are able “To see it 
feelingly” (Act IV, Scene vi, l. 147). Moreover, emotions which would not 
easily be tolerated in non-fictive situations (such as destruction, aggression, 
the wish for power, and so on) can be encountered and explored through 
play and thereby integrated into the child’s affective understanding 
(Lowenfeld, 1972, p. 54). Indeed, as children’s fictional play becomes 
increasingly sophisticated they can even examine (normally around the ages 
of five or six) potentially distressing feelings or ideas within the play-frame 
(Garvey, 1990, p. 141). It might be pertinent here to cite the Greek myth of 
Perseus and the Gorgon: Perseus is charged with the task of destroying the 
Gorgon but he knows that to look directly at the creature will result in his 
being turned to stone. He therefore confronts the Gorgon via its reflection in 
his polished shield (Blakeney, 1910, p. 394). In much the same way, 
sociodramatic play might be thought of as providing a mechanism – a kind 
of safe, protected environment – where children can encounter, and perhaps 
overcome, some of the fears and feelings that beset them (Kitson, 1997). 
Clark and Goode (1999) make a comparable point: “The emotions drawn 
upon in the metaphorical present of the drama activity . . . allow the sublime 
subtlety of at one and the same time a distancing of the emotion into safety, 
and a speedy journey to the understanding at its heart” (1999, p. 13). The 
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fictive distance provided by the play-frame (rather like Perseus’ shield) 
ensures that the potentially distressing subject matter is handled at one 
remove and allows the child to confront the mirror images of certain 
features of life which might be too painful, too “raw”, if tackled head-on. 
Once again, novelist Stephen King would appear to be in agreement: “. . . 
the purpose of the imagination, I believe, is to offer us solace and shelter 
from situations and life-passages which would otherwise prove 
unendurable” (1993, p. 7). The understanding of problematical situations 
developed during play and the concomitant mastery of the emotions 
connected with them can, in other words, possess therapeutic benefits: “By 
representing a traumatic experience or situation symbolically and by 
returning to it and perhaps reversing its outcome in play, the child becomes 
better able to deal with the problem in real life” (Garvey, 1990, p. 55). The 
observations of D. W. Winnicott (1971) are pertinent here – he regarded 
free play as absolutely necessary for normal and stable emotional 
development. Likewise, Freud and, later, Erikson (cited in Smith, 1988, p. 
198) saw play as a means of working through traumatic events and of 
gaining sovereignty over anxieties and difficulties: “Play takes place on the 
border of dangerous alternatives and is always beset both with burdening 
conflicts and with liberating choices” (Erikson, 1976, p. 698). 
 
It is only a small step from here to realise how the exploration and 
examination of a wide spectrum of emotional states and ethical dilemmas in 
sociodramatic play, and their respective desirability and justifiability, will in 
turn help inform the child’s notions of good and evil, right and wrong, and 
will help constitute the child’s moral framework. Less obviously perhaps, 
the individual’s emotional and moral commitment to the greater good of the 
wider community discussed earlier might also be nurtured by the co-
operative social activity required to facilitate sociodramatic play. Vygotsky 
(1978) argues that cooperation is the basis for morally-informed action and 
states that children first learn to subordinate their individual behaviour to 
group rules during play (p. 90). Morally responsible behaviour, in other 
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words, rather than self-seeking hedonistic action, might be fostered by the 
requirements of sociodramatic play: 
 
By co-operating with others in a social group that is significant to 
them, [children] can gain direct experience of learning about what is 
morally right for that group as well as the opportunity to learn that 
reciprocity is of greater value than the maximisation of individual 
benefits. 
(Smith et al, 1998, p. 226) 
 
Our research must enquire, then, whether the attainment and continuance of 
successful social pretend play is indicative of the subjugation of individual, 
short-term interests for the sake of constructive social relationships 
engendered by morally responsible behaviour. That is, does the form as well 
as the content of sociodramatic play encourage a positive, socially 
committed conception of morality? Of course, in coming to pretend play a 
child is not a “blank sheet” bringing no previous moral understandings to 
the activity. On the contrary, the values, attitudes and beliefs of the child’s 
social environment will influence and inform the play itself. The 
relationship between the moral frameworks of the child’s real and fantasy 
worlds, in other words, will be transactional and mutually informative 
(Garvey, 1990, p. 145). 
 
Pretend play would appear important, then, in developing each of the three 
interdependent areas of development which have been the subject of this 
section. It offers significant – and possibly unique – opportunities for 
children’s developing affective intelligence, for their burgeoning moral 
understanding, and for building a coherent, broad-based and integrated self-
identity (Berg, 1999, p. 24). 
 
5. Humour/Pleasure 
The fundamental importance of pleasure to play has already been touched 
upon several times during this work and will continue to feature 
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significantly throughout. Pleasure is an integral part of pretend play and a 
strong motivational factor in its occurrence: “Play is a tremendously 
enjoyable activity” (Smith, 1977, p. 130). The notion of humour, however, 
whilst possessing many very obvious connections to pleasure (humour is 
often intrinsically pleasurable, for instance), requires more detailed analysis 
if a suitable definition is to be operationalised during this research. 
 
Many theories of humour abound (Bergson, 1980; Dunn, 1988), some more 
persuasive and convincing (and more pertinent to our present purposes) than 
others. The first theorist to investigate possible connections between 
humour and, specifically, play was Freud. He emphasised children’s use of 
incongruous elements to provoke laughter (Bergen, 2003, p. 45). McGhee 
also, following Piaget, itemised four stages of children’s humorous use of 
incongruity and categorised development through these four stages as, 
essentially, a cognitive process (Bergen, 2003, p. 45). However, theories of 
laughter which emphasise a yoking together of contrasting elements, or of 
laughter being the result of surprise are far from definitive (Ross, 1998). As 
Bergson notes, “surprise” and “contrast” are “definitions which would 
equally apply to a host of cases in which we have no inclination to laugh” 
(1980, p. 86). So what, if any, are the essential characteristics of humour 
which may be identified in all the multifarious humorous examples which 
daily confront us? Examples as diverse as the laughter arising from, for 
instance, a child’s innocent use of a malapropism (“Mummy, is that dog a 
puddle [poodle]?”), a teacher tripping up a flight of stairs in front of a group 
of pupils, or a fine performance of the “Pyramus and Thisbe” scene towards 
the end of Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Or is the seeking of 
some quintessential component of comedy a mere chasing after shadows? 
As Bergson enquired as long ago as 1900 in his seminal essay on 
“Laughter”, would it be “idle to derive every comic effect from one simple 
formula” (p. 84)? 
 
Although Purdie (1993) might be criticised for emphasising the linguistic 
features of comedy to the virtual exclusion of all other comic forms (little 
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mention is made, for instance, of purely visual humour such as slapstick), 
her analysis is particularly helpful in locating the breaking-and-marking-of-
rules at the source of all humour: “Funniness involves at once breaking rules 
and ‘marking’ that break, so that correct behaviour is implicitly instated” 
(1993, p. 3). A joke, in other words, occurs at the point at which a rule is 
both simultaneously transgressed and recognised. To take two of the 
examples referred to above: the child’s misuse of the word “puddle” for 
“poodle” transgresses a semantic/verbal rule – a dog cannot be a puddle. 
The child, however, does not recognise the rule-break (and therefore does 
not laugh), the adult, on the other hand, does (and therefore laughs). In the 
example of the teacher falling up the stairs, it is a social – rather than 
linguistic – rule which is both breached and acknowledged (by the 
onlooking pupils at least, if not by the embarrassed teacher). A teacher is, 
normally, a virtually error-free figure of authority and respect and these 
norms are momentarily both broken and implicitly instated by the ungainly 
mistake of tripping up steps. 
 
One can now begin to see how this rule-breaking-and-marking device for 
understanding the roots of humour may possess a more universal application 
than other theories of comedy – such as the “surprise” and “contrast” 
explanation previously referred to and proposed by the likes of Freud and 
McGhee. In order to clarify matters further, it might be worthwhile 
investigating an application of the surprise-and-contrast analysis of comedy 
to see if it is actually the breaching-and-recognising-of-rules which truly lies 
at the source of the mirth. Ross (1998) deconstructs the following W. C. 
Fields joke: 
 
 “Do you believe in clubs for young people?” 
 “Only when kindness fails.” 
(p. 7) 
 
It is, she argues, the surprising conflict between what is expected and what 
actually occurs which produces the joke – i.e. the punch-line is both a 
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surprise and a contrast to what was expected, given the first line. The 
audience is deliberately misled into thinking that “clubs” refers to social 
organisations, only then to realise that it is actually denoting “weapons” (p. 
7). But surely there is more to the joke than Ross allows: as well as breaking 
a linguistic “rule” (i.e. when the word “clubs” is used in direct connection 
with “young people” it is reasonable to assume that we are referring to 
“youth clubs” or something similar rather than weapons), it is also breaking 
a rule of socially-appropriate behaviour: it is comically outrageous to 
conclude that young people should be bludgeoned if the use of kindness has 
not previously encouraged them to behave acceptably. Again, then, one 
might conclude that it is the breaking-and-marking-of-rules which 
essentially lies at the centre of a humorous occurrence rather than any other 
rationalisation. Significantly, Dunn draws similar conclusions from studying 
children’s use of humour: “Breaking the rules of what a parent permits is . . 
. a frequent source of amusement in children” (1988, p. 151). 
 
The use of the W. C. Fields joke leads us on to another generally-pervasive 
feature of comedy. The notion of children being battered with clubs would 
usually be regarded as horrific and disturbing. Its use in a comic episode, 
though, somehow renders it not only “acceptable” but even laughable. In 
much the same way, the story of a man beating to death a distraught baby 
and its mother can be rendered suitable entertainment material for pre-
school children by being ensconced within the Punch and Judy formula 
(Steiner, 1963). What is it about humour which annuls the horror in 
normally horrific subject matter? How narrow is the dividing line between 
comedy and tragedy, its supposed polar opposite? And how do these comic 
issues align with the preceding observations about laughter and rule-
breaking? 
 
Morris (1967) begins to provide some answers to these questions when he 
observes: “It is important to realise how similar crying and laughing are, as 
response patterns” (p. 102). Furthermore, the laughing reaction actually 
evolves – during the third of fourth month – out of the crying one as a 
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secondary signal, coinciding with the arrival of parental recognition (p. 
103). In order to follow Morris’s line of argument here, it is necessary to 
realise (as will be detailed further in the next sub-section) that laughter, like 
pretend play, needs to operate on two levels simultaneously – the “real” and 
the “fictional”. As Bergen notes, humour and pretence both require 
participants to act in an “as if” manner (2003, p. 47). Morris argues that 
laughter is produced when an infant acknowledges these two sets of 
opposing signals occurring at the same time. So, if a parent engages in, say, 
peek-a-boo or knee-dropping or lifting-high with a baby, one set of signals 
says, in effect, “I am your parent – your personal protector; there is nothing 
to fear,” (i.e. this is the “real” situation) while the other set says, “Look out, 
there’s something frightening here” (i.e. this is the “as if” situation). The 
resultant reaction from the infant, Morris claims, is a combination of a 
parental-recognition gurgle and a cry of fear – that is, laughter (1967, p. 
103). Moreover, the laughter can be interpreted as demonstrating the 
infant’s recognition that an implied danger is not actually “real” – it is a 
form of pretence: “The mother can now play with the baby quite vigorously 
without making it cry” (pp. 103-4). Surely it is not a million miles from here 
to hypothesise that, as the child develops, if a potentially frightening subject 
can be rendered humorous – in effect, not “real” – then it can also be 
rendered “safe”. If the bogeyman in the wardrobe can be laughed at, he need 
hardly be feared. And the proximity of fear and comedy can so often be 
observed in young children’s reactions to the “baddie” in traditional 
pantomimes and Walt Disney feature films. Whilst many children will relish 
their adopted hatred of the bad guy, for some the fear might be just a little 
too real and the watchful parent might comment, “He didn’t know whether 
to laugh or cry.” Taken a step further, one can perhaps see how, with 
increasing maturity, humans can utilise humour as a safety/protective 
mechanism for a whole range of potentially frightening realities: death and 
disability can be laughed at; feared outsiders to one’s social group can be 
made the butt of jokes; poverty and starvation can be the source of 
amusement (or, in the example given above, “super-human” authority 
figures such as teachers can be rendered human and capable of mistakes). 
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All of these are dangers which can be safely encountered because, if they 
are laughable, they are also, to use Morris’s phrase, “not real” (1967, p. 
104). Humour can be used as a kind of general anaesthetic to ward off all 
ills – something which is funny need not be feared, it is safe, its inherent 
danger is not real. 
 
If humour, then, is intrinsically a safety-mechanism as well as also 
essentially concerned with rule-breaking-and-marking, how – if at all – do 
these two critiques of comedy cohere? In answer to this, it must be noted 
that humour will only be allowed to operate as a safety-mechanism so long 
as its transgression of rules is acceptable to those partaking in the joke. 
Comedy can “permit” obscenity, aggression, and so on, but only if the 
“permission” is mutually accepted (Purdie, 1993). It is not difficult to think 
of jokes about people with cerebral palsy or Down’s syndrome or starving 
Africans – jokes which many of us would not find funny and which would 
continue to appal. If we do laugh at such jokes, however, and if the social 
barriers they violate are acceptable to us then, arguably, the horror will not 
be sensed by us because the laughter has rendered the subject matter and its 
inherent fear, in effect, “not real”. Hence, Bergson’s capacity – because he 
was writing in France in 1900 rather than a hundred years later – to ask with 
impunity, “Why does one laugh at a negro?” (p. 86). Today, most people in 
our society would be horrified at the notion of unavoidable laughter simply 
because someone has a black skin; in early 20th century France, however, it 
might be argued that a negro was a largely unknown (and therefore possibly 
threatening) outsider – to laugh at a negro, then, converted the potential 
danger into something risible and, consequently, “safe”. 
 
In summary, therefore, we might note that, while there are many theories of 
comedy including one which focuses essentially upon notions of incongruity 
(see, for instance, Nash, 1985), it is the dual notion of laughter-as-the-
breaking-and-marking-of-rules and laughter-as-a-safety-mechanism 
(providing that the necessary rule-breaking which occurs is socially 
acceptable) which may well prove to be the most pertinent to my current 
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research. This is especially likely when one realises – as shall be analysed in 
the next section – that humour and sociodramatic play possess several 
features in common: two of which relate directly to the preceding discussion 
and are (i) their mutual reliance on “rules” and (ii) the fact that both need to 
operate on two levels of reality simultaneously in order to be successful. 
 
5a. Sociodramatic Play and Humour/Pleasure 
There are, arguably, five componential features of sociodramatic play and 
humour which are common to both areas (certain of which have been 
explored in the previous section). The features in common are: 
 
i. Both are overwhelmingly human. 
ii. Both are necessarily social. 
iii. Both necessitate participants operating on two planes of reality 
simultaneously. 
iv. Both are intrinsically pleasurable. 
v. Both are highly rule-orientated. 
 
I shall deal with each of these areas of commonality in turn. 
 
i. Both are overwhelmingly human. 
Although I have referred to a number of examples of play amongst higher 
primates in this work, sociodramatic play (that is, the joint adoption of 
characters and the mutual development of co-ordinated scenarios) is only to 
be found in human beings. Similarly, laughter – even though certain 
animals, such as hyenas, might be capable of producing laugh-like sounds – 
is an exclusively human trait (Morris, 1967). Once again, Bergson, writing 
in 1900, is particularly enlightening on this matter and delineates how 
comedy cannot exist beyond the human sphere: “A landscape may be 
beautiful, charming or ugly; it will never be laughable” (1980, p. 62). We 
may, of course, find humour in the antics of some animals – especially in 
the less-than-expert exploits of some of their young (itself a feature which 
may be regarded as the breaking-and-marking of rules: the rules of adult, 
62 
 
intended behaviour). Arguably, however, it is generally the human 
connections with animal behaviours and appearances which give rise to 
laughter. One has only to think of the “Monkey House” in a zoo to realise 
how it is the apes’ and chimpanzees’ similarities with human activity and 
the behaviours which would breach human taboos (their facial expressions, 
the explorations of each others’ faeces, the proclivity to copulate in public) 
which is ultimately the mainspring of their funniness. It is surely no 
coincidence that Will Self (1997) makes extensive use of this aspect of 
higher primate behaviour in his novel Great Apes. Indeed, Bergson – and 
also Meredith writing several years earlier in 1877 – both believe comedy 
not merely to be essentially human but even regard it as “a premise to 
civilisation” (Sypher, 1980, p. xvi). This observation very neatly takes us on 
to our second area of commonality. 
 
ii. Both are necessarily social. 
For some time, writers have drawn attention to the importance of the social 
context for both the creation and the reception of humour (Dunn, 1988; 
Nash, 1985; Purdie, 1993; Ross, 1998). Indeed, research has shown that 
people are far more likely to laugh at the same example of humour if it is 
received in a room full of people rather than alone (Ross, 1998, p. 1). 
Predictably, Bergson made similar observations over a hundred years ago, 
noting how difficult it is to appreciate comedy when you are feeling isolated 
from others: “Laughter appears to stand in need of an echo. . . . How often 
has it been said that the fuller the theatre, the more uncontrolled the laughter 
of the audience!” (1980, pp. 64-5). 
 
However, humour (and, for that matter, sociodramatic play) is not merely 
“social” in the sense that it requires more than one person in order to be 
successfully achieved, humour (and sociodramatic play) is also “social” in 
the sense that it nurtures and improves social relationships. Bergson, again, 
underlines the interpersonal utility of joking: “Laughter must answer to 
certain requirements of life in common. It must have a social signification” 
(Bergson, 1980, p. 65). Dunn also highlights the usefulness of shared 
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humour in not only revealing but also fostering social understanding: 
“Discovering how to share a sense of absurdity and pleasure in the comic 
incidents of life is an important step toward intimacy” (1988, p. 168). 
Hannikainen (2001) similarly emphasises the beneficial social effects of 
“playful actions” and draws a number of parallels and overlaps between 
pretend play and humour. However, because of her failure adequately to 
define what she means by “playful actions” – the subject of her empirical 
research – the relationship between pretend play and humour, as manifested 
both within and outside of playful actions, is blurred and confused rather 
than analysed and clarified. Nonetheless, the positive social function of both 
play and humour is enumerated: “Playful actions . . . make their [i.e. 
children’s] everyday lives more interesting, exciting and meaningful. 
Moreover, a playful action is also . . . a way to communicate and express 
positive feelings to other people” (2001, pp. 132-3). Both play and humour, 
then, it would appear from Hannikainen’s research, can not only operate 
within a social context, but even (as we noted in the section on 
Sociodramatic Play and Perspective Taking/Social Cognition) help build 
and reinforce positive social relationships. 
 
iii. Both necessitate participants operating on two planes of reality 
simultaneously. 
It may not be entirely coincidental that, as stated earlier, the arrival of an 
infant’s ability to laugh coincides with an infant’s ability to recognise its 
parent (Morris, 1967). This allows the parent, during rough-and-tumble 
play, to give the child a double signal: “There’s danger but there’s no 
danger” (Morris, 1967, p. 103). On occasions such as this we are, then, 
simultaneously operating in both the real and the fictional domains: the 
“real” domain tells the baby there is nothing to fear, it is only mother having 
fun; the “fictional” domain tells the baby this is what the frightening 
situation would be like IF it were for real and IF it were being perpetrated 
by someone other than mother: “There may appear to be danger, but 
because it is coming from me, you do not need to take it seriously” (Morris, 
1967, p. 103). One can hypothesise from this as to why, possibly, play is so 
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frequently taken to be a non-serious (and therefore relatively unimportant) 
activity. If play is fun and unthreatening (because it is “unreal”), then 
perhaps one can excuse those people who deduce from this that play is 
consequently frivolous and of little genuine import: play is not serious, play 
is not real, ergo play is of little consequence in the truly important business 
of life-as-it-is-really-lived. This may also help to account for the perennial 
downgrading of humour and comedy as opposed to more “serious” pursuits; 
note Meredith in 1877: “Comedy, we have to admit, was never one of the 
most honoured of the Muses” (1980, p. 5). 
 
But to return to the matter of humour operating simultaneously on two 
planes. Pretend play (as we noted in the section on Sociodramatic Play and 
Cognitive Development) appears to be a pivotal stage in the progression 
towards symbolic functioning. Similarly, the “dual” awareness that is an 
essential pre-requisite for recognising humour (the joke is both “real” and 
“unreal”, the rule is both “broken” and “marked”) may indicate that humour 
is significant in, or at least comparable to, abstract, conceptual thinking: “In 
this light, joking appears as central in the construction of Symbolic agency” 
(Purdie, 1993, p. 16). Let us revert to some of the examples of humour 
already referred to in an attempt to clarify this purported relationship 
between joking and the ability to think abstractedly. In order to “get” the W. 
C. Fields joke, for instance, one has simultaneously to understand both what 
was actually referred to as well as the meaning which was expected: one has 
to hold in mind the twin notions of “clubs” as “bludgeons” as well as 
“clubs” as “social organisations”. Likewise, the pupils laughing at the 
teacher falling on the stairs must not only see the reality of the mishap but 
they must also hold on to the abstract notion of teacher-as-authority-figure; 
only then are they aware that a particular “symbolic rule” (teachers do not 
make fools of themselves) has been violated (Purdie, 1993). Joking, in other 
words, would appear to demand a similar (if not identical) capability to that 
utilised in disembedded thinking – conceptual operation which occurs away 
from the concrete realities which immediately surround us. Perhaps it is not 
without significance, then, that “Small children . . . begin to joke as soon as 
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they reach symbolic competence” (Purdie, 1993, p. 54). Joking involves 
understanding on both the “symbolic” as well as the “real” planes of reality 
– just as pretend play does. 
 
If joking does indeed necessitate such simultaneous operation in both the 
“real” and the “pretend/symbolic” worlds, then this would appear to be at 
odds with Piaget (1962) who argued that, for three year olds, “the 
distinction between the realms of reality and fantasy are [sic] at best 
blurred” (cited in Golomb and Kuersten, 1996, p. 204). As anyone who has 
knowledge of three year olds will vouchsafe, they are more than capable of 
engaging in shared humour (Dunn, 1988). Does this mean that the 
connection I have drawn between joking and the pretend/reality divide does 
not hold water? On the contrary, I believe it is Piaget who is guilty of 
underestimating young children’s ability to operate simultaneously in the 
worlds of both reality and fantasy. The naturalistic observations of Wolf and 
Hicks (1989) “seem to support the notion that young children . . . are able to 
make the distinction between fantasy and reality” (cited in Golomb and 
Kuersten, 1996, p. 204). Likewise, Golomb and Kuersten’s own empirical 
study into children’s pretend play utilising adult interventions concluded 
that: “Young preschoolers seemed to have no difficulty crossing the 
boundaries of fantasy and reality in their play” (1996, p. 215). It would 
appear, then, not only that the ability of a child to share a joke has much in 
common with the ability of a child to engage in pretend play (both 
necessitate simultaneous operations in the real and the symbolic domains) 
but also that these capacities have connections with the ability to think 
conceptually – which likewise, of course, involves mental operations away 
from the immediate actualities of the “real” world. 
 
iv. Both are intrinsically pleasurable. 
Perhaps the most noticeable and pervasive feature of play – and also the 
least researched – is that it is pleasurable (Mellou, 1993, p. 14). The young 
of all higher species indulge in frolicking, cavorting and pretend fighting 
with no apparent utilitarian objective (Garvey, 1990, p. 3). Children engage 
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in play for the sheer enjoyment and/or excitement it brings (Huizinga, 1977, 
p. 675; Moyles, 1989, p. 7; Sutton-Smith, 1980, p. 11). Play and pleasure 
can be seen to be linked in a variety of ways: the development of play 
parallels the development of smiling (Garvey, 1990, p. 170); play only 
occurs “in an atmosphere of familiarity, emotional reassurance, and lack of 
tension or danger” (Bruner, 1991, p. 256); and the child who is unhappy 
does not, of course, play (Garvey, 1990, p. 22). 
 
As previously mentioned, the enjoyment derived from playing can have 
significant motivational (and, ultimately, socialising) consequences. In the 
research by Sylva, Bruner and Genova (1976) discussed earlier, what was 
remarkable was not just the success of the pupils who had been merely 
asked to play with the clamps and the sticks, but the fact that they continued 
to enjoy the objects and play with them after the test had been completed. 
The element of “playfulness” overcame any notion of frustration and 
“giving up” – “the children, after all, were playing” (p. 16). Van Oers and 
Hannikainen (2001) hypothesise a similar reason for the children’s 
perseverance in their study of a teacher and four six-year-old children 
collaboratively composing a story: “It is probably the play element in the 
children’s work that constitutes a strong factor for these children to keep on 
working together,” (p. 107). Smith and Dutton (1979) likewise comment on 
the potency of play as an enhancer of motivated task-oriented activity (cited 
in Vandenberg, 1980, p. 58). For Vygotsky (1976), “playfulness” was a 
critical feature of play and of the socialisation of the child. He noted a 
fundamental paradox in play: in the first place, during play children adopt 
the line of least resistance – i.e. they are doing what they are doing because 
play is associated with pleasure. Simultaneously, however, the children are 
following the line of greatest resistance in that they are subordinating their 
own spontaneous, impulsive desires to the rules of joint pretend play: “Play 
continually creates demands on the child to act against immediate impulse” 
(1976, p. 548). As previously discussed in sections 3 and 4a of this 
Literature Review, the subordination of one’s own wishes to the imperatives 
of the group during sociodramatic play is surely significant in the successful 
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socialisation of the child – and it is the pleasure in play which, arguably, 
enables this to occur. 
 
v. Both are highly rule-orientated. 
In “The Rules of the Game of Marbles” (1976), Piaget notes how, from its 
first living moments, notions of regularity and order are brought to bear 
upon a baby. Meals, bed-time, the alternation of night and day, and so on, 
all “conspire to impress upon the baby” the predictability and “law-
governed” nature of life-as-it-is-lived: “From its earliest months the child is 
therefore bathed in an atmosphere of rules” (Piaget, 1976, pp. 430-1). And 
as we noted in the previous section, Piaget argues that the passing on of 
rules and certain accepted norms of behaviour is inextricably connected 
with the developing moral understanding of the child: “Consciousness of 
rules cannot be isolated from the moral life of the child as a whole” (1976, 
p. 430). In imposing certain regularities upon a baby, the parents are, 
thereby, imposing certain moral obligations (and, of course, cultural norms) 
upon it as well: in learning the rule that we do not throw food around the 
room, for instance, the infant is also learning to conform to a moral 
expectation (unlike the chimps in the zoo referred to above). As we 
observed in the section on Sociodramatic Play and Identity 
Construction/Emotional and Moral Development, moral growth cannot be 
isolated from other aspects of development. 
 
However, not only is real life highly rule-governed but so too, as Vygotsky 
noted, is play. Indeed, the more rigid and demanding the rules, the greater 
the pleasure potentially to be gained from the play: “Simply running around 
without purpose or rules is boring and does not appeal to children” (1978, p. 
103). In fact, Vygotsky goes even further than this and proposes that “there 
is no such thing as play without rules” (1978, p. 94). As Huizinga observes, 
“As soon as the rules are transgressed, the whole play-world collapses. The 
game is over” (1977, p. 678). Vygotsky gives two examples which 
substantiate this claim and which also underline the importance of rules to 
both play and development per se. When a young girl is playing with a doll 
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and imagines herself to be a mother to a child, she is, Vygotsky argues, 
obeying “the rules of maternal behaviour” (1978, p. 94). Similarly, when 
two sisters are playing at being two sisters, there is a vital difference 
between the pretence and the reality. In life, the sisters behave as their 
sister’s sister without thinking about it; in play, though, both girls are 
concerned with consciously displaying their sisterhood and adhere to those 
rules of behaviour which externally highlight this: “They dress alike, talk 
alike, in short, they enact whatever emphasises their relationship as sisters” 
(1978, p. 95). And through the observance, adherence and portrayal of such 
rules in active play, the girls’ understanding of what the concept of 
sisterhood means (previously only held implicitly) becomes conscious and 
explicit: “What passes unnoticed by the child in real life becomes a rule of 
behaviour in play” (1978, p. 95). Bruner and Sherwood (1976) in their study 
of “peekaboo” similarly emphasise the importance of rules and their 
observation to successful shared play: The child very soon becomes 
sensitive to the “rules of the game” as he [sic] plays it” (p. 27). However, 
Bruner and Sherwood also note that what is most is striking about the 
playing of peekaboo is not the slavish adherence to pre-determined rules but 
rather “the systematic introduction of variations constrained by set rules” 
(1976, p. 283). The child, then, is not only learning the basic rules of the 
game but, more crucially, the range of variation and development that is 
permissible within them. Piaget draws similar conclusions from observing 
the playing of marbles. Variation within a rule-governed pattern is what has 
led to the fact that “there is never one single way of playing marbles, there 
are quantities of ways” (1976, p. 414). Indeed, “variations occur from one 
generation to another” (p. 414). 
 
However, the importance of rules to play, their exploration and variation, 
would appear to be at odds with Garvey’s comments that: “Violation of the 
rules, norms or accepted procedures that shape and guide social behaviours 
can, under certain conditions, result in play. . . . some kind of rule has been 
violated or distorted in a playful performance” (1990, pp. 92 and 97). What 
appears to be at issue here is a question of semantics. Whilst Garvey refers 
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to the “violation” of rules in play, it is more likely to be the case (and my 
research tests this thesis) that it is the bending rather than the breaking of 
rules which is permissible in play. The experimental, exploratory nature of 
play allows boundaries to be safely tested and possibly stretched, it does not 
allow them to be breached: “The naked ape, even as an adult, is a playful 
ape. . . . He [sic] is constantly pushing things to their limit . . . without 
getting hurt” (Morris, 1967, p. 104). And one can think of many examples 
of adult game-playing which involve “pushing things to their limit”: 
gambling, for instance, involves emotional enjoyment being derived from 
danger and risk-taking (Bateson, 1976, p. 122). 
 
As detailed above, it is, of course, laughter (rather than play) which results 
when rules are actually broken (rather than bent). Thus, if I am playing a 
game of football and amaze my team-mates with a series of previously 
unseen, but legitimate, ball tricks, the game will continue. If, however, I 
pick the ball up and start running with it towards the opposition’s goal, my 
team-mates may laugh (or conversely be extremely angry) but the game 
cannot continue as the rules have been broken. In spite of the several 
parallels between sociodramatic play and humour, then, (they are both 
human, both social, both operate simultaneously on two planes of reality 
and both are pleasurable) there is also a, possibly significant, distinction 
between the two – one is concerned with the observance and variation of 
rules whilst the other is concerned with their violation and marking. Might 
this difference result in the two being inimical to one another? Can both 
sociodramatic play and humour occur simultaneously and in 
complementarity? My research endeavours to find this out. 
 
Relationship of Literature and Research Questions to Field Work 
In summary, my reading of the literature has encouraged me to delineate 
three particular (but overlapping) research questions: 
 
1. What types of development are nurtured through children’s 
sociodramatic play? 
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2. How do these aspects of development manifest themselves during 
sociodramatic play? 
3. How might these various types of development interrelate during 
sociodramatic play? 
 
My literature reading has, as previously noted, highlighted five interlocking 
areas of development for particular scrutiny and analysis; these are 
sociodramatic play and: (i) cognitive development; (ii) language 
development; (iii) perspective taking/social cognition; (iv) identity 
construction/emotional and moral development; and (v) humour/pleasure. In 
analysing and discussing the data, therefore, I have been especially 
observant for instances when, during sociodramatic play, any of these five 
areas of development appears to have been manifested and I have theorised 
about how play may (or may not) be helping to nurture these specific 
developmental areas as well as about potential connections between them. It 
would have been conceivable, of course, for my analysis to have adopted a 
more “grounded” approach and for me to have put these five pre-determined 
categories to one side whilst I combed the collected and collated 
information for data-driven categories concerning the value of 
sociodramatic play. However, it must be remembered that, in part at least, 
these five categories were already “data-driven” – I had initially expected to 
focus on the cognitive, linguistic, social and affective aspects of social 
pretend play but my pilot and subsequent research insisted upon raising 
issues concerned with identity construction, moral development, pleasure 
and humour. In essence, then, my field work as well as the literature has 
contributed to the formulation and the operationalisation of these five areas 
of development. 
71 
 CHAPTER 3 
FIELD WORK 
Research Methodology 
In order to describe and analyse sociodramatic play and the five areas of 
development outlined in the previous chapter, and to theorise about their 
possible inter-connections, arguably the most useful and relevant data I 
could hope to produce would be that which equates most closely to a 
naturalistic setting – that is, where the distorting effects of an outside 
observer are most openly acknowledged and minimised. Interestingly, 
however, many studies which I have encountered during my reading opted 
for an essentially experimental rather than ethnographic approach (for 
instance, Dansky and Silverman, 1976; Hickling, Wellman and Gottfried, 
1997; Hutt and Bhavnani, 1976; Mellou, 1981; Perlmutter and Pellegrini, 
1987; Tan-Niam, 1994, 1998). On closer inspection, the reasoning behind 
such methodological decision-making is perhaps not difficult to discern. 
Many of the aforementioned researchers are, essentially, psychologists 
interested in what are primarily cognitive aspects of pretend play. Thus, 
Dansky and Silverman (1976) and Hutt and Bhavnani (1976) opted for an 
experimental approach when investigating the effects of pretend play on 
creative thinking. Hickling, Wellman and Gottfried (1997) and Tan-Niam 
(1994, 1998) understandably decided upon an empirical methodology to 
research possible links between pretend play and perspective-taking 
abilities. Perlmutter and Pellegrini (1987) were interested in children’s 
linguistic progression and Mellou (1981) in cognitive development and 
object substitution: again, it is hardly surprising that these researchers chose 
to utilise essentially experimental, laboratory-based research methods. What 
we have in these examples, then, is a collection of psychologists adopting 
research methodologies which are, in all likelihood, the most familiar to 
them; which are, arguably, suited to the investigation of fundamentally 
psychological/cognitive aspects of pretend play; and which, as Dunn (1998, 
p. 102) points out, possess the intrinsic advantage of enabling more “clear-
cut” inferences to be made than might be the case with fundamentally 
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naturalistic data. However, the reasons which can be inferred behind the 
adoption of such experimental research methods are precisely the same 
reasons which led me to opt for a more naturalistic, ethnographic approach. 
I am not a psychologist and have no experience in conducting laboratory-
based research nor, indeed, in utilising statistical analysis to interrogate such 
data. What is more, I am not solely, nor even primarily, interested in the 
connections between sociodramatic play and fundamentally cognitive 
aspects of development. On the contrary, as my research progressed I 
became increasingly aware of and absorbed by the importance of the 
linkages between pretend play and: 
 
1. social factors (including: interaction with peers, adult intervention, 
environmental influences, object stimuli, rule-adherence); 
2. affective features of development (such as: motivation, caring, 
having fun); 
3. intrapersonal aspects (for example: self-concept, self-esteem, role-
modelling, morality). 
 
Consequently, Dunn’s arguments (1998, p. 102) regarding the benefits of 
attaining naturalistic data in research of this kind appeared particularly 
persuasive. In brief, she details three a priori advantages for unstructured 
observation, each of which can be directly linked to the three, “non-
psychological” areas of development listed above: in the first place, this 
kind of research potentially yields contextual information (such as those 
features noted in 1. above) which is not necessarily available in the 
laboratory; secondly, children can be studied in social settings which have 
real emotional significance for them (see 2. above) rather than the 
potentially unfamiliar surroundings of a “psychological workroom”; and 
finally, ethnographic research allows us to study the comments and 
behaviours generated by the children themselves rather than those imposed 
by an adult psychologist (see 1., 2. and 3. above). My field work, therefore, 
adopted an ethnographic approach (that is, “the observational study of small 
groups of people within society” [ Open University, 1991, p. 6]) and, as well 
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as utilising observation, employed the taking of field-notes, audio- and 
video-recording of children’s play and its transcription, the keeping of a 
“research diary”, and post-observation semi-structured interviews with the 
class teachers and relevant children in an attempt to triangulate and validate 
the data. Each of these strands of my chosen methodology (and their various 
implications, ramifications and, where applicable, associated problems) is 
discussed during the remainder of this chapter. 
 
Sampling 
It almost goes without saying that a variety of factors informed my sampling 
decisions with regard both to the schools I selected for visiting and also the 
children chosen to participate in my research. In the interests of reliability 
and validity, the selected samples necessarily had to be characteristic and 
representative of the population as a whole (Greig and Taylor, 1999, p. 59). 
On the other hand, the size of my sample could not be too large given the 
logistical constraints – such as limited time – of this research (Bell, 1993, 
pp. 82-3). In attempting to select a sample which was neither unmanageable 
nor unrepresentative, therefore, I decided to choose schools with a 
significantly white European catchment. This is not to infer that cross-
cultural issues are irrelevant to research concerning the value of 
sociodramatic play, but rather that to extend the scope of this work to 
include such matters would have been straining its feasibility. However, I 
did decide to include schools with differing socio-economic catchments. 
The hope here was that, should social class show itself to be a significant 
issue, then I might be able to deal with it in a reasonably thorough way 
without over-taxing the limits of this study. I selected, therefore, a total of 
three schools, with different socio-economic catchment areas, in the belief 
that this number would be both manageable as well as sufficiently 
representative. Also with regard to attempting to make my sample as 
characteristic as possible of the population as a whole, I decided to use 
equal numbers of both boys and girls and to draw them from across the 
“academic ability” range. Once again with concern for feasibility, I chose to 
focus upon eight children in each school, thus giving me a total research 
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population of 24 children – hopefully, this was neither too small to be 
unrepresentative nor too large to be unachievable. 
 
However, it was not purely considerations of representativeness which 
affected my sampling decisions. I was also concerned that my data 
collection should yield sufficient opportunities for accruing usable material 
and I therefore selected schools where I knew the reception class teacher(s) 
to place a strong emphasis on the educational utility of pretend play. The 
preparatory meetings which I held with each of the three headteachers also 
confirmed the notion that all these schools were ideologically committed to 
the benefits of play for young children and each headteacher bemoaned the 
relative lack of curricular time for such activity. In this light, my sampling 
strategy can be regarded as being “purposive” or “judgemental” in that I 
used my judgement to ensure that the sample was selected on the basis of 
the information required (Greig and Taylor, 1999, p. 59). After all, there 
seemed to be hardly any point in spending time in schools where little or no 
sociodramatic play actually occurred. 
 
The result of all these aforementioned considerations was the choosing of 
three schools within my locality which I shall term, following Shakespeare’s 
lead and for reasons of anonymity, “Agincourt”, “Elsinor” and “Harfleur”. 
The data collection for the first phase of my research was carried out during 
November 2000 (week beginning Monday, 13th) at Elsinor Primary School; 
the second phase was conducted at Agincourt Primary School during March 
2002 (week beginning Monday, 18th); and the third phase at Harfleur 
Primary School during October and November 2002 (week beginning 
Monday, 28th October). 
 
As stated, my original intention was to observe, record, transcribe and 
analyse the sociodramatic play of eight reception class children in each 
school. In Elsinor Primary School, however, one selected child was actually 
absent during the three days of recording, and in Agincourt Primary School 
one selected child refused to participate, thus leaving me with seven 
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children as the subjects of my study in each of these cases. In an attempt to 
redress somewhat this slight “shortfall”, I recorded and observed nine 
reception class children in Harfleur; consequently, my total research 
population was 23 four- and five-year-old children. Social pretend play is 
highly prevalent during this age-range (Goncu, 1998, p. 121; Smith, 1977, p. 
126) and thus – especially in the light of my earlier comments regarding the 
emphasis these particular teachers placed on pretend play – I hoped that the 
chances of my obtaining sufficient relevant data would be optimised. I 
further endeavoured to increase the likelihood of acquiring usable material 
by recording the children in pairs and during free play within symmetrical 
relationships (that is, free play with peers as opposed to play incorporating 
direct adult intervention [Open University, 1999, p. 92]) as Moyles had 
found that: “Richer and more varied verbal communication occurred 
between peers, particularly in pairs . . . in free play activity compared with 
directed activity” (1989, p. 141). Smith similarly found that dyadic play (as 
opposed to larger social groupings) was the most common arrangement 
whether participants were as young as two and a half or as old as five (1977, 
pp. 126-7). Goncu and Kessel also divided their sample “into same-age and 
same-sex dyads, the members of each dyad being friends with one another” 
(1984, p. 15). Although I did not specifically ask the teachers to select 
pairings of children who were friends, when I sought the teachers’ 
assistance as to which pair of children should next be given the radio mics 
(as I did on every occasion), the teachers without exception chose two 
children whom they believed would be likely to play co-operatively 
together. Indeed, when I interviewed the teachers at Harfleur on this point, 
they explicitly stated their belief that friendship was one of the important 
factors enabling the children to play successfully in concert: 
 
Mr Meakin  Ms. “Britten”  Ms. “Swift” 
1. Have you any theories 
2. as to why you think 
3. the children in this 
4. school appear to play 
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5. so well together? 
6. A lot of them know 
7. each other, don’t they. 
8. From nursery and 
9. from playgroup 
10. friendships have 
11. been formed. 
 
Furthermore, taking a lead from Perlmutter and Pellegrini (1987) and again 
with the class teacher’s assistance, I endeavoured in each school to ensure 
that the play materials available would help stimulate and facilitate 
sociodramatic play for both boys and girls. In Elsinor Primary School, this 
consideration led to areas being set up to encourage: school play, parent 
play and birthday party play. In Agincourt, the restaurant corner – a semi-
permanent feature of the classroom – was deemed to be the most 
appropriate area for our purposes. And in Harfleur, several different parts of 
the atrium were available for sociodramatic play. Interestingly, however, the 
props and costumes at hand in Harfleur were ultimately seen to possess 
something of a gender bias. The need for three boys to transform vacuum 
cleaners into fire engines (again, this shall be discussed in more detail in due 
course) prompted me to question Harfleur’s reception teachers as to whether 
there were sufficient toys available to promote the kinds of play favoured by 
boys. All teachers were adamant that “violent” play should not be 
encouraged but they did, on reflection, state that more “boy-friendly” props 
should be considered for the play areas. During my time in Harfleur, only 
two fire-fighters’ helmets and a few replica tools fell directly into this 
category: 
 
Ms. Britten   Ms. Swift 
1. I mean I was shocked actually . . .  
2. ‘cause we thought we were quite 
3. equal, didn’t we? We thought 
4. we’d got things out here that were, 
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5. like, equal opportunities. We 
6. thought we’d got equal for boys 
7. and girls. 
8.      We thought ‘cause there’s a 
9.       toolkit. 
10. This has made us think actually, 
11. hasn’t it? 
 
Clearly, in the light of these observations, early years practitioners may well 
be advised to give close consideration to the toys, props and costumes 
available in their play areas and to ensure that sufficient materials are 
available to stimulate pretence amongst both girls and boys. Indeed, 
teachers in Bennett et al’s study explicitly noted the need to ensure “there’s 
a balance and a variety in all the activities that are on offer” (1997, p. 37). 
 
With further regard to issues surrounding the notion of sampling in research, 
the selected children were proposed by the class teacher (a “key informant” 
– Ball, 1993, p. 40) after I had asked for the following (and aforementioned) 
considerations to be borne in mind: (i) the children were to consist of four 
boys and four girls; and (ii) they would reflect a wide academic ability 
range. As the children in each school were all in the reception class, there 
was necessarily not an age range greater than twelve months. Needless to 
say, I still had to be constantly aware of bias creeping into my research as a 
result of sampling decisions (Ball, 1993, p. 40) including the possibility that 
the children might not be as representative of the population as a whole as I 
had originally intended. It is notable that parental permission was refused 
for two of the selected children in Agincourt School (and two more children, 
therefore, had to be chosen by the reception class teachers) and in Harfleur 
permission was only granted for one particular child on condition that a 
member of the school staff was present throughout. This might indicate 
methodological, and ethical, difficulties for much future educational 
research, especially in the light of certain recent tragic events nationally as 
well as initiatives such as more stringent Criminal Records Bureau vetting. 
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Another consequence of allowing the class teachers to take prime 
responsibility for sampling decisions as well as deciding the pairs of 
children to be “miced together” at any one time, was that in Elsinor Primary 
School, Ms. “Parr” (as she later informed me during the semi-structured 
interview with her) independently decided to include a child (“Colin”) in her 
sample who, whilst “academically bright”, did not find it easy to engage in 
sociodramatic play. Furthermore, she chose to pair him with the more 
outgoing “Edward” – some of the consequences of this decision will be 
discussed later. 
 
In continuing the discussion regarding the sampling decisions I made and 
the reasons underpinning them, some detail must now be given concerning 
the nature of the three schools I ultimately decided to use for my study. 
Particular reference will be made to their ideologies regarding play and the 
provision of play opportunities. 
 
Elsinor 
The first of these, Elsinor Primary School, is a school with a semi-rural 
location but quite a broad socio-economic catchment. The ethnic 
composition of the school is almost exclusively white European. There are 
just over 200 pupils in Elsinor of which, during the time of my field work 
there, 16 were in the reception class – the class where I conducted my 
research. The recordings were made on three consecutive afternoons in 
November 2000, although I was present throughout the day on each 
occasion and thereby able to observe – and participate in – the more formal 
curricular activities taking place each morning. The reception class teacher 
in Elsinor – Ms. Parr – had stated on previous occasions to me her opinion 
of the importance of social pretend play and she was keen to make every 
effort to facilitate and encourage such activity during afternoon sessions. 
Consequently, Ms. Parr had a whole “store” of boxes containing different 
props and costumes designed to stimulate themed pretence and she would 
frequently vary which boxes were placed out on tables in order to help 
prevent the children becoming bored with the same old paraphernalia. These 
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boxes had such titles as “School”, “Hospital”, “Birthday Party”, “Garage”, 
“Cookery”, and so on. However, during my pilot research at this school in 
1999, I had focussed my recording and observation solely upon one area of 
the classroom – “The Home Corner” – which was a permanent feature of the 
layout of the room and contained a variety of props, furniture and dressing-
up clothes. In choosing to use this single area, I had been able to secrete 
myself away alongside the mixing equipment, “eavesdrop” on headphones 
the children’s conversation and observe their activity without being too 
conspicuous a presence to the children themselves. Whilst the Home Corner 
had proved successful in stimulating prolonged pretend activity during my 
pilot research, it had also, unsurprisingly, encouraged pretence along a 
broadly similar theme – which could be called something like 
“domesticity”. I had intended to adopt the same procedure – this time armed 
with a video camera as well as radio mics – during my second phase of 
research in Elsinor. However, when I arrived at the school on the first 
morning of recording, I was informed that the Home Corner was “out of 
bounds” as one of its windows had been broken. This forced me, of course, 
to focus my attention (and the video camera) on the tables where various 
play boxes were set out. Fortuitously, as it transpired, this resulted in my 
being able to record what was possibly a greater variety of themed play than 
might otherwise have been the case. Perhaps there is a lesson here for early-
years teachers concerning the desirability of providing a breadth and 
frequently-changing assortment of play stimuli in order to try to appeal to 
all children (of both genders), to broaden their range of play references and 
to help prevent the danger of boredom setting in. 
 
Agincourt 
The second school, Agincourt Primary, is a similar size to Elsinor, it too has 
a mainly white European composition, but the vast majority of its pupils – 
as it is located on a council housing estate – are from a working-class 
background. Although social class was not initially intended to be a 
consideration within the remit of my research, I believed that, as detailed 
above, should my data determine that it was both necessary and feasible to 
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pursue this line of inquiry, then the topic of social class could be 
accommodated within my study. Indeed, certain readings around the subject 
had already raised the possible importance of socio-economic factors to 
social pretend play and had actually led me to fear that obtaining relevant 
data might well be more problematic in Agincourt Primary School (because 
of its far higher ratio of working-class children) than in Elsinor. Smith’s 
research (1977, p. 140), for instance, noted how children from working-
class backgrounds showed less sociodramatic play than middle-class 
children and Smith et al (1998, p. 191) cite several studies which have 
suggested that children from “disadvantaged” homes exhibit less frequent 
and less complex fantasy play than their middle-class counterparts. Children 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds probably also receive less 
encouragement from their parents to engage in sociodramatic play (Smith, 
1988, p. 193). But perhaps it was not solely issues of social class which led 
to my being able to record far fewer amounts of successful sociodramatic 
play at Agincourt than at either Elsinor or Harfleur. As previously alluded 
to, there was only one area of Agincourt’s classroom which was explicitly 
“geared up” for sociodramatic play: namely, the restaurant corner. Whilst 
this area was reasonably well-equipped with a variety of play props and play 
materials, its ever-present nature might possibly have meant that it lacked a 
certain degree of novel stimulation for the children. Also, it was very much 
a part of the classroom as a whole, bordered off only by the arrangement of 
some of the furniture. Consequently, distractions from activities progressing 
in other parts of the classroom were various and frequent. Moreover, 
although there was a class rule stating that no more than four children were 
allowed in the area at any one time (and a sign saying as much), I frequently 
observed children circumventing this rule and accessing the play area – 
normally to the annoyance (and distraction) of those children already in the 
restaurant corner. Once again, possible lessons for the facilitation of 
sociodramatic play in reception classrooms might be evident here. What 
constraints do we need to place upon children in order to try and ensure that 
they themselves are able to play freely without causing a negative effect 
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upon the play of others? How “exclusive”, and how varying and various, do 
the play areas ideally need to be? 
 
Harfleur 
My third and final primary school – Harfleur – is approximately twice the 
size of the other two with over four hundred children on role. Like Elsinor 
and Agincourt, it has a predominantly white, European, middle-class 
catchment. Due to its size, Harfleur possesses three reception classes and 
my sample of children, with input from all three reception teachers, was 
drawn from across all three groupings. The three reception classrooms in 
Harfleur are all connected by an atrium in which most of the children’s 
pretend play activities occur and which afforded me near-ideal 
circumstances for recording purposes. The atrium facility meant that the 
children could play with little or no distraction from peers engaged in other 
activities and the generous and varying amounts of free space allowed me to 
“secrete” myself and my recording equipment away from the children’s 
main play areas whilst still being able to observe their activities in a 
relatively unobtrusive manner. The atrium, in other words, appeared to offer 
me an almost perfect combination of the naturalistic and experimental 
environments – the children were able to engage in a variety of dyadic play 
activities, in their accustomed school surroundings, whilst I was able to note 
and record their play without, for the most part, extraneous noise and 
interruption from other children. It is perhaps hardly surprising then, given 
the relative lack of distraction in Harfleur’s atrium and its range of assorted 
play areas, that the children here were generally able to engage more 
immediately and in a more sustained manner in sociodramatic play than in 
either of my other two schools. There might well be a lesson here for 
teachers whose children experience difficulties in engaging in social pretend 
play – a more “private” and multi-featured environment with fewer 
extraneous diversions (should one be able to be sourced) might be one way 
of improving the quality and the quantity of play, as well as other initiatives 
which I shall come to anon. Interestingly, the few occasions when there 
were extraneous distractions in Harfleur – such as other children walking 
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through the atrium or myself altering the camera position – almost always 
interrupted the children’s play momentarily until the distraction passed and 
play could be resumed. It is at least worth noting at this point that Umek and 
Musek in their study of the effects of the environment on children’s fantasy 
play concluded that “the level and complexity” of symbolic play are 
affected by both play materials and play context (2001, p. 55). In light of 
this and the findings of my own research, therefore, early-years practitioners 
may well be advised to give detailed consideration to the play environments 
they provide for their children – including the contents therein and its 
variety and novelty, as well as potential distractions from other activities – if 
they are to optimise the nature and quality of their children’s social pretend 
play. 
 
As previously stated, and in the interests of reliability, I had no intention of 
using the data collected on my first day of recording in each school. 
However, my initial tapes and observations in Agincourt Primary School 
confirmed my fears that sociodramatic play might well be less prevalent in 
this school than in Elsinor or Harfleur. The video camera had been set up in 
the Agincourt classroom next to the previously-mentioned “restaurant”. The 
reception class teachers (there were two in Agincourt – Ms. “Pollard” and 
Ms. “Murphy” – as they were on a “job share”) had identified this area as 
the most conducive to sociodramatic play on a previous visit of mine to the 
school. However, of the near one hour of recordings made on the first day, 
no instances of sustained sociodramatic play were observed. One child – 
“Craig” – was noted as making repeated attempts to engage others in shared 
pretence over a nine-minute period but none was successful. The recordings 
made on the second and third days of my data collection (that is, the 
recordings which I would actually be analysing) confirmed my fears. Only 
one instance of sustained shared pretence (i.e. lasting more than three 
“turns”) within symmetrical relationships was documented and this lasted 
less than three minutes. This play involved three children – “Angie”, 
“Mary” and “Craig” plus, very intermittently, “Jack” – and I have termed it 
the Bonfire Night and Frightened Doggy episode. For ease of reference, 
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each episode of sustained sociodramatic play which I recorded in each 
school has been given its own “play-title”. It is hoped that this might assist 
the reader in keeping track of the discussions across a range of play 
episodes. In passing, I have deemed an “episode” of sociodramatic play – to 
refer back to the definition given earlier – to be an instance of pretend play 
between two or more children where a mutual focus is attained and where 
characters and story-line are developed in a complementary, co-operative 
manner. As previously noted, I have used a minimum length of three “turns” 
in the belief that any exchange briefer than this cannot really be held to 
denote a joint development of either character or story-line. I have regarded 
the conclusion of an episode as being the time when mutual focus, for 
whatever reason, is abandoned and conjoined attempts to continue the plot 
and characterisations are ended. 
 
But to return to the discussion about the effects of my sampling decisions 
upon the quantities of usable material acquired. Unlike the dearth of 
relevant data I was able to collect in Agincourt, of the near three hours of 
recording I made in Elsinor Primary School, three passages of sustained 
sociodramatic play (totalling some twenty-four minutes) were obtained. In 
other words, although the recording periods at Elsinor were nearly twice as 
long in total as those at Agincourt, they actually exhibited more than eight 
times the duration of sustained shared pretence within symmetrical 
relationships. The passages of sociodramatic play at Elsinor involved a total 
of only four of the children I observed and were: 
 
1. “Edward” and “Colin” playing at School. 
2. “Andrea” and “Lizzy” playing at School and sporadically joined by 
Edward and Colin. 
3. Lizzy and Colin playing at Parents. 
 
As will be discussed in the next section, examples were manifested within 
these three play passages of all five areas of development which I wished to 
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analyse. The same cannot be said about the one sustained play passage I 
recorded at Agincourt. 
 
My work in Harfleur Primary School – probably for the aforementioned 
reasons – was even more fruitful than in Elsinor. On the second and third 
days of my recording in this school I was able to capture four passages of 
sustained sociodramatic play totalling two hours and nine minutes – that is, 
the children were almost constantly engaged in shared pretend play during 
my entire recording period in Harfleur. On a pro rata basis, this is about six 
times more than I recorded in Elsinor and approximately forty eight times 
more than in Agincourt – surely this further underlines the beneficial impact 
which a favourable environment can have on the quantity of social pretend 
play, as well as providing additional emphasis to my earlier comments 
regarding children’s play and social class. The episodes in Harfleur were: 
 
1. “Alice” and “Zelda” playing at Poorly Baby Sister (36 minutes). 
2. “Jock” and “Larry” playing at Pizzas and Fires (23 minutes). 
3. Jock and “Jim” playing at Eating, Fire-fighting and Shopping (32 
minutes). 
4. “Rebecca” and “Kathy” playing at Mummy and Big Sister (38 
minutes). 
 
The three schools involved in this study, then, were chosen to include a 
level of consistency and also a degree of variety in the circumstances 
encountered. I specifically did not conduct field work in either a single-sex 
school or a school with a highly varied ethnic composition as issues such as 
gender and cross-cultural comparisons were considered to be beyond the 
scope of my research. The choosing of schools with different social 
catchments did result in some consideration having to be given to pretend 
play and social class. In a completely unforeseen manner – as shall be 
discussed in due course – this topic also resulted in time and attention being 
devoted to the problematic area of children’s play and teacher intervention. 
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Another occasion, notice, when my field work has encouraged me to 
reconsider my theoretical perspective and to further my background reading. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
In order to retain the assured anonymity of everyone involved in this 
research, all names used are, of course, fictional. Furthermore, in order to 
ensure that adequate and appropriate information was given to all concerned 
and that acceptable procedures were followed, the data collection in each 
school was preceded by: (i) my obtaining permission to conduct the research 
from the respective headteachers, reception class teachers and governors of 
the school, as well as giving them detailed information about the nature and 
perceived importance of my research; (ii) discussions with the reception 
class teachers to select the particular children I would focus upon in my 
study (see below); (iii) written permission from the respective 
parents/guardians to work with their children as the subjects for my 
research; (iv) a series of visits to the school in general and to the reception 
class in particular in order to begin to make myself a “familiar face” to the 
children (see Appendix A for examples of some of these written 
communications). Throughout these preparatory communications I was 
careful not “to minimise nor indeed exaggerate the demands that [were] to 
be made in terms of time, effort, or stress on subjects” (Dockrell, 1996, p. 
62). 
 
During my time in each school I endeavoured to find ways to “give” as well 
as to “take” – a very important ethical consideration when conducting 
research within a school (Stenhouse, 1996). My involvement in each school 
meant a not-inconsiderable increase in the workload of a number of already 
busy people. Headteachers, teachers and non-teaching staff all afforded me 
significant amounts of their time in discussions before, during and after my 
data collection. Ethically, therefore, it seemed only fair that I should offer 
my services wherever and whenever they seemed most appropriate. As a 
result, I frequently found myself leading small groups of children in a whole 
range of classroom activities including word games, story-telling exercises, 
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practical mathematics tasks, and so on. A fortuitous off-shoot of such first-
hand involvement with the children was that my presence became ever more 
familiar to them and the distorting effects of my being there appeared to be 
progressively reduced. Indeed, by the third day of data collection in all 
schools the children did appear to have become accustomed to me as “part 
of the furniture”. In a further effort to give as well as take, I have also 
offered to lead INSET sessions focussing upon my research in each school. 
 
With continued regard to ethical considerations, it seemed necessary to 
ensure that my findings were fed back to the relevant people and all 
concerned have been given the opportunity to read my report. Following the 
data collection, I wrote once again to those involved (reception class 
teachers, headteachers, governors, parents/guardians and children) to thank 
them for their co-operation (see Appendix A). 
 
Reflexivity 
My research strategy also attempted to pay continuous attention to the 
notion of “reflexivity” – the idea that research design and theory making are 
ongoing and transactional, the one constantly influencing and possibly 
adjusting the other (Ball, 1993). Perhaps the most conspicuous example of 
reflexivity throughout the entire research process can be seen in the fact that 
the project was originally entitled Sociodramatic Play and Children’s 
Cognitive Development. I did not have to progress very far with the reading 
for my Literature Review in order to realise that the cognitive aspects of 
children’s pretend play – along with the social – had already received 
relatively large amounts of attention and research. My practical field work, 
consequently, endeavoured to adopt a broader – and, hopefully, more 
comprehensive – approach than many I had encountered in theory. In direct 
connection with this important feature of reflexivity, my research was, 
necessarily, open-ended and any theorising I attempted had to be 
“grounded” in the material that was exposed (Measor and Woods, 1991, p. 
60). Thus, as previously discussed, although I encountered little or no 
reference to the area of pretend play and humour during my reading, my 
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field work – from as early as my pilot project in 1999 – made apparent the 
potential significance of this domain for my resultant theorising. 
Throughout my work, therefore, theory and practice were not viewed as 
oppositional to each other nor as being separate. Rather, in accordance with 
the Aristotelian notion of praxis (Carr, 1993), the two were seen as 
inextricably interlinked and constantly helping to refine and re-define one 
another. 
 
Self-reflection 
Whether or not my chosen method of observation could be classed as 
“participant” or not is a moot point. Research is, of course, inevitably both a 
“distortion” of the world under observation (Lacey, 1993, p. 125) as well as 
a “construction” of a particular representation of that world (Eisner, 1993). 
The researcher can never be the anecdotal “fly-on-the-wall” (Open 
University, 1996, p. 96) and, consequently, “the claim that non-participant 
observation has been achieved in ethnographic fieldwork is suspect” (Ball, 
1993, p. 34). Therefore, although I did not actively participate in the 
children’s sociodramatic play, my very presence in the classroom must, to 
an extent, be deemed to have been participatory and hence to have had a 
distorting effect on the data collected. However, I attempted to minimise the 
distortion thus caused through a number of strategies: 
 
1. I made several visits to each school and its reception class before 
actually beginning formal observations and recordings in an attempt to 
become, as far as possible, “part of the furniture”. I also strove to be 
aware of being “tainted by the entry process” (Ball, 1993, p. 34) and of 
being seen by the pupils as another “teacher”, thereby potentially having 
a constraining effect on their play activities. I endeavoured to build 
warm and constructive relationships with the children in order that they 
might feel as comfortable as possible in my presence. Predictably 
perhaps, the more time I spent with the children, the less they seemed to 
regard me as a source of novelty and interest: for example, during the 
first periods of my involvement in their classroom they would frequently 
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turn round and look at me to assess my response to something the 
teacher had said or done. After a relatively short time, however, they 
appeared far less distracted by my presence. In like manner, I sought to 
develop professional and trusting relationships with the adults connected 
with the school – especially the class teachers, the E.C.O.’s and any 
adult helpers who worked in each reception class (Open University, 
1996, p. 68). 
2. I have not used any data collected during my first day of recording and 
observation (a strategy employed by Tizard and Hughes, 1991) as the 
“novelty factor” may well have had its greatest distorting effect during 
this session. 
3. I recorded the children using a video camera discreetly placed a short 
distance away from the play areas and also “radio mics” (again, 
following the lead given by Tizard and Hughes, 1991) which were 
relatively unobtrusive and which allowed me to gain high-quality audio-
recordings. I was fortunate in being able to borrow all recording 
equipment from my place of work. Like Tizard and Hughes (1991), I 
attached the mics and their power packs to the children using special 
“harnesses”. Inevitably, perhaps, the microphones and harnesses were 
initially a source of great fascination to the children. I gradually 
discovered, however, that the more transparent and explicit I was with 
the children about the equipment, then the more quickly they appeared 
to forget about it. Eventually, I adopted a regular procedure whereby, 
once both children had had their mics fitted, one would go to the far end 
of the room and whisper the other’s name into the microphone. The 
second child, meanwhile, would “eavesdrop” this greeting some 
distance away using my headphones. This transparency appeared to 
assist the children in readily accepting the recording equipment and 
may, of course, have methodological implications for future research. 
Indeed, in Harfleur, two of the boys became so accustomed to their 
microphones that they started to utilise them in their play and attributed 
them with a fictitious function – they became the “walkie-talkies” which 
fire-fighters use to communicate with each other. 
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However, alongside these various attempts to make me an “insider” (at least 
from the pupils’ perspectives) I also endeavoured to retain and sustain the 
objectivity and neutrality of an “outsider” so that the complementary 
advantages of both approaches might be achieved (Bird, 1996, p. 30). I 
constantly attempted to make “anthropologically strange” the familiar 
setting and its taken-for-granted features (Measor and Woods, 1991, p. 70) 
by consciously “stepping outside” of the immediate situation during both 
observation and analysis, and endeavouring to assess what was happening as 
if “I were seeing it for the first time”. 
 
Field Notes 
I also took field notes during my school visits although I was aware that 
these were, inevitably, not as comprehensive as I would ideally wish. The 
observer’s pen-and-paper cannot hope to reproduce anything like the vast 
amounts of recorded information provided by the video camera (Simco and 
Warin, 1997, p. 663). Moreover, I was aware of the fact that non-verbal 
forms of communication are difficult to record in writing and yet may have 
significance for data analysis (Measor and Woods, 1991, p. 73) – hence one 
of the reasons for using a video camera which I did not do during my pilot 
research in 1999. Illustrative examples of my Field Notes, along with the 
coding conventions employed, are included in Appendix B. 
 
Transcription 
Perhaps the greatest potential problem associated with the recording of the 
children’s dialogue (apart from the manner of the recording which has 
already been discussed) is the onerous burden associated with transcription 
(Open University, 1996, p. 94). I was wary of initially collecting too much 
material as this could simply weigh me down with transcribing data and 
thereby prevent me from moving on to the critical analysis of the 
information. Nearly three hours of recording was made on the second and 
third days in Elsinor, half that amount (ninety minutes) was collected in 
Agincourt, and just over two hours and ten minutes in Harfleur, due to the 
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schools’ differing time-tabling arrangements. This made a total of just over 
six and a half hours of recordings not including, of course, those made on 
the first day of data collection in each school. With the data collected in my 
first two schools, I transcribed in full all instances of the children engaging 
in social pretend play as I suspected that this may well reveal elements 
which I had previously not thoroughly considered. An example of such a 
revelation was the apparent “seriousness” and concomitant lack of humour 
which the children’s sociodramatic play exhibited during my lengthy 
periods of transcription. By the time I came to transcribe the recorded data 
from my third and final school (Harfleur), however, my theorising had 
become far more finely tuned and I was, consequently, able to be rather 
more selective in choosing appropriate passages for transcription. Once 
again, this process of gradually greater selectivity in transcription might 
provide guidance for future research. 
 
Co-ordinating the audio and video playbacks in a synchronised manner 
proved slightly problematical as the “counter-speeds” of the two pieces of 
recording equipment did not cohere. Consequently, on each occasion I 
would have to decide upon a particular moment from which to start both 
recorded playbacks simultaneously. The situation became even more 
awkward as the video playback was fractionally slower than the audio one. 
As a result, I would regularly have to pause the audio playback for a short 
moment whilst the video playback “caught up”. Needless to say, the actual 
process of transcription entailed thousands of pressings of the respective 
pause buttons whilst I wrote out and examined the data in detail. Illustrative 
examples of my transcriptions of the semi-structured interviews, along with 
the coding conventions I employed, are included in Appendix C and of the 
children’s sociodramatic play in Appendix D. 
 
Research Diary 
The keeping of a research diary may not initially strike one as being a 
priority, but if methodological rigour were to be sustained then a continuous 
reflexive account of “the processes, problems, choices and errors which 
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describe the fieldwork upon which the substantive account is based” may 
well prove to have been indispensable (Ball, 1993, p.46). By regularly 
adding to this particular research instrument, revisiting various entries, 
reconsidering previous problems, and re-thinking former observations and 
questions, the research diary has, hopefully, assisted in achieving both 
reflectivity and objectivity, as well as, of course, ultimately providing 
further informative data (Open University, 1996, p. 94). An illustrative 
example of a page from my research diary has been included as Appendix E. 
 
Post-Observation Semi-Structured Interviews/Triangulation 
It was also the intention that the semi-structured interviews with the class 
teachers and the relevant pupils would prove a successful means of 
triangulation – of using more than one method to explore and investigate 
certain areas – to help validate the data arising out of the observations and 
field notes (Open University, 1996, p. 97). These interviews would operate, 
in other words, as a form of “respondent validation” (Open University, 
1996, p. 96). However, although the semi-structured interviews with the 
class teachers were lengthy and, arguably, yielded useful information such 
as the previously-mentioned comments concerning the gender-
appropriateness of certain toys in Harfleur, the interviews with the children 
initially proved highly problematic and were, in my first two schools at 
least, of dubious value. In essence, the questions I had originally prepared 
seemed to make little sense to the children (even though they were refined 
for my second phase of data collection in the light of the experience gained 
at Elsinor) and reflection upon their play activities seemed to be a very alien 
concept to the children. For instance, a question such as, “Do you enjoy 
playing on your own or with friends?” would tend to be answered by, “With 
my friends.” But when I then asked why this was, the children seemed to 
founder for a suitable response. In the light of the recurring difficulty which 
the children appeared to encounter in understanding the point and the 
meaning of quite general, play-related inquiries, the questions were altered 
for the interviews in Harfleur to include only those which referred 
specifically to the children’s recorded play. Consequently, the children were 
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able to progress from reflection upon particular aspects of their play to more 
general contemplation about their activities. The questions also were 
adjusted to align much more closely with the five areas of development 
under investigation (see Appendix C for examples of both an earlier and also 
the final version of my question sheet). The upshot of these amendments 
was that the children in Harfleur seemed to experience much greater facility 
in discussing their pretend play and, arguably, much more useful data was 
thereby obtained. For instance, they were able to talk about features of the 
characters they had recently portrayed and their relationships with other 
characters in the scenario as well as discussing particular aspects of story-
lines. Thus – as shall be discussed in the Language Development section of 
Chapter 4 – Alice in Harfleur was able, during the interview, to proffer the 
information that certain phrases she used to help comfort her “poorly baby 
sister” were, in fact, drawn directly from her grandmother’s linguistic 
repertoire. Similarly, and with specific regard to issues of triangulation, the 
children were able to confirm (or not) that my interpretation of what I had 
witnessed was, indeed, correct. For example, Rebecca and Kathy in Harfleur 
were not only able to substantiate my interpretation of the content of their 
play, but were even able to offer further clarification on one or two features 
of their Mummy and Big Sister episode: 
 
 Mr Meakin   Rebecca   Kathy 
1. Now let me get this right 
2. Kathy was the mum? Is 
3. that right? And Rebecca 
4. was . . . 
5. big sister. 
6. The sister. Did you have 
7. other sisters in the play 
8. then? 
9. No. There’s only 
10. sisters over there 
11. [Pointing to 
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12. where their 
13. imaginary 
14. “house” had 
15. been] 
16. We’ve only got 
17. one boy and two 
18. girls. 
19. But Rebecca you were 
20. the oldest of the children 
21. were you? 
22. [Nods head] 
23. How old were you? 
24. Five. 
25. Five. Same as you. 
26. That’s my proper 
27. age. 
28. And what age were you 
29. in the play? 
30. Erm. Six. 
31. Six? Is that right, 
32. Rebecca? 
33. Yes. 
34. And was nana ill? 
35. Yes. 
36. Did you go and visit 
37. nana? 
38. Yes. 
39. Yes. 
40. Oh and took her some 
41. flowers? 
42. These flowers. 
43. Where was nana? 
44. At hospital. 
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45. And where was the 
46. hospital? Over here 
47. was it? 
48. No. 
 
From these specific observations, the children then seemed able to make 
more general comments about their play, including favourite characters, 
favourite playmates, play at home and in the playground, and so on. For 
instance – as shall be detailed in the Moral Development section of Chapter 
4 – Paulo and Jeff were able to discuss their preference for portraying 
“goodies” rather than “baddies”. Likewise, in the Mummy and Big Sister 
episode just referred to, Kathy could detail something about the pleasure 
gained from caring for a poorly sister: 
 
 Mr Meakin    Kathy 
1. Kathy, did you enjoy looking 
2. after big sister? 
3. Yes. 
4. Why did you enjoy that? 
5. Because we had dinner. 
6. And I cooked for her. 
7. And did she eat it all up? 
8. Yes. And I helped 
9. to make her better. 
 
This progression in my refined interviewing structure from the specific to 
the more general is diametrically at odds with that advocated by Wilson and 
Powell (2001). When interviewing children, they recommend a “funnel” 
approach whereby the interviewer begins with the most open-ended 
questions and then progresses to the more specific (p. 45). The discrepancy 
in the advice given by Wilson and Powell and that which I found to be most 
effective may be because Wilson and Powell are offering their advice to 
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people such as counsellors, lawyers, the police and social workers who, 
clearly, have very different concerns to mine when interviewing children. 
 
With regard to the physical circumstances of these interviews, I initially 
endeavoured to carry them out “on the hoof”, as it were, grabbing some time 
with the children before taking off their radio mics. In Harfleur, however, I 
provided more time and space for the interviews, and supplied a suitably 
conducive environment for discussion, including placing my own eye-level 
at the same height as theirs. I was able to sit the children and myself on 
small chairs, whilst continuing to record them, and discuss their play with 
them without interruption from adults or other children. As a result, the 
environment for the interviews in Harfleur conformed precisely to that 
proposed by Wilson and Powell (2001, p. 29). Once again, there may be 
lessons here for future research. 
 
Data Analysis 
As mentioned previously, the compartmentalising of my work into five 
separate, but overlapping, areas of development has informed not only the 
structuring of my Literature Review but also the format of much of my data 
collection and analysis. For example, although the recording equipment was 
simply “left running” whilst the children played together (or not), my 
selection and investigation of the data was increasingly influenced by the 
aforementioned five developmental areas. As my analysis progressed from 
school to school, I became more and more likely to “home in” on those 
instances where sociodramatic play and one of the developmental areas in 
question appeared to be manifesting themselves. However, this process of 
increasing selectivity in my data analysis must not be held to imply, when a 
passage was chosen for its utility in exploring one of the five developmental 
domains, that other, complementary aspects of development were not also 
taking place. Take, for instance, the incident of Alice reading books to 
Zelda, her “poorly baby sister” - of which an extract from my Transcription 
Notes is provided in Appendix D, HPS, page 4. This passage, as shall be 
discussed in detail in section 2 of the next chapter, was primarily chosen for 
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detailed analysis and scrutiny because of the insights it provided into Alice’s 
burgeoning linguistic abilities, especially with regard to literary genres. 
However, and again as discussed in section 2 of Chapter 4, this must not be 
thought of as implying that other areas of development – such as the 
emotional, interpersonal and moral – were not also concurrently being 
reinforced and, arguably, furthered. The selection of certain passages of my 
data for greater analysis, in other words, was based principally on those 
passages’ ability to exemplify points arising out of the literature or, and 
increasingly so, because they were capable of extending the discussion 
concerning sociodramatic play and a particular area of development even 
further. To repeat myself, though, this must not be held to imply that 
particular types of development were progressing in isolation from others. 
Child development, of course, is a far too complex and multi-faceted field to 
allow the researcher such neat and tidy categorisations. Similarly – and 
again as already touched upon – my questioning in the semi-structured 
interviews with teachers and children alike became increasingly focussed 
upon the possible interconnections between social pretend play and the said 
five areas of development, especially as exhibited in the instances of 
sociodramatic play I had witnessed in the respective schools. This brief 
extract from my interview with the teachers in Harfleur displays them – and 
me – making connections between pretend play and social learning, problem 
solving and emotional development: 
 
Mr Meakin   Ms. Britten  Ms. Swift 
1. Zelda said she knows it’s 
2. wrong to laugh at people. 
3. Oh, our PSHE 
4. is coming through. 
5. That’s nice. 
6. So what’s the point of this 
7. kind of activity? 
8. The social behaviour. 
9. And to work out 
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10. situations. You 
11. know you can 
12. make it out into 
13. different things 
14. if a child’s going 
15. through 
16. something like 
17. going into hospital 
18. or something. 
19. And you get children 
20. coming in who are 
21. quiet as well and  
22. become totally 
23. different. 
24. Right, so again that 
25. would be social benefits 
26. Social yeah 
27. whereas, Ms. Swift, you 
28. also see kind of therapeutic 
29. potential as well? 
30. Yes. I mean you 
31. can direct it in 
32. whatever 
33. direction you 
34. want it to go. 
35. Yes, I was saying to Ms. 
36. Britten yesterday they 
37. actually dealt with the 
38. subject of mum dying. 
 
Of course, this approach may be deemed to be unadvisedly “positivist” in 
nature. It may be argued that my chosen five areas were artificially 
expelling interest in and analysis of other important issues connected with 
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sociodramatic play. However, it must again be emphasised that the five 
areas of development themselves were not simply the result of my reading 
of the literature. The categories had ultimately become almost “self-
selecting” as a result of being grounded in the data analysis I had conducted 
during my pilot research and the earlier stages of my study as well as being 
a consequence of the reading I had undertaken. Importantly, further 
refinement also occurred to the actual composition of the categories as my 
study progressed – for example, the area which had been earlier labelled 
Identity Construction/Emotional Development came eventually to include 
Moral Development as well. The five categories finally utilised, then, and 
which increasingly informed my data collection and data analysis as well as 
my ongoing theory making, were a direct consequence of both my field 
work and the literature. There was a constant moving back and forth 
between theory construction, data collection and analysis and the process of 
explanation. Ultimately, these various componential features of my research 
were “developed [quasi-]simultaneously in a dialectical process” (Mason, 
1996, p. 141). It does not seem unreasonable, then, that the five areas of 
development finally used to structure my Literature Review should also help 
provide the framework for my data analysis and reporting. 
 
Validity 
Mention has already been made of triangulation as a means of seeking to 
ensure the validity of this research, but there are further issues surrounding 
the concept of validity which need to be discussed. It may be persuasively 
claimed that, in seeking to triangulate one’s data, one is unwisely looking 
for confirmation of one’s findings rather than alternative viewpoints. The 
researcher, in other words, is seeking consensus as opposed to challenge 
(Simco and Warin, 1997). In order to guard against this, Simco and Warin 
propose a set of criteria which I have endeavoured to adhere to in my data 
analysis. In the first place, I have attempted to produce, as far as possible, 
“full” descriptions of the events taking place. Whilst these could never hope 
to record every last detail, by constantly questioning and challenging the 
descriptions I have produced it is hoped that ever more adequate 
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redescriptions have been achieved. The above section entitled Post-
Observation Semi-Structured Interviews/Triangulation, for instance, has 
been revised and expanded upon on several occasions throughout my 
research activity in an attempt to give the reader increasingly useful insight 
and information. Likewise, I have endeavoured to attain transparency in my 
research through explicit communication of every stage of the research 
methodology. Notions of reflexivity (that is, reciprocity between the 
development of the literature review and the development of the empirical 
study) and self-reflection (the capacity and will to situate oneself within the 
research process) have been constantly borne in mind. I have, that is, 
continuously striven to place myself conspicuously within my field work 
and its reporting. Finally, conflicting interpretations have been positively 
striven for – as well as the perspectives of the pupils and class teachers 
already referred to, my tutor-supervisor has also viewed the recordings and 
the earlier drafts of this report in order to produce challenges to my 
interpretations and analyses. On numerous occasions – through phone-calls, 
emails and face-to-face exchanges – she has prompted me to consider 
alternative viewpoints and to provide more detailed, more rigorous 
observations and considerations. All of these above strategies, then, have 
been utilised in a concerted attempt to make my research as valid and as 
reliable as possible; to try and ensure, in Mason’s words, that my study is 
“thorough, careful, honest and accurate” (1996, p. 146). 
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 CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS/DISCUSSION 
Frequency of Sociodramatic Play 
Perhaps because I had been reasonably assiduous in arriving at an 
acceptable – and operationisable – definition of sociodramatic play (namely, 
play in which two or more people participate in symbolic activity 
simultaneously, assuming complementary roles and co-operating together in 
developing a single scenario), I experienced little difficulty in determining 
whether the play which I observed could be categorised as sociodramatic (or 
not). As has already been detailed, the periods of activity observed and 
recorded during my time in the three schools which conformed to my 
definition of sociodramatic play can be classified as follows: 
Agincourt Primary School: 
• Angie, Mary and Craig plus, very intermittently, Jack playing at Bonfire 
Night and Frightened Doggy. 
(Less than three minutes of sociodramatic play out of over two hours of 
recording). 
Elsinor Primary School: 
• Edward and Colin playing at School. 
• Andrea and Lizzy playing at School and sporadically joined by Edward 
and Colin. 
• Lizzy and Colin playing at Parents. 
(Twenty-four minutes of sociodramatic play out of nearly four hours of 
recording). 
Harfleur Primary School: 
• Alice and Zelda playing at Poorly Baby Sister. 
• Jock and Larry playing at Pizzas and Fires. 
• Jock and Jim playing at Eating, Fire-fighting and Shopping. 
• Rebecca and Kathy playing at Mummy and Big Sister. 
(Two hours and nine minutes of sociodramatic play out of approximately 
two hours and fifteen minutes of recording). 
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In Agincourt, when the children were not involved in sociodramatic play (as 
was the case for the vast majority of the time) but remained in the restaurant 
corner, they tended to continue to be involved in pretend play but of a 
solitary nature. The possible significances of this will be discussed later. In 
Elsinor, when the children were not playing sociodramatically together, they 
were inclined to wander around the classroom (the various play areas were 
dotted around the room, remember), and join in other activities such as 
playing with Duplo or in the water tray. In Harfleur, of course, the observed 
children were involved almost constantly in sociodramatic play throughout 
the recording. 
 
At first sight, it may appear that the frequency of sociodramatic play in the 
sessions which I observed might be capable of being categorised essentially 
along lines of gender. What is more, it might also appear possible to classify 
the different sociodramatic activities using Thyssen’s (2003) thematic 
distinctions. In brief, he sees social pretend play as tending to fall into one 
of two general topical areas: 
 
1. Being an active person in possession of strength and able to 
accomplish acts that earn respect. 
2. Human relations: to give and receive love and care. 
(2003, p. 605) 
 
The play episodes which I observed, from the very titles alone which I have 
attributed to them, may be deemed to fit neatly into one or other of these 
categories. Moreover, as mentioned above, they may also be thought of as 
being distinguished along essentially issues of gender. The play of all the 
girls (admittedly joined at times by some of the boys) might be thought of as 
adhering to Thyssen’s second category concerning loving and caring: 
Angie, Mary, Andrea, Lizzy, Alice, Zelda, Rebecca and Kathy were all 
involved in kinds of play where parents, teachers or elder siblings were 
protecting and nurturing children, babies, grandparents, pets, pupils or 
younger siblings. Edward and Colin’s School play might also be deemed to 
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fall into this category but, as shall be discussed later, Edward’s teacher was 
extremely autocratic and dictatorial and, indeed, anything but loving and 
caring. In like fashion, the boys’ sociodramatic play might typically be 
thought of as conforming to Thyssen’s first category concerning strong 
characters earning respect. The “power” of Edward’s teacher has already 
been referred to but, similarly, the fire-fighters of Jock, Larry and Jim and, 
very briefly, the father-figure of Jack might all be considered to be “manly” 
characterisations bravely using their strength and abilities in activities 
designed to gain respect. However, closer inspection of my data might well 
help to reveal that such distinctions made along gender differences and 
utilising Thyssen’s thematic categories are in danger of over-simplifying 
reality, leading to mistaken conclusions regarding boys and girls. For 
example, and again as will be discussed later, Andrea’s teacher in Elsinor 
could certainly not be categorised as loving and caring but endeavoured to 
be every bit as autocratic as Edward’s teacher in the same school. 
Furthermore, although many of the girls were involved in giving and 
receiving love and affection, this frequently also entailed issues of strength 
and the capacity to earn respect. For instance, in Harfleur it was precisely 
because Alice and Rebecca were strong, fit and healthy that they were able 
to care for their less-than-well sibling and child respectively and thereby 
generate reciprocal love and respect. In like manner, the boys’ 
sociodramatic play, as well as entailing notions of strength and prestige, also 
frequently involved concepts of loving and caring. Both pairs of fire-fighters 
in Harfleur, for example, were concerned not only with putting out fires and 
protecting the general populace, but also with cooking and caring for one 
another. Similarly, Colin’s father in Elsinor was every bit as concerned and 
gentle with their baby as was Lizzy’s mother. Nor did this similarity 
between the boys’ and girls’ play extend only to the capacity to provide 
nurturing attention: Craig’s dog in Agincourt and two of the fire-fighters in 
Harfleur were just as capable of appreciatively receiving care and protection 
as were Zelda’s sister and Kathy’s daughter. To conclude this brief 
endeavour to categorise my recorded passages of sociodramatic play, then, 
it may be stated that any attempt to shoe-horn the activities into pre-
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determined classifications may well result in an over-simplification of 
reality leading to misleading generalisations about – in this particular 
instance – sociodramatic play and gender. 
 
1. Sociodramatic Play and Cognitive Development 
As discussed above, it may be persuasively argued that play is inherently 
connected to both linguistic and symbolic behaviour in humans and that, 
ultimately, it helps facilitate higher, more abstract ways of thinking (Bruner, 
Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 21). As Vygotsky comments, “From the point of 
view of development, creating an imaginary situation can be regarded as a 
means of developing abstract thought” (1978, p. 103). Thus play may be 
claimed to assist children in their progression from concrete, tangible 
activity to more conceptual, disembedded ways of thinking. Ms. Parr, the 
reception class teacher at Elsinor, herself made this observation when I 
interviewed her: 
 
It’s all done through play and talk really. . . . Unless they’ve got it in 
the concrete and they can see it and use it, it’s not going to go in here 
[pointing to her head]. 
 
Essentially, of course, Ms. Parr is delineating a social-constructivist view of 
learning here with progress being regarded as advancing from the exterior to 
the interior “worlds”. Arguably, she is also thereby providing further 
justification for the adoption of this paradigm of development throughout 
this work. To achieve the kind of successful social pretend play Ms. Parr is 
referring to, though, co-ordination and agreement are necessary in both the 
real and the fictional “worlds”. This co-operation is negotiated at two levels 
– the communicative and the metacommunicative (Goncu, 1998, p. 121). 
Giffin (1984) highlights the distinction between these two forms of 
communication by citing pertinent examples. Direct, explicit 
communication may occur outside of the play-frame (e.g. “Let’s pretend 
we’re monsters”) or within the play-frame (“I’m mummy”). As play 
progresses and as play becomes more mature, however, players tend to 
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utilise more indirect, implicit forms of managing the fiction and negotiate 
with one another on the metacommunicative level about the play’s content – 
what theme or script is to be played, and where and how the theme is to be 
realised (Bretherton, 1984, p. 25; Garvey, 1990, p. 135). Mary in the Bonfire 
Night and Frightened Doggy episode in Agincourt School exhibited both 
forms of communication within seconds of one another. “Is it bonfire 
night?” she asked the recalcitrant Jack from within the play-frame in order 
to try and involve him in the pretence and implicitly to progress the scenario 
(i.e. an instance of metacommunication). When Jack responded with an 
abrupt, “No”, Mary then immediately stepped out of the play-frame and 
communicated directly with Jack: “No, pretend it is.” 
 
These two forms of communication could be observed on numerous 
occasions during the children’s sociodramatic play in Elsinor and Harfleur. 
Direct communication frequently involved the giving of instructions, either 
“as oneself” and outside of the play-frame (such as, “Pretend we’ve got to 
do our work” or, “Pretend this hurts”) or “in character” and from within the 
play-frame (for instance, “Do your writing then” or, “Now then can you 
draw this?”). Metacommunication could often be observed when a new plot 
ingredient was being suggested to a play-mate (such as, “I want Daddy get 
the doctor”) or when names were used to indicate who was playing which 
character (“Miss Parr em can I do my work now?”). Both of these 
metacommunicative examples may be held to denote a surprising 
sophistication of cognitive process. In the first instance, when Lizzy says in 
Colin’s hearing during their Parents episode, “I want Daddy get a doctor,” 
she is implicitly conveying at least two suggestions to Colin: 
 
1. I want you to continue playing the role of the father (there had 
previously been no direct reference to this). 
2. I would like to instigate a plot development along the lines of, “The 
baby is ill and a doctor must be found”. 
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In the second example, when Lizzy says to Andrea during their School play, 
“Miss Parr em can I do my work now,” again a number of points are being 
metacommunicated: 
 
1. Andrea, I wish you to continue to be the teacher. 
2. I will resume being the compliant pupil. 
3. Can we all continue properly with the pretence of playing school? 
 
What we are witnessing in these instances, then, is not the kind of 
metacommunicative activity described by Bateson (cited by Goncu, 1998, p. 
124) which simply conveys the message “This is play and not reality”. 
Indeed, many animals have been noted as utilising such metacommunication 
through purely physical means, indicating to their fellows that what follows 
is playful rather than real: such instances include the head jerks of the black-
tailed deer, the bow or foreleg half-crouch of the dog and the open-mouth 
face of rhesus monkeys (White, 1977, p. 17). The metacommunication 
observed in the example of Lizzy and Andrea above, however, is of a more 
advanced form (noted by Goncu, 1998, p. 125) and is linguistic rather than 
physical in character. Lizzy is metacommunicating with Andrea, unlike the 
deer, dogs and monkeys referred to, in a manner which is detached from the 
actual action itself. Could the ability to communicate implied rather than 
overt meanings, via language, then, be evidence of progression towards 
more sophisticated ways of thinking and socially/linguistically interacting? 
Could the progression from the concrete world of enactment to the more 
esoteric world of implicit linguistic communication in play be held to be 
symptomatic of a higher, more abstract manner of cognitive operation? 
Rosenblatt, for example, notes that, “Developments in play go hand in hand 
with other cognitive abilities” (1977, p. 39). Yet again, linguistic, social and 
cognitive development would appear to be concurrent and complementary 
and their resultant effects to be manifested in sociodramatic play. 
 
Interestingly, during my data accumulation in Elsinor Primary School I 
encountered no instances of objects being used as “pivots” during play 
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where “the meaning of the action” was severed from “the real action” 
(Vygotsky, 1976, p. 548). Vygotsky cites the example of a long stick being 
used as a horse in play but I observed no such degree of quasi-symbolic 
activity in that school. Objects were, needless to say, of the utmost 
importance in stimulating and directing pretend play in all three schools that 
I visited but they were only ever used in Elsinor in an almost completely 
literal manner – thus, party hats and a pretend cake prompted a Party 
scenario; books, pencils, crayons, chalk and a blackboard gave rise to 
School play; dolls and bedding promoted Parents play; and so on. To my 
knowledge, however, no “props” were ever used in Elsinor in an entirely 
representational manner quite removed from their actual functioning. In 
Agincourt Primary School, on the other hand, the dressing-up clothes in the 
washing machine were transformed into the bedding materials for the 
frightened dog – they were being used, in other words, in a non-literal 
manner. Arguably, this transformation of an object’s functioning within play 
is evidence of a greater degree of cognitive sophistication (Smith, 1977, p. 
140). Garvey notes that “older children” are more able to use objects in an 
“ideational” rather than “material” manner during their pretend play (1990, 
p. 136). As will be discussed below, the play of the children in Agincourt 
was arguably significantly less socially mature than those in Elsinor; 
nonetheless, might it conceivably have been more cognitively developed? 
 
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of an object being used in a non-
literal manner which I encountered during all phases of my data collection, 
however, occurred during Jock and Larry’s Pizzas and Fires scenario in 
Harfleur (see Appendix B, HPS, p. 5). The play had been proceeding in a 
relatively calm and pleasurable manner but one sensed that the boys desired 
more excitement in their play – Jock preparing and cooking pizzas for Larry 
did not really appear to enthuse either participant and, indeed, the scenario 
continued for eight minutes before the boys even seemed to be operating 
with genuine mutuality and co-ordination. A metacommunicative prompt 
from Larry to spice up the proceedings (“I’m from Pluto and I’ve come 
down to Earth”) seemed to go unheeded by Jock. It was not until eighteen 
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minutes had passed that Jock took the two play vacuum cleaners which were 
present in the home corner and – in an entirely implicit, referential manner – 
transmogrified them into, of all things, fire engines: 
 
  Jock 
[taking the vacuum cleaners] 
1. We’ve got to put the fire out today 
2. [passes a cleaner to Larry] You have that one 
3. O.K. let’s go and put the fire out 
 [they run off with the vacuum cleaners] 
 
From this point onwards, the play became far more animated and energised 
and the boys were even able to link this new plot development into their 
preceding play – it was the burning pizza which had caused the initial fire. 
As Jock explained to me in the subsequent interview: “The pizza was really 
warm and the fire started to come out.” Similarly, at the start of Jock and 
Jim’s play on the following day, Jock appeared to have little difficulty in 
resuming the cleaners’ symbolic, secondary function as fire engines, nor did 
Jim experience any problem in accepting this: 
 
  Jock 
1. [to Jim] Let’s get the Hoovers 
2. Let’s put a fire out 
3. [both boys run off with the “Hoovers” to put out a fire] 
 
As we have previously noted, Vygotsky (1978) has observed that only 
certain props can be transformed and utilised in fantasy play in certain ways 
– thus, a long stick can be a pretend horse but a postcard cannot (p. 98). 
What was it, then, that allowed Jock, Jeff and Jim so readily to transform 
two vacuum cleaners into two fire engines? Not surprisingly, perhaps, it was 
the “hose” which the cleaners contained. This could readily be “substituted” 
for the hose of a fire engine and the fact that the cleaners had wheels and 
could be pushed around at high speeds presumably assisted in their 
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transformation. Indeed, in the interview which followed the Pizzas and 
Fires play, Jock validated this interpretation and explained how the cleaners 
had to be used as fire engines because the hoses, significantly, on the “real” 
fire engines had previously broken:  
 
 Mr Meakin   Jock 
1. Whose idea was it to 
2. use the Hoovers as the  
3. fire engines? 
4. Because our fire engine 
5. broke and there was no 
6. more fire engines 
7. So you used that did 
8. you? 
9. Yeah 
10. And what did you use 
11. the hose on the 
12. Hoover for? 
13. Because the hose because 
14. the hose on the fire engine 
15. we tried them hoses on the 
16. fire engines but they didn’t 
17. work so we used these 
18. Hoovers and we tried ‘em 
19. on there and then they worked 
 
One could hardly wish, then, for a more transparent realisation of 
Vygotsky’s (1978) description of the way in which a prop in the “real” 
world can be attributed with a secondary, symbolic meaning (the objects are 
“really” cleaners and not fire engines) and thereby operate as a pivot into the 
world of enacted fantasy and enacted symbolisation. Surely this is a 
convincing instance of how sociodramatic play can function as an 
intermediary stage between concrete, immediate operations in the “real” 
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world (the props are cleaners in actuality) and abstract, “inner”, 
decontextualised thought (the props are used as fire-engines). Or, in social 
constructivist terms as discussed in the Literature Review, are we not 
witnessing here Jock, Jim and Larry accruing active understandings in the 
external, interpersonal world which are leading ultimately to the 
development of internalised, conceptual thinking (Light and Perret-
Clermont, 1991)? 
 
Furthermore, is this example of “object transformation” additional evidence 
of the kind of inferential, implicit, quite sophisticated metacommunication 
already discussed in this sub-section? As previously stated, on neither 
occasion when the vacuum cleaners became fire engines did the 
transformation have to be explicitly explained to the play partner. These 
findings would appear to contradict Umek and Musek’s (2001) observation 
that: 
 
. . . the use of various objects have different functions in play and in 
real life, therefore the child – player – must define these symbolic 
transformations verbally, so that they have a clear (recognisable) 
meaning and are comprehensible to his or her playmates. 
        (2001, p. 56) 
 
My data would seem to suggest otherwise (the “symbolic transformations” 
most definitely did not have to be defined verbally) – and, arguably, this 
finding gives further support to the claims made earlier about the level of 
cognitive advancement being displayed when meanings are conveyed in 
such an indirect, implicit manner. 
 
What was also noticeable about the influence of props, whether used in an 
essentially literal way or otherwise, was not simply their utility in prompting 
particular types of play, but also their essential ability to form a shared focus 
during social pretend play. This mutually-accepted nexus is, of course, an 
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essential prerequisite for any form of collective social engagement (Goncu, 
1998, p. 118) and the objects used during the sociodramatic play which I 
observed were particularly facilitative of this kind of co-operative activity. 
The presence of the “teacher’s stamps” when Edward and Colin were 
playing at School in Elsinor, for instance, was instrumental in giving them a 
shared focus as well as helping to determine the apportioning of character 
roles (Edward as the teacher and Colin as the pupil) and the derivation of 
the story-line (Colin is to strive for stamp marks on his work and Edward 
will adjudicate its worthiness). In a comparable manner, it was the inability 
to agree on a shared focus which impeded the progress of Andrea and 
Lizzy’s play in Elsinor until a third object provided the solution: a letter-
picture was initially proposed by Andrea as the shared focus, whilst Lizzy 
clearly opted for pencils; finally, it was the joint utilisation of a blackboard 
which operated as the springboard for their pretend play. Again, as will be 
further discussed below, the inability – or, rather, often the refusal – to agree 
a shared focus frequently meant the collapse of any attempted joint pretence 
in Agincourt. A solitary example might suffice for now – Craig approached 
“Shane” with a pot full of food as the proposed shared focus for their play. 
Shane responded by simply emptying the food all over the floor. Needless to 
say, no pretend play ensued from this. 
 
Similarly, the adoption of mutually-recognised schemata – set routines from 
day-to-day activities – were also of great assistance in providing focus and 
structure to the children’s play in both Elsinor and Harfleur. As already 
discussed in the Literature Review chapter, it is schemata or “narratives” 
which arguably help shape and clarify our view of the world (Bruner, 1989, 
p. 46; Open University, 1994, p. 90) and in a broadly similar manner these 
“scripts” appeared to give coherence and combined understanding to the 
children’s pretend play. Thus, as already referred to, the procedure adopted 
from “real” class activity of a pupil trying to produce work of a sufficiently 
high standard to merit award stamps and then the teacher deciding whether 
or not this has been attained is the daily schema which provided the story-
line for Edward and Colin’s School play episode. Interestingly, Colin and 
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Lizzy utilised separate, but related, narratives in their Parents play so that 
the pretence might continue without necessitating too great a degree of co-
operation (or contact?) between the boy and the girl. Thus, although both 
children were enacting the roles of caring parents at their children’s 
bedtime, Colin utilised the (presumably more “masculine”) script of reading 
a story to the baby, while Lizzy pursued the plot-line (presumably more 
“feminine”) of putting baby to bed. Again, though, it was the transference to 
a fictional context of readily-identifiable “real” set routines and procedures 
which appeared to structure the children’s play and allowed each one of 
them little difficulty in understanding what was occurring. Indeed, the 
utilisation of such schemata is, arguably, evidence itself of progress towards 
more abstract, disembedded ways of thinking and operating. For the ability 
to extract from certain set social routines, general “rules” of appropriate 
shape, structure, progress and conduct and then to apply these in new and 
various contexts suggests, arguably, the beginnings of conceptual, 
decontextualised operation (Garvey, 1976, p. 577). Not only is 
sociodramatic play itself, and the props utilised therein, then, persuasive 
evidence of fantasy play’s utility in the progress towards greater conceptual, 
hypothetical thinking, so too are the narratives or schemata which also are 
part and parcel of this kind of play. 
 
The capacity to think fluently, inventively, experimentally and effectively 
(that is, componential features of what were earlier discussed as constituting 
“creativity”) was constantly manifested in the children’s sociodramatic play 
which I observed. Examples of this might include, for instance, Colin 
deciding not simply to read to his “baby” to help her sleep but also to assist 
the process by singing when the book suggested an appropriate song: 
“Postman Pat Postman Pat ( ) black and white cat . . .”. Another instance of 
ideational fluency/problem solving might be when Andrea, realising she has 
no pupils to form her class, proposed that the solitary Lizzy is used to 
represent the entire group: “You’re the little children so you have to sit 
down”. I do not think, incidentally, that this was merely a grammatical error 
– for one reason, an identical instance of a child using another individual to 
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“represent” a whole class was encountered during my pilot research in 1999. 
Both these instances of single people being “transformed” into many due to 
the exigencies of particular plot-lines, then, might be held to be clear 
illustrations of the children’s creativity during sociodramatic play – of free 
association and fluidity of thinking being utilised to solve specific problems 
(Russ, 2003, p. 292). 
 
But perhaps the most striking instances of creative solutions being found to 
resolve existing difficulties – along with the aforementioned “vacuum-
cleaner-fire-engines” – were displayed in the children’s use of the 
“invisible”. Although, as noted above, no objects were ever used in a 
completely non-literal manner within Elsinor, there were two instances 
recorded there when, presumably because of the absence of anything 
approximating to what was actually needed, the required dramatic 
ingredients were “invented from nothing” by the children and were, 
consequently, invisible to the outside observer. Smith (1988) regards the use 
of such imaginary objects as indicative of a certain level of cognitive 
advancement which is possible in three and four year olds but which is more 
common in middle childhood. He notes how three and four year olds, when 
asked to pretend to comb their hair or brush their teeth, will use a substitute 
body part such as a finger; most six to eight year olds, on the other hand, 
will imagine the comb or toothbrush in their hand (1988, p. 186). 
 
The first observed instance of such “invisible” object substitution in Elsinor 
involved Andrea’s entrance to the Party. It was dramatically expedient for 
Andrea to be “outside” of “Jess’s house” as she needed to make a grand 
entrance (accompanied by song and the “birthday cake”) into the party. As 
there was no tangible partition, therefore, Andrea appeared to have little 
difficulty in “miming” the door and thus highlighting her entrance into the 
house’s “interior”. No such door existed in actuality, of course, but 
Andrea’s performance of “turning the door knob” and “opening the door” 
left no doubt as to the intention of her actions. Similarly, a point was 
reached during Andrea and Lizzy’s playing at School where Lizzy no longer 
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wished to be the compliant pupil but appeared to want to take on a more 
prestigious adult role. Again, Lizzy seemed to have no problem whatsoever 
in compensating for her lack of pupils by creating an invisible boy. The tape 
shows her writing on the blackboard (“You see you see I gotta write 
something”), adopting an autocratic teacherly role and saying about the 
“non-existent” child, “Has to do something. He has to do that and and a 
‘b’”. (Just as fascinating is the fact that, presumably to enhance her new-
found status, Lizzy actually delivers this directive in a pseudo-American 
accent.) A comparable instance of the utilisation of the purely imaginary 
occurred in Harfleur during the Mummy and Big Sister play when Rebecca 
presented Kathy with an invisible “dead flower”. Rebecca stated that she 
had heard about the flower dying “on the news” and then proceeded to enact 
presenting the non-existent flower to her “mother” as a token of love and 
affection. The fact that Andrea was able to mime a door opening and also 
that Rebecca was able to conjure up a dead flower, each with such apparent 
facility, suggests to me that neither child was simply producing already-
learned mimeographic routines; rather, they were creatively resorting to the 
utilisation of the invisible as no suitable “pivots” – to use Vygotsky’s 
terminology – were present to hand. 
 
What is especially remarkable about the various instances of creative 
thinking in the children’s play is the apparent ease with which they resolve 
problems – the children are, after all, playing and playing is intrinsically 
“good fun”. As Bax comments, “. . . children and animals play because they 
enjoy playing, and therein lies their freedom” (1977, p. 2). A similar 
observation, already referred to, is made by Sylva, Bruner and Genova: 
“What was particularly striking was their capacity to resist frustration and 
‘giving up’. They were playing” (cited in Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976, p. 
16). It is perhaps worth restating at this point that, even as an adult, one is 
arguably able to think most creatively and productively when one is 
enjoying what one is doing and feeling relaxed and confident. Conversely, it 
is very difficult to produce creative solutions to problems if one is under 
threat, over-pressurised and/or unhappy (Broadhead, 2003). As mentioned 
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in the Literature Review, it is very difficult for playfulness and coercion to 
co-exist. Again, then, the cognitive and affective domains are seen as 
operating transactionally and, ultimately, inseparably. 
 
In summarising this section, it must needs be restated that my data 
repeatedly appeared to lend weight to the notion that, in social constructivist 
terms, children’s sociodramatic play affords opportunities for abstract, 
conceptual areas of understanding to be enacted and explored in the 
exterior, tangible world en route to their becoming internalised as higher-
order thinking. Such instances include the adept use of metacommunication 
– both inside and outside the play-frame – in order to transmit implied rather 
than overt meanings; the creative and ideationally-fluent use of props – in 
both more and less literal fashions – as “pivots” into the world of 
imagination-in-action; and the transference and adaptation of mutually-
recognised schemata from “real” life into the world of the children’s 
fictional play. My data certainly seemed to lend weight to the arguments of 
Vygotsky (1978), and many others since, concerning the utility of 
sociodramatic play to cognitive development. 
 
2. Sociodramatic Play and Language Development 
As previously observed, it may be argued that, prior to children becoming 
conscious of the constituent features and structures of language, “playing” 
with language by decimating it, reconstituting it, repeating sounds and 
“talking funny” (Garvey, 1990, pp. 70-1) is an important aid to their 
growing understanding of how language operates and also to the increasing 
enjoyment that is to be gained from the wilful manipulation of linguistic 
features (Garvey, 1977). Stern and Stern (1928), for instance, mention 
children’s predilection for rhythm, rhyme and alliteration, while Scupin and 
Scupin (1907) discuss associations based on recurring sounds (both cited in 
Weir, 1976, p. 610). Thus, whilst young children have no “meta-language” 
to enable them to analyse and discuss aspects of language itself, their 
spontaneous play does enable them to carry out a whole range of linguistic 
explorations, quite outside of the usual conventions concerning “normal” 
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language use (Garvey, 1977, p. 82). As Weir observes (in a linguistically 
playful manner): “There is linguistic sense in the child’s nonsense” (1976, p. 
618). Language may not be analysed in the abstract at this stage of 
development, but its componential aspects can be actively engaged with 
during play. Indeed, just as we have seen above (in the section in Chapter 2 
on Humour/Pleasure) how play can facilitate both the reinforcement and the 
development of rules in games such as marbles and peekaboo, so, too, can 
play provide opportunities for the child to experiment with the rules 
governing language use. Weir, again, is enlightening on this point: “At 
times we have the feeling of listening in on a foreign language lesson with 
extensive pattern practice” (1976, pp. 611-2). 
 
However, it is interesting to note that during my field work, although I 
regularly encountered the “playing with language” referred to, it did not 
tend to occur during the passages of sociodramatic play (exceptions to this 
were when Alice in Harfleur was “reading” from a book to her “poorly baby 
sister”.) As with my forthcoming observations on the incompatibility of 
sociodramatic play and humour, it may also be the case that the rule 
breaking which occurs when language is de- and re-constructed is anathema 
to the rule observance essential to sociodramatic play. When sustaining a 
particular character in a particular situation in play, in other words, one 
presumably needs consistently to adhere to language appropriate to that 
character in that situation rather than endeavour for linguistic novelty. In 
this brief extract from Rebecca and Kathy’s Mummy and Big Sister play in 
Harfleur, for example, the two girls not only observe and make explicit the 
“rules” of appropriate maternal and elder sibling behaviour (as noted by 
Vygotsky [1978]), they also adhere to apposite linguistic “rules” concerning 
the speech of mothers and their older children during co-operative domestic 
activity: 
 
 Rebecca    Kathy 
1. No more books now I’m not 
2. buying anymore for you 
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3. No because we’ve got enough books 
4. Mum? 
5. What? 
6. I need to go to school 
7. O.K. if you want. Sister, I’m 
8. just making the dinner  O.K. 
9. O.K. for you I’ll come and 
10. fetch you when I’ve had dinner. 
11. Sister, I’ll come and fetch you 
12. when I’ve done when I’ve 
13. done dinner 
 
Indeed, playing with language and striving for humorous effect (as noted 
earlier) can often be part and parcel of the same thing – and both, I would 
argue, are intrinsically concerned with the breaking of rules. In the extract 
from my pilot research in 1999 cited below in the section on Sociodramatic 
Play and Humour/Pleasure, it is perhaps significant that both boys play with 
and decimate language and linguistic rules precisely when they are also 
concurrently striving for humorous effect and threatening the continuance of 
successful shared pretence: their laughter and joking when feeding the “cat” 
inedible items is accompanied by linguistic irregularities such as, “Chicken 
chicky chick,” and, “Bishy bishy biscuits.” One further example might help 
to clarify my position here. Note the following exchange between “Paulo” 
and “Jeff” in Harfleur: 
 
  Paulo     Jeff 
1. What’s his name again? 
2. Mr. Meakin 
3. Mr. Meakin 
4. Mr. Meessey 
5. Mr. Mess 
6. Mr. Meakin 
[Laughter] 
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Paulo’s playful experiments with constituent features of my surname may 
well be regarded as evidence of the kind of linguistic exploration cited 
above (as well as, perhaps, being indicative of Paulo being playfully cheeky 
with the name of the man he knew to be eavesdropping his conversation on 
a set of headphones). Having confirmed what my name actually is, Paulo 
alters it but keeps the same initial sound and the same number of syllables: 
“Mr. Meessey”. Alliteration and syllabic structure might thus be held to be 
under experimentation. He then alters the surname again, still retaining the 
initial “m” and the medial “s” sounds, but this time reducing the number of 
syllables to one – all with a linguistically humorous outcome: “Mr. Mess”. 
Alliteration and syllabic structure are not the only aspects of language 
brought into play (literally) this time, assonance is also utilised: “Meess” 
becomes “Mess”. Paulo finally reverts to my proper name. In this brief 
instance, then, Paulo is seen to be exploring and operationalising linguistic 
features which he probably will not be able consciously to utilise for some 
years to come. His linguistic ability is not yet of the meta-linguistic kind 
with regard to attributes such as assonance, alliteration and syllabic structure 
and yet his play affords opportunities to experiment light-heartedly with 
these very same aspects of language. However, it needs also to be noted that 
this playful use of language is outside of the children’s sociodramatic play. 
Linguistic rules are being broken here for comic effect (“Mr. Meakin” is 
transformed into “Mr. Mess”) and this kind of rule-breaking is, arguably, 
incongruent with social pretend play and the rules which have to be adhered 
to in order for characterisations to be sustained and plot-lines mutually 
developed. 
 
In the Literature Review chapter I discussed how the rule-governed nature 
of play bore strong resemblance to the rule-governed nature of “normal” 
language use (Bruner, 1983, p. 46). In my field work, what was equally 
noticeable was how the rules of both play and language also helped to 
inform, and be informed by, the “rules” of social routines and interactions. 
In like manner, and as observed in the previous paragraph, Vygotsky noted 
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how play necessitates the observation of accepted rules for social behaviour: 
“The child imagines herself to be the mother and the doll to be the child, so 
she must obey the rules of maternal behaviour” (1978, p. 94). Thus, Colin 
and Edward whilst playing School in Elsinor not only assumed the 
appropriate vocabulary and phraseology of their respective roles (Barrs, 
1994), but actually used these linguistic paradigms to detail and display 
their relevant statuses and behaviours. In the following extract, for example, 
Colin and Edward do not merely use language which is character-apposite 
(apart from Colin calling the “teacher” by his first name!) but also 
linguistically portray in their play the superiority of the authoritarian teacher 
and the eager compliance of the willing pupil (a “neat” is a stamp for neat 
work): 
 
  Edward    Colin 
1.      Oh, can I have a neat 
2.      Can I have a neat 
3. Yep     Edward 
4. For your writing. I’ll draw 
5. something for you. 
6.      No, I’ll draw something 
7. No I’ll draw something 
8. No that’s not a pencil 
9. Now this letter writ today 
10. it’s “a”. And this an apple 
11. If you finish it neatly I’ll 
12. give you a neat O.K.? (.) 
13.      Neat colouring. If I do 
14.      everything right do I get 
15.      everything or 
16. No you don’t get everything 
17. until you do it very very  O.K. 
18. neat and stay in the lines 
(Appendix D, EPS, pp. 1-3) 
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Clearly in this extract one can observe language use and social interaction 
reciprocally helping to define and determine each other. For example, Colin 
– in the subservient role of pupil – asks with explicit subservience, “If I do 
everything right do I get everything or . . .” (lines 13-15), to which 
Edward’s authoritarian teacher responds with the requisite authoritative 
register, “No you don’t get everything until you do it very very neat and stay 
in the lines” (lines 16-18). Even before the teacher has finished his tirade, 
the submissive pupil has compliantly concurred with, “O.K.” (line 17). 
 
To continue with the subject of linguistic “rules”, what was also apparent in 
the children’s pretend play was their ability to utilise appropriately “rules” 
of literary genres. Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this facility 
occurred in Alice and Zelda’s Poorly Baby Sister episode in Harfleur. Over 
the “four days and three nights” of this scenario (36 minutes in actuality) 
Alice “read” a total of three books to Zelda as she lay “ill” in the “hospital 
bed”. Interestingly, all three books were drawn from different literary 
genres: a counting book (the “animals story”), a “happy” book (the 
“telephone story”) and a thriller (the “scary story”) and as Alice “read” the 
books aloud she displayed numerous features appropriate to the different 
genres. Alice did use “real” books as props during this play but, as she 
confirmed in the interview which followed, she actually “made up” the 
stories as she went along. Also during the interview, Alice enumerated the 
“titles” of the three different stories: “the animals one, the telephone one and 
the scary one.” It may be worth repeating all three stories in order fully to 
appreciate the unconscious grasp of literary genre being displayed. This is 
the thriller story: 
 
  Alice 
1. [to Zelda] Do you want this one? 
2. Do you want this? 
3. [whispers] It’s a bit scary 
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4. One day he looked in the passage. [shows book to Zelda] See 
5. There was a noise 
6. [whispers] What was it? 
7. [joyfully] Oh, it’s only teddy 
8. [whispers] What’s the noise? 
9. Only the clock downstairs 
10. But it was dark 
11. What was the noise? 
12. What was behind 
13. [whispers] what was behind the curtains? 
14. [joyfully] Cat. It’s a cat 
15. Then a fish was making a bubble noise 
16. “Bubble bubble” 
17. And he said, “I’m gonna get some biscuits” 
18. And he got some biscuits 
19. [frightened voice] Oh dear someone’s coming 
20. Drop the biscuits 
21. [frightened voice] Look behind you. “Agh,” shouted 
22. [relieved voice] It’s only a teddy. It’s only  
23. His mummy said, “Get back in your bed” 
24. So he did 
25. He was fast asleep (with) his mummy 
 
Admittedly, Alice had the benefit on each of these three occasions of actual 
picture books which presumably helped her structure her story-telling in 
generically-appropriate ways. Nonetheless, it must surely be admitted that 
the insights displayed into the features of the thriller genre in this passage – 
both the story itself and also the way such stories are actually read aloud – 
are quite remarkable. Throughout the story, Alice is repeatedly able to 
utilise the thriller-writer’s stock-in-trade of building up suspenseful 
instances (“There was a noise”, “What was it?”, “What’s the noise?”, “What 
was behind the curtains?”, “Oh dear someone’s coming”, “Look behind you. 
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Agh”, etc.), only for them eventually to be discovered to be relatively 
innocuous (“Only the clock downstairs”, “It’s only a teddy”, etc.). 
Moreover, her vocal techniques further enhance this notion of increasing 
tension (whispering) followed by joyous relief. The achievement is even 
more noteworthy when one considers that, when I later discussed this play 
with two of the reception class teachers, they both expressed their 
astonishment at Alice’s abilities and commented that she was actually “quite 
shy and retiring in class”. Different generic features to that of the thriller can 
clearly be noted in the “counting story”: 
 
  Alice 
1. Do you want this one ‘cause it’s 
2. It’s got lots of animals in 
3. One day there was two horseys 
4. one his dad and one his baby 
5. When a lorry came past 
6. How many goats did they have? 
7. Count. One two three four five six 
8. And then the man looked out the window 
9. and said, “Go.” He looked cross 
10. How many [horse sound] neigh? 
11. One. One two three four five six seven eight nine ten 
12. Ten [horse sound] neigh ones 
13. How many dogs? 
14. One. One two three four five six 
15. Six [dog sound] woof dogs 
16. One two three four five six 
17. Six [cat sound] meow cats 
18. One two three 
19. Two chickens 
20. One two three 
21. Three bugs or whatever 
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22. There that’s the end 
23. Come on go to sleep 
 
The suspenseful climaxes and releases pertinent to the thriller genre are 
clearly not present here as they were in the “scary story”, and the use of the 
reading voice is quite different (animal noises as opposed to whispered-and-
relieved passages). Repetition of linguistic shapes and structures is brought 
into play, however, in ways consistent with the “counting book” genre: “Ten 
neigh ones . . . Six woof dogs . . . Six meow cats.” Further generic 
distinctions can be noted in the third and final book, the “happy story”: 
 
  Alice 
1. Do you want this one? 
2. Aidan [Alice’s brother] has got this one 
3. He was sad because the telephone 
4. Or the telephone keeps 
5. Say hello bunny 
6. Bunny wants to say rude words 
7. And then he got a piece of cake 
8. and he got dirty after that 
9. Yummy scrummy cake 
10. And then mum came down and said 
11. “Where’s my teddy?” said baby 
12. Painted the red round the chocolate cake 
13. Then he phoned him up 
14. Quick and quick and quick he did it 
15. and then he run [panting sounds] 
16.  And then he got the telephone 
17. He was on his way on a motorbike 
18. And then he thought, 
19. “Ugh ugh ugh” 
20. “Stupid old telephone,” he said 
123 
 
21. “No more ringing,” he said 
22. “Hello hello,” and he said, “Hello” 
23. Everyone knew he was happy now 
24. He was happy. He was happy 
25. And then he ate all the cake 
26. Happily ever after all shared the cake 
27. Did you like this story? Did you? 
(Appendix D, HPS, p. 4) 
 
Although the narrative shape of this story is rather more difficult to discern 
than in the previous two examples, Alice clearly adheres in this instance to 
the Aristotelian notion (see Dorsch, 1965) of a comedy (i.e. Alice’s “happy” 
story) being a tale in which everything initially goes wrong for the main 
characters only for everything to turn out all right in the end. At the start, the 
central character is “sad” and “dirty”, but, after an exciting passage (“Quick 
and quick and quick he did it and then he run”), he ends up “happy”, 
everyone knows this, they all share the cake and the story concludes 
“happily ever after”. Three quite distinct literary genres are, then, utilised by 
Alice in her reading aloud and surely not all generic features on display here 
are a direct result of the “scaffolding” being provided by the books 
themselves. Rather, it may be argued that just as Alice does not yet have a 
meta-language for discussing and analysing linguistic features, so she does 
not yet have a “meta-literacy” awareness for evaluating literary genres. 
Nevertheless, her social pretend play in these instances does allow her to 
bring into operation the unconscious understanding of literary form which 
she currently possesses. 
 
It may also be argued, of course, that this kind of play is useful 
reinforcement for such curricular provision as the “Literacy and Numeracy 
Hours” in English schools (e.g. Merttens, 2002). However, I would wish to 
stake a claim that it is more than mere curriculum reinforcement which is 
occurring here. For Alice is not only actively exploring linguistic and 
124 
 
literary features which may be relevant to her more formal academic 
pursuits, she is also – and I believe this to be a critical point which I shall 
return to later when discussing Humour/Pleasure in my field work – 
reinstigating for herself (and for the “poorly” Zelda) the notion of books as 
sources of potential pleasure, comfort and social communication (and the 
importance of pleasure for effective learning has been stressed throughout 
this work). In each instance Alice initially asked Zelda if she wanted the 
particular book and, after the conclusion of each story, she inquired, “Do 
you like it? Do you want to keep this one at home? Do you?” (after the 
“scary story”); “There that’s the end. Come on go to sleep,” (after the 
“counting story”); and “Did you like this story? Did you?” (after the 
“telephone story”). From conversations with many teachers, one suspects 
that the Literacy Hour does not always produce the same positive effect in 
encouraging children to appreciate the enjoyment to be gained from literacy 
and literature. 
 
This leads us on to a critical question in discussing not only the linguistic 
benefits of pretend play but also all the developmental areas under scrutiny 
in this work. Namely, is it sociodramatic play per se which is helping to 
foster such abilities, or is it due simply to peer interaction? Would the same 
or similar developmental benefits be occurring if the children were 
operating together in a non-symbolic way – for instance, if they were sat 
together discussing the school disco? Is the element of pretence, in other 
words, an irrelevancy in these contexts to child development? Rubin (1980) 
is certainly under no doubts as to where the real educational benefits lie in 
the pretend play environment: “The major moving/guiding force is the peer 
interaction itself and not the dramatic activity per se” (1980, p. 81). Rubin 
is, of course, following in the footsteps of Piaget (1962) in arguing for the 
causal influence of peer interaction rather than play on development in 
general and social cognition in particular (1980, p. 76). And, to be fair to 
Rubin, he is able to cite a whole raft of empirical studies (nine in total) 
which purportedly stress the developmental significance of symbolic play 
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and yet which all display a “critical methodological problem” (1980, p. 77). 
Namely, all nine studies are unable to determine whether it is the fantasy 
play itself or the social interaction of which it is a part which has led to 
social and cognitive gains (1980, p. 77). My own reading has also 
encountered similar methodological shortcomings. I shall cite but one 
example – and this involves monkeys rather than humans. Suomi and 
Harlow (1976) experience little difficulty in detailing the deleterious effects 
on development for monkeys denied adequate play opportunities in early 
life. Some of these monkeys were reared in cages where they could see and 
hear, but not make physical contact with, other monkeys. These rapidly 
developed “obvious disturbances” (p. 492). Others were reared with their 
mothers but without the opportunity to interact with peers. These were 
found to be hyper-aggressive when they were finally exposed to peers at the 
age of eight months (1976, p. 491). Such observations allow the authors to 
conclude that: “It becomes obvious that play . . . is actually one of the most 
important aspects of social development” (1976, p. 494). But one is left 
wondering along with Rubin as to how the authors can claim that it is 
actually play which nurtures “normal” development and not simply 
interaction with one’s fellows. Suomi and Harlow’s research, in other 
words, exhibits precisely the same methodological shortcomings as those 
listed by Rubin (and, arguably, in their treatment of the monkeys, the 
research contains ethical failings as well). Doubtless, more research needs to 
be undertaken to determine conclusively whether or not social play 
possesses developmental benefits over and above those of mere social 
interaction, but an episode such as Alice and Zelda playing at Poorly Baby 
Sister referred to above surely provides us with some intimation of the 
positive effects of the fantasy element – the pretence – within such co-
operative peer activity. We have already discussed some of the possible 
linguistic benefits of this episode to the participants but would these positive 
attributes still have occurred if Alice and Zelda were not pretending to be 
sisters? Would Alice have “made up” and “read aloud” three fictitious 
stories to Zelda had she not been motivated by a sympathetic urge to 
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comfort her ailing baby sister as part of the pretend scenario? Similarly, 
would Alice have explored her linguistic repertoire by regularly referring to 
Zelda as “sweetheart” and “darling” if the play had been factual rather than 
fictitious? Alice informed me in the interview which followed their pretend 
play that these were the words which her grandmother used to her in real 
life. In this instance, then, Alice could be regarded as drawing on hidden 
resources and assuming elements of an adult’s register (Barrs, 1994, p. 256). 
Would comparable linguistic exploration have conceivably taken place 
outside of fantasy play? Furthermore, as already mentioned, it is not only 
language development which Alice and Zelda’s pretend play arguably 
nourishes and nurtures. Throughout the 36 minutes of the episode, Alice (a 
“quite shy and retiring” girl, remember) adopted the persona of a confident, 
capable and very caring older sibling. She rang “mother” to reassure her that 
Zelda was going to be O.K.; she regularly comforted Zelda not only with 
words but also by physically holding her and supporting her; she made 
several “meals” (always pizza!) to aid her sister’s recovery; and at one point 
she said to Zelda, “Give me a hug”, enfolded her in her arms and whispered 
in her ear, “It’s gonna be O.K.”. In short, the care and attention Alice 
lavished on Zelda was unstinting and entirely selfless throughout the whole 
36-minute play. With regard to section 4 of my Literature Review, how 
might such sustained characterisation have influenced Alice’s self-concept? 
How did she feel being such a responsible and conscientious carer? How did 
such painstaking mindfulness underpin Alice and Zelda’s moral outlook? 
And reflecting now on section 2 of the Literature Review, what social skills 
were being reinforced and developed for both Alice and Zelda? (Their co-
ordination and co-operation must have been operating on the 
communicative and meta-communicative levels, and within and without the 
play-frame in order for such pretence to be sustained.) And would such 
interpersonal and intrapersonal understandings have been brought into play 
if the fiction had not been present, if the girls were, say, tidying up the play 
area together (an activity they later accomplished in a couple of minutes)? 
Would the motivation to continue the pretence and thereby the supportive 
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relationships have been present had the girls not been experiencing the 
pleasure to be had from sustained social symbolic play? Clearly, these are 
questions which further research must endeavour to answer but surely it 
must at least be a distinct possibility that not only does sociodramatic play 
assist development in a variety of areas but that it also provides hugely 
beneficial and supportive environments for such development to occur over 
and above those facilitated by simple peer interaction. 
 
3. Sociodramatic Play and Perspective Taking/Social Cognition 
Due to the difficulties which the pupils at Agincourt School appeared to 
experience in attaining mutual pretence, I shall initially confine my analysis 
in this section to the data collected in Elsinor School (some of the 
perspective taking/social cognitive gains and abilities observed at Harfleur 
have, of course, been discussed towards the end of the preceding section). 
Later, though, I will focus specifically upon Agincourt in the hope that 
insights might be gleaned as to why the children achieved relatively 
minimal amounts of shared pretence and the implications this might have 
for theorising about their levels of social understanding. But first to Elsinor. 
 
Not only are narratives from the social world enacted during sociodramatic 
play but, moreover, they are engaged with and examined from different 
viewpoints, affording children perspectives on situations not otherwise 
available (Bretherton, 1984). Here again, we have reason to refute Rubin’s 
(1980) assertion that the developmental role of imaginative play is merely as 
“a method of exercising newly developed cognitive skills” (p. 76). How, we 
must ask, can non-fantasy social activity provide the same kind of 
opportunities as sociodramatic play for taking – and, indeed, “inhabiting” – 
a multiplicity of perspectives? Role-playing, by definition, requires that we 
assume roles (and, consequently, perspectives) other than our own. Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, for example, described Shakespeare as “myriad minded” 
(Hawkes, 1969, p. 26) precisely because of the playwright’s exceptional 
facility in viewing a situation from a vast array of ideological standpoints. 
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Sociodramatic play and drama per se are, indeed, built on the prerequisite of 
a multiplicity of perspectives being brought into action. How, then, can 
Rubin (as detailed in the previous section) argue that non-pretend play 
would provide comparable opportunities for progression – because of the 
critical presence of peer interaction – when fantasy role-play can provide 
occasions for experiencing situations at first hand from perspectives other 
than one’s own? 
 
As previously intimated, what was particularly noticeable with regard to the 
adoption of personae other than oneself, and which shall be discussed 
further in the next section, was the children’s penchant for assuming adult 
roles – especially those which entailed a degree of power and status such as 
teachers and parents. Garvey made the same observation from her own 
research: “Adult roles were the most favoured of all ages” (1990, p. 91). 
The adoption of such personae enabled the children, presumably, to view 
the world from a more privileged and prestigious vantage point than that 
which is normally available to them in “real life”. Needless to say, however, 
the adoption of such characters in joint play is often dependent on other 
participants’ preparedness to assume socially inferior roles. In Colin and 
Lizzy’s Parents episode in Elsinor, for instance, this was not problematic as 
the “lesser” characters were denoted by dolls. During the School play (also 
in Elsinor), however, the situation was not always so readily resolved. As 
will be discussed in the section on Sociodramatic Play and 
Humour/Pleasure, Colin and, in particular, Edward were far from willing to 
perform obedient pupils to Andrea’s teacher in spite of her repeated 
utilisation of a variety of teacherly strategies and set phrases to gain 
compliance: for example, “Edward. You spoilt it for all the children . . . 
Now go away and say sorry to them”; or “Stop what you’re doing and show 
me that you’re listening”; or “What’s this then Edward Davis?”. Lizzy, 
however, was far more willing to assume the “inferior” role of pupil to 
Andrea’s teacher (in spite of the occasional attempt, as mentioned above, to 
portray an adult) and she regularly reinforced her willingness to accept the 
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pupil role – both inside and outside of the play-frame – in order that the 
pretence might continue: “I’ve got to write something haven’t I, Miss 
Parr?”; “Pretend we’ve got to do our work. . . . Pretend we’ve got to do our 
work. Got to do my work”; “I’m doing my work”. It would seem that, for 
Lizzy, it was more important to play than it was for her to insist on a 
superior role. Indeed, Lizzy perhaps gained some pleasure from enacting 
compliance, obedience and conscientiousness. 
 
Equally interesting in Elsinor was Colin’s eagerness to be the compliant 
pupil in his School play with Edward, in spite of Edward’s very autocratic 
and demanding teacher. Colin’s pupil strove very diligently to produce work 
which Edward would reward with the wished-for stamps, but Edward’s 
teacher constantly refused to be satisfied: “So you don’t get any just a 
smiley face”; “Then you’ll get two . . . and not even four”; “No. I said lots 
of ‘a’s’. Now do it please”; and so on. These observations would appear to 
be congruent with Schwartzman’s findings (1978) that the 
metacommunicative messages of dominant children during pretend play 
were qualitatively different from those of less dominant children (cited in 
Goncu and Kessel, 1984, p. 8). Not until near the end of the episode did 
Colin appear to get frustrated with the never-satisfied teacher and avert his 
attention elsewhere. Significantly, this threat to the play caused Edward to 
lavish stamps on Colin’s work – the continuance of the pretence would 
seem to be too desirable a prize to lose: “You get all of them (not) just three. 
No five. You do get six. One two three four five six. And you have seven. 
Eight. Nine. Ten. You have ten stamps please”. Ms. Parr, in my subsequent 
interview with her, probably provided the reason for Colin’s willingness to 
persevere with such an apparently thankless role: 
 
I picked Colin as one of your people because intellectually he’s a lot 
higher up but in play he’s very shy. . . . In play he used to sit on the 
very corner and do his own thing and listen. Now I’ve seen he 
interacts a lot more, especially with Edward. He finds Edward an 
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easy one because Edward’s so bossy and into everything it’s easy for 
Colin to play with him because Edward will say, “Do this, do that” 
and Colin’s like, “Oh, I’ll do that then”. 
(Appendix C, EPS, p. 13) 
 
Edward’s dominance, then, would seem to be inadvertently “scaffolding” 
Colin’s induction into the social world of joint pretend play (Bruner, 1989). 
The social importance of such participation is stressed by Garvey: “Joining 
in the play of others and sharing playtime are central to children’s social 
relationships” (1990, p. 155). Colin does not yet seem to have the 
confidence to take on a high-status character during his pretence with 
Edward, but his ability to engage with others appears to be developing 
through his willingness to assume a more minor role. Colin, therefore, 
provides us with an example of two potential educational benefits – that is, 
both the diagnostic and the remedial – provided by pretend play and argued 
for by Moyles (1989, p. 132): “Play in itself can serve both to identify 
children’s needs and provide palliative measures”. Ms. Parr, in Elsinor, had 
utilised the children’s sociodramatic play for both of these purposes: it had 
been during passages of play that she had monitored Colin’s reluctance to 
become actively involved (“In play he used to sit on the very corner and do 
his own thing and listen”) and she had utilised play – and the more 
dominant figure of Edward – to improve Colin’s self-confidence and social 
abilities in these areas. 
 
The great degree of co-operation, co-ordination and shared understanding 
required to facilitate sociodramatic play has been touched upon repeatedly 
in this report (Dunn, 1988, p. 109). However, the extent to which mutual 
collaboration is an essential prerequisite for sociodramatic play was perhaps 
nowhere more apparent during my data collection than when successful 
joint pretence was not achieved. The most conspicuous example of this 
failure to attain mutual agreement in Elsinor School again concerns Andrea 
and her role as teacher. For over twenty minutes on my final day of 
131 
 
recording in that school she repeatedly attempted a range of strategies in a 
variety of environments to coerce, cajole, persuade and/or entice a number 
of children to become her pupils. She failed on every instance and only gave 
up her attempts when Ms. Parr drew the afternoon’s activities to a close. 
One has to wonder, therefore, while sociodramatic play requires, and 
presumably nurtures, social co-operation and collaboration, what social 
understandings are being gained when successful play is not reached? After 
all, as detailed in section 3 of the Literature Review chapter, “not having 
anyone to play with when others are engaged with their companions is a 
serious and sad state of affairs” (Garvey, 1990, p. 155). Will Andrea 
eventually realise that, until she becomes more compliant, more 
acknowledging of others people’s desires and demands, and more capable of 
seeing the world from their vantage point, she will continually risk failure in 
attempting to engage her peers in protracted pretend play – a prize 
apparently held in high regard by the children? As Garvey comments, 
“Social and communicative expertise as well as cognitive ability is reflected 
in [play] exchanges and their successful conclusion” (1990, p. 134). 
 
In spite of Andrea’s failed attempts to engage others in her shared pretence, 
however, the difficulties some children encounter in agreeing and sustaining 
joint pretend play were far more noticeable in Agincourt Primary School 
than in Elsinor. From the very first day of recording in this school, my field 
notes make continual reference to this problem: 
  
The social abilities of these children, on the whole, appear  
significantly less than those of the two classes I have previously  
researched. At the moment, the relative lack of social abilities 
appears commensurate with their relative inability to engage in 
shared pretence. 
(Appendix B, APS, p. 1). 
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Indeed, even the one passage of sustained sociodramatic play which I was 
able to capture in Agincourt was, arguably, only as the result of persistent 
striving and very sensitive social handling on the part of three of the 
children involved. Prior to the onset of the joint pretence, Craig had 
endeavoured for a full ten minutes to engage the other three – Angie, Mary 
and Jack – in shared play by adopting the (rather low status) role of a dog. 
Craig’s dog was sometimes fawning and sometimes naughty (stealing the 
food in the restaurant) but always failed to initiate prolonged mutual 
pretence. Unsurprisingly, in the light of the discussion in the Cognitive 
Development section above, this was largely due to the children failing to 
agree a joint pretend focus; specifically in this instance, a joint scenario. 
Angie persisted in imposing a “going to the beach” story-line while Jack 
adamantly refused to move from his “going to my bonfire party” plot. After 
ten minutes, however, Craig proved successful in enlisting both Angie and 
Mary into his Doggy pretence. Both girls were now prepared to respond to 
Craig as a dog and, accordingly, developed a joint scenario. Angie began to 
prepare the previously mentioned doggy’s “bed”: “I’m tidying this bed up, 
doggy. Then I’ll put it out, doggy,” and Craig’s dog responded with a 
couple of appreciative doggy “grunts”. Jack, meanwhile, still refused to co-
ordinate his play with that of the other three – he persisted in promoting his 
preferred “bonfire party” story-line. Mary, to my mind, then exhibited a 
significantly high level of social (and dramaturgical!) understanding in order 
to enlist Jack’s co-operation. She turned to Jack “in character” and, from 
within the play-frame, metacommunicatively endeavoured to meld the two 
conflicting scenarios together by simply asking Jack: “Are we having a 
bonfire did you say?” In other words, Mary implicitly facilitated the 
entrance of her and Angie’s characters – as well as the dog – into Jack’s 
pretend world. Jack, however, still refused to join in. Angie then made a 
comparable overture to Jack and offered to help him with the preparation of 
the food, “Can I help you?” Jack continued to refuse to participate: “No.” 
Angie went on with, “Shall I put it on the cooker?” and Jack responded with 
a surly and unhelpful, “Put it there.” Mary then went a stage further than she 
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had done before. Now she did not endeavour merely to link the two 
conflicting scenarios together, but she even “cast” Jack as the father in their 
play. She gave him, that is, a role of high status, overcame the tension and 
conflict, and did this all metacommunicatively from within the play-frame 
by stating, “Erm excuse me dad. Dad. The dog’s scared of the bonfire. The 
dog’s scared of the bonfire.” Angie accepted this implicit development of 
the story-line and told the dog to, “Get under the table.” All their efforts had 
not been in vain, it would appear, for Jack – for the one and only time – 
actually joined in the pretend play: he told them that the dog was “all right”. 
Shortly after this, however, Jack again became aggressive with Mary and 
refused to participate further in the shared pretence. It would appear, then, 
that it was social (rather than purely cognitive) ability which helped Angie, 
Craig and, in particular, Mary to foster and develop their joint pretend play. 
By the same token, it would seem to be Jack's difficulties in the social 
domain of understanding which render sociodramatic play, as yet, a very 
problematic area for him. Perlmutter and Pellegrini would presumably 
agree: “The ability to understand the points of view of others may facilitate 
and sustain fantasy play” (1987, pp. 278-9). 
 
Once again, both my data and my wider reading here would seem to be at 
odds with the findings of Rubin (1980). In classic Piagetian manner, rather 
than conflict resolution being essentially the result of social understanding 
and the acceptance of perspectives other than one’s own, he argues that 
compromise is necessary to alleviate the unpleasurable mental state of 
“cognitive disequilibria” (1980, p. 80). My data would appear to lend 
support to a more social constructivist analysis and suggest that conflict 
resolution is less about internalised “thinking” processes (a la Rubin) and 
more to do with complementary co-operation in the social world. But my 
disagreement with Rubin goes still further. He argues that peer conflict does 
not actually occur during social fantasy play, but that, when disagreement 
does appear, the actors “break frame” and resolve their conflict in the “real 
world”, thereby allowing participants to re-enter the pretence in a conjoined 
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manner. This, says Rubin, is further evidence that it is peer interaction, once 
again, which is proving beneficial to social development rather than 
sociodramatic play (1980, p. 81). However, my data demonstrate beyond 
doubt that peer conflict does, indeed, occur during fantasy play itself and 
that participants do not necessarily have to “shift from the non-literal to 
literal world” (Rubin, 1980, p. 81) in order to achieve successful resolution. 
Indeed, my data indicate that conflict was, if anything, more not less likely 
to be resolved within the passages of pretend play than outside of joint 
pretence. Take, for instance, the following exchange between Rebecca and 
Kathy during their Mummy and Big Sister episode in Harfleur. As will be 
noted, the play generally progresses in an extremely amicable manner. The 
only threat to the equilibrium comes when Kathy implicitly suggests a 
development to the plot-line, utilising a piece of material as a “scarf”. 
Rebecca is clearly less than interested in this suggestion but is able to 
resolve the potential conflict without stepping out of character and without 
breaking the play-frame. Rebecca also appears to accept this “rebuttal” and 
the joint pretence is thereby able to proceed: 
 
 Rebecca    Kathy 
1. Wow this one [a book] looks good 
2. Let’s see. Gosh. Gosh this one 
3. looks good as well 
4. And this one looks good it’s got  
5. number five on the front 
6. These are all the books that 
7. are ours O.K.? 
8. Yes these are all the books that are ours 
9. Sister what do you want for 
10. dinner? 
11. Anything 
12. O.K. I’ll see what I’ve got 
13. Mum mum I’ve got you a new scarf 
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14. Oh that’s nice sister 
15. Do you want me to put it in the 
16. wardrobe for you? 
17. No it’s for you if you buyed 
18. it 
19. Oh 
20. O.K. right I’ll just get dinner 
21. ready O.K.? Do you want a 
22. cup of tea? 
23. No can I have some water? 
 
Furthermore, it would seem that – as in this instance – it was often the 
desire to ensure the continuance of the pretence (presumably because of its 
intrinsically pleasurable nature) which encouraged participants to resolve 
tensions and conflicts – often, and again as in this instance, from inside the 
actual play-frame. Dockett’s findings (1998, p. 113) would also appear to 
agree with mine. Should it be needed, Jock and Jim’s Eating, Fire-fighting 
and Shopping episode provided yet another instance of successful conflict 
resolution from within the play-frame: Jock took Jim’s pizza away from him 
while he was still “eating”. Jim protested with, “I haven’t eaten all mine,” to 
which Jock explained, “It’s not warm enough.” Jim compliantly accepted 
this and the play was able to continue amicably through Jim saying, “I’ve 
eaten mine now.” Had Rubin himself noticed sociodramatic play’s ability to 
facilitate conflict resolution, he may have been less insistent in arguing for 
the supremacy of “peer interaction” over “dramatic activity” in achieving 
social-cognitive gains (1980, p. 81). 
 
But to return to Agincourt. The relative paucity of sociodramatic play which 
I observed in this school must not, it should be noted, be held to imply that 
the pupils’ play per se was less frequent or less sustained than that observed 
in either of the other schools. Rather, the majority of children recorded in 
Agincourt were concentratedly engaged in pretend play for the majority of 
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the time. The most significant difference, as previously alluded to, was that 
the overwhelming amount of play in which the children engaged in 
Agincourt was of a solitary nature. On day two of my data collection, for 
instance, Mary was engrossed for fourteen minutes in play on her own – 
until Shane came and snatched away the bowl of money with which she was 
playing. On day three, four children (the maximum number allowed in the 
restaurant area in Agincourt at any one time) were involved in virtually 
uninterrupted play for seventeen minutes but, again, the degree of social 
interaction was negligible. Indeed, “John” exhibited the longest continuous 
period of “good”, socially acceptable behaviour – eleven minutes – whilst 
engaged in solitary pretence in the restaurant which I observed of him in the 
entire three days that I was a member of this reception class. This 
observation was endorsed in my interview with Ms. Pollard, one of 
Agincourt’s reception class teachers, later that afternoon. Once again, then, 
it would seem that, whilst the children in Agincourt had the cognitive ability 
to engage in pretend play (they seemed, for instance, to experience no 
semiotic difficulty in allowing a play item to “represent” an item from 
reality), it was their relative social immaturity which rendered sustained 
sociodramatic play so difficult for them. Put another way, this observation 
would seem to conform to Piaget’s assertion that solitary pretend play is a 
less sophisticated form of pretence than shared play, but it would also 
disagree with Piaget and assert that the greater sophistication is due to 
increased social – rather than cognitive – competence: “ ‘According to 
Piaget, . . . a shift from solitary to social pretence may occur at about three 
years of age’ ” (Fein, G., 1981, cited in Dunn, 1988, p. 117). The ability to 
engage in sociodramatic play in Piaget’s paradigm of development, then, 
implicitly attributes the progress to cognitive advancement (see Sylva and 
Lunt, 1982, p. 162). My findings, however, suggest that it is primarily due 
to increased social understanding. These findings – betokening that, while 
advancements in play per se may be indicative of cognitive development, 
progression in sociodramatic play is fundamentally dependent upon growth 
in social cognition – are supported elsewhere in the literature (see, for 
137 
 
instance, Smith et al, 1998, p. 197). It is perhaps hardly surprising, then, that 
Smith et al (1998, pp. 198-9) assert “the evidence is better for the benefits 
of play for social competence” than it is for cognitive gains. 
 
The relative social immaturity of the pupils at Agincourt might also be seen 
in the fact that Piaget identifies three years as the age where the shift from 
solitary to social play might occur. The Agincourt pupils were on average 
approximately two years older than this and yet still overwhelmingly 
indulged in solitary pretence. Indeed, the interviews with the two class 
teachers confirmed that they also were concerned about their children’s 
perceived lack of social understanding. Interestingly, during one of my 
preliminary visits to the class, Ms. Murphy emphasised to the children the 
need for social sensitivity during their time in the restaurant area. She 
stressed, “You have to share”, “You mustn’t throw the food around”, and so 
on, as if she were aware that the children might encounter difficulties in 
sustaining mutually-agreed pretend play. Ms. Pollard also confessed to me, 
prior to my first recording session, that she was nervous and feared the 
children would not provide me with the data I was seeking. 
 
One other form of play was also observed to be more frequent than peer 
pretend play at Agincourt School and that was sociodramatic play within an 
asymmetrical relationship – in other words with an adult. The field notes 
from my research there persistently refer to the children’s attempts to enlist 
me within their play. Whilst being as friendly and as co-operative as I could, 
this clearly was not providing the wished-for instances of sociodramatic 
play amongst peers. Indeed, the children’s apparent need to pretend with a 
willing adult – rather than a peer – might also be indicative of immaturity in 
the play context. Perlmutter and Pellegrini’s research, for example, found 
that three year olds produced more fantasy play with their parents than with 
their peers whereas for children aged four and above it was the other way 
around (1987, p. 277). The Agincourt children’s social immaturity, in other 
words, might have (unconsciously?) encouraged them to seek joint pretence 
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with an adult as this offered a more satisfying, less problematic, sustained 
enjoyment than with a peer. Indeed, it may even have been that the children 
– possibly denied such opportunities at home (Smith, 1988, p. 193) – 
actually required adults to “scaffold” their development of pretend scenarios 
prior to their being able to accomplish such mutuality with their peers. 
Again this would appear to be congruent with the literature on the subject 
and would once more seem to indicate the relative immaturity of the 
Agincourt children within the social play context: “It appears, as Vygotsky 
(1976) hypothesised, that younger pre-schoolers do rely on more competent 
adult support” (Perlmutter and Pellegrini, 1987, pp. 276-7; see also Smith, 
1988, p. 192). 
 
The value and necessity of adult scaffolding of the children’s pretence was 
perhaps nowhere more apparent than on the final day of my data collection 
in Agincourt. “Helen” had previously only been recorded engaging in 
solitary pretend play. On day 3, however, the class teacher – Ms. Murphy – 
made a conscious attempt to join in the children’s pretence. Significantly, 
perhaps, Ms. Murphy’s engagement with the play was not superficial but 
wholly committed, thereby enabling her to “enhance and deepen the child’s 
experiences through intervention” (Kitson, 1997, p. 33). Ms. Murphy, that 
is, endeavoured to “interact” with Helen rather than merely trying to 
“intervene” in her play (Kitson, 1997, p. 36). She went towards the 
restaurant and asked Helen, “Can I order a take-away?” She then gave 
Helen her home address and the time she wanted the meal delivered. She 
was clearly attempting, in other words, to structure and to scaffold the 
development of the pretend scenario with Helen and, notably, from within 
the actual play-frame. As a result, it would appear that Helen had no 
difficulty whatsoever in sustaining the pretence – in spite of frequent 
interruptions and persistent calls upon Ms. Murphy from other children. 
Indeed, when Ms. Murphy broke away from the restaurant area four minutes 
later, Helen continued the pretence by carrying on her preparations for the 
take-away meal. One minute later, she then re-engaged Ms. Murphy in her 
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fictional scenario – and extended the story-line – by calling out to the 
teacher, “Ms. Murphy, what would you like for your pudding?” In all, this 
passage of asymmetrical play lasted for over six minutes (indeed, until Ms. 
Murphy called the session to a close) – more than twice as long as the single 
passage of symmetrical sociodramatic play I was able to record in 
Agincourt. This instance would appear to support the claims of Smilansky 
and numerous other researchers (e.g. Dockett, 1998; Kitson, 1997) that 
sociodramatic play can indeed be encouraged and developed through adult 
tutoring (Smith, 1988, p. 195). 
 
Once again, then, the data would seem to suggest that, despite the Agincourt 
children’s relatively high age (around five), their social immaturity meant 
that they required adult assistance in their social play which would normally 
be applicable to children around two years their junior. This raises 
interesting questions about the value and appropriateness of adult 
intervention in children’s play – especially in a formal educational context. 
The literature – as well as my data – would indicate that adult intervention is 
desirable when children find it difficult to sustain sociodramatic play 
because of their relative paucity of social understanding. Children who are 
able to sustain joint pretence with their peers are, arguably, less needing of 
adult intervention (Perlmutter and Pellegrini, 1987, p. 276). These 
observations are particularly pertinent in light of the fact that, prior to my 
visit to Elsinor Primary School, Ms. Parr had actually been criticised by 
Ofsted inspectors for not regularly intervening in the children’s social 
pretend play – even though they were, of course, generally very competent 
in this area. My data would suggest that adult scaffolding is appropriate in 
children’s sociodramatic play where the children find difficulty in otherwise 
sustaining shared pretence but that – as with any successful learning process 
involving scaffolding – there has to come a moment of “handover” where 
the learner is deemed competent enough to continue the activity without the 
support of someone else (Buckingham, 1994; Meakin, 1998). Meckley, for 
instance, found “a sophisticated range of behaviours in the play of four- and 
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five-year-old children without the presence of an adult” (cited in Bennett et 
al, 1997, p. 5). Indeed, research would indicate that adult intervention in the 
sociodramatic play of socially-competent children might actually have a 
deleterious effect on its frequency, length and sophistication: “Pellegrini 
(1984) found with four year olds . . . adult presence was negatively 
correlated with interactive-dramatic play” (Perlmutter and Pellegrini, 1987, 
p. 270). Moreover, several teachers in Bennett et al’s study were able to 
recall instances when their interventions “had a detrimental effect” on the 
children’s play (1997, p. 41). I certainly observed several occasions in 
Elsinor when Ms. Parr’s well-intentioned interventions brought the pretence 
unwittingly to a premature halt. Note, for example, the following instance: 
Edward and Andrea were setting up a variety of impedimenta to commence 
a Postman story-line. Both had begun to prepare and write the “letters” 
which were to be delivered on their “rounds”: Andrea said, “I’ll write a 
message on a card so you know.” Ms. Parr – whilst engaged in a 
conversation with two other children – took this opportunity to “ring” 
Edward on a play-telephone: 
 
 Ms. Parr    Edward 
1. Ring ring. Ring ring. Ring ring 
2. Hello 
3. Ring ring 
4. Hello 
5. Hello who’s that? 
6. Postman Edward 
7. Hello Postman Edward how are 
8. you today? 
9. Fine 
10. Erm could you bring me a 
11. letter please 
12. Yeah 
13. from the post office? 
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14. Thank-you bye 
 
This intervention then resulted in Edward leaving Andrea to “deliver” a card 
to Ms. Parr and the mutual pretence was not re-established. Apparently 
without realising it, and presumably in an attempt to follow the Ofsted 
inspectors’ guidance, Ms. Parr had brought to a close, before it had really 
commenced, the single possibility for joint pretend play between Andrea 
and Edward (both quite dominant children, remember) which I witnessed 
during my time with this class. It is perhaps hardly surprising, then, that 
Christie argues that adult intervention in pretend play when it has reached a 
certain level of sophistication should be phased out (cited in Smith, 1988, p. 
195). This advice, moreover, would appear to be congruent with the social 
constructivist approach to learning adopted throughout this work. As 
Bennett et al note, the social constructivist theories of Lev Vygotsky and 
Jerome Bruner “imply a proactive role for the teacher in creating 
challenging learning environments and providing appropriate assistance at 
the right time even in play activities” (1997, p. 12). A key phrase in this 
quotation must surely be, “at the right time”. Teacher intercession in 
children’s sociodramatic play must be sensitive to, and supportive of, the 
children’s respective levels of social competence – as well as, of course, 
their cognitive, linguistic and intrapersonal capabilities. Teachers can 
actively assist children’s learning and their learning how to play (Bennett et 
al, 1997, p. 14) but they must also be aware of the necessity of “handover” – 
of the refraining from intervention where appropriate – if the children are to 
become adept, autonomous players. 
 
4. Sociodramatic Play and Identity Construction/Emotional and Moral 
Development 
According to Vygotsky, play is “a novel form of behaviour liberating the 
child from constraints” (1978, p. 96). It contains the capacity, in other 
words, for wish-fulfilment – for the child to possess a command and control 
over events and situations not normally attainable in the “real” world. As 
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already touched upon, the ability of play to provide children with an 
otherwise unavailable status and power was notable in the roles which were 
most fervently striven for – for example, parents, older siblings, fire-fighters 
and teachers. Moreover, not only the striving for certain roles but also the 
ability to sustain the portrayal over a period of time are, arguably, essential 
if the child is ultimately to crystallise its own identity “in a social world of 
infinite roles and possible identities” (Berg, 1999, p. 18). To put it another 
way (and as examined in detail in the Literature Review), the assuming and 
continuance of roles other than one’s own paradoxically assists, in the final 
reckoning, the creation and understanding of one’s own emotions and 
character or, as Berg phrases it, the self is being subjected “to formation 
through the child’s working with different human stimuli from the outside 
world” (1999, p. 18). Sensitivity to the perspectives of others helps 
formulate a sense of self. Intrapersonal, as well as interpersonal, intelligence 
is thus fostered in sociodramatic play. Again, the ability of the children to 
adopt and sustain a convincing role was repeatedly apparent in the recorded 
passages of pretend play. For example, Colin and Lizzy in Elsinor enacting 
the personae of caring, protective parents: 
 
  Colin     Lizzy 
1. Now me read this um book 
2. to the baby. It’s a hard 
3. book. It’s a real book this is. 
4. Brush. Comb. Toothbrush. 
5. Shoes socks and boots. 
6. And coat hat. ( ) 
7. Cup. Teddy. Doll. Baby. 
8. Car. 
9.      Leave the baby alone 
10.      She’s asleep now she’s 
11.      not looking at the pages 
12.      You all right? (Take there) 
143 
 
13.      She doesn’t read anything 
14.      she doesn’t want ( ). Come on 
15.      Right. De de. Now sleep 
16.      Go to sleep 
 
Lizzy’s empathetic understanding of the “baby’s” needs and wishes 
displayed in lines 12-16 may well be regarded as exemplifying the benefits 
of play previously referred to – namely, in allowing Lizzy to express the 
baby’s feelings and desires, she is simultaneously being allowed to explore 
and express her own emotional terrain (Fein, 1991, p. 330). Furthermore, 
through “stepping out of herself” and “becoming a parent” Lizzy is thereby 
enabled to view her own self from the vantage point of another, thus 
arguably assisting in the development of her self-concept. Herron and 
Sutton-Smith (1982) cohere with this line of reasoning: “To establish a 
separate identity . . . the child must literally get outside of himself [sic] and 
apprehend himself from some other perspective” (cited in Moyles, 1989, p. 
145). 
 
Moreover, not only can sociodramatic play arguably assist in defining and 
understanding one’s own personality, it can also help to constitute children’s 
moral framework – their notions of right and wrong, good and evil (Berg, 
1999). Especially noticeable in this respect in the data I collected were the 
two “serious” portrayals of pupils – on both occasions the pupils were 
depicted as industrious, polite and keen to please the teacher: ideals and 
values keenly promoted in this particular reception class and, arguably, in 
the wider culture of which the children were a part. Colin’s diligent pupil, 
for instance, explicitly asked Edward’s teacher, “Is this being helpful?” 
 
The wish to portray characters of high status and also to utilise 
sociodramatic play’s ability to reaffirm the supremacy of good over evil 
were not only evident in the children’s play but also in the semi-structured 
interviews I conducted with them. The following is a case in point: 
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  Mr. Meakin   Paulo   Jeff 
1. Who do you like playing at 
2. best? Goodies or baddies? 
3. Goodies 
4. Goodies 
5. Why do you like playing goodies? 
6. ‘Cause they  
7. always win 
8. So what kind of goodies might 
9. you be in your play? 
10. I want to be  
11. a knight 
12. I want to be a 
13. spaceman 
14. Did one of you say you were  
15. going to be frightening when 
16. you were playing? 
17. Yeah. I was  
18. pretending 
(Appendix C, HPS, p.1) 
 
The children had no hesitation whatsoever in affirming their preference for 
assuming morally-good characters. Jeff’s answer as to why this might be the 
case may initially strike one as being rather immoral – “’Cause they always 
win.” However, rather than simply displaying a Machiavellian desire to be 
on the winning side whatever the cost, Jeff might conversely here be 
demonstrating an implicit understanding of genre: in most forms of 
literature – and especially children’s literature – good overcomes evil in the 
end. Ultimate success and moral rectitude frequently go hand in hand in the 
stories and television programmes which children are most often exposed to, 
and it might be this which Jeff is unconsciously alluding to. Further 
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evidence of the moral surety pervading the children’s play might be seen in 
Paulo’s response to my question, “Did one of you say you were going to be 
frightening when you were playing?” Paulo was clearly concerned lest I 
thought that he was “really” trying to frighten someone and so clarified the 
situation for my benefit: “Yeah. I was pretending.” Play, once again, was 
seen as something which was exciting and pleasurable, yet where cultural 
moral norms could be experimented with only ultimately to be reaffirmed. 
Jeff and Paulo’s predilection not simply for morally good characters but also 
for exciting ones with high status can be seen in their choice of favourites: a 
knight for Jeff and a spaceman for Paulo. Both of these characters, one 
might hazard a guess, offer possibilities of perspective and power not 
normally available to the boys in real-life situations and might thereby, in 
their own small way, assist the boys’ developing sense of others and, 
concurrently, their developing sense of self. 
 
The Literature Review chapter of this work also detailed how social 
symbolic play might usefully assist emotional development as well as 
helping children to confront and perhaps accommodate anxieties and fears 
which are present in the “real” world. The play, that is, might possess 
therapeutic benefits for children and their feelings. One such instance 
occurred during Jock and Larry’s Pizzas and Fires play in Harfleur. Jock 
appeared to be searching for reasons for Larry – his fellow fire-fighter – to 
stay at his “house” and allow him to cook and care for him. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
 
  Jock    Larry 
1. Has your mum died? 
2. No 
3. Has your mum died? 
4. No 
5. She has 
[Larry shakes his head] 
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6. No I mean your pretend mum 
[Larry nods his head] 
7. Well you have to stay 
8. and visit here 
 
Understandably, the notion of his mother dying initially appears wholly 
unacceptable to Larry – he twice says “No” to the suggestion and shakes his 
head the third time. However, after Jock has stepped out of the play-frame 
to explain, “No I mean your pretend mum” the appalling thought of the 
death of his mother seems to become more acceptable to Larry – on the 
fictitious plane at least. Indeed, when I inquired in the ensuing interview 
why Jock was “looking after” Larry, Larry seemed to experience neither 
difficulty nor hesitation in replying, “My pretend mummy was died.” 
Perhaps, the children’s sociodramatic play, then, has allowed Larry to 
encounter, and thereby possibly begin to accommodate, the seemingly 
unthinkable notion of his mother’s death. The feelings associated with such 
loss have been able, however tentatively, to be vicariously experienced in a 
pretend – and, therefore, “safe” – environment. Another, perhaps more 
“immediate”, instance of sociodramatic play allowing children possibly to 
“live through” difficult and distressing circumstances appeared in Rebecca 
and Kathy’s Mummy and Big Sister episode in Harfleur. Regularly during 
the thirty-eight minutes of this play, Kathy introduced and reintroduced the 
plot-line of her “nana” being ill in hospital. In the interview which followed 
their play, Kathy revealed that her grandmother was, indeed, currently in 
hospital but that she would be allowed home “in two days time”. Again, 
then, could the “safety” and the aforementioned “Perseus’s-shield” potential 
of sociodramatic play be helping Kathy to cope with difficult and unpleasant 
feelings currently worrying her? It is, of course, extremely problematic to 
prove beyond doubt that this is actually the case here, but surely such a 
hypothesis is not beyond the bounds of reason? 
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If social pretend play may, indeed, assist children in coming to terms with 
feelings and experiences difficult to encounter or to cope with in “the real 
world”, it is interesting to speculate as to why, as previously mentioned, all 
three reception teachers in Harfleur Primary School – in the semi-structured 
interview I conducted with them – were so adamant that toys such as swords 
and guns should not be allowed in school. Indeed, many nurseries and 
playgroups actually ban pretend weapons (Smith et al, 1998, p. 187). Ms. 
Swift had no hesitation in asserting that such play props “encourage 
aggression”. This in spite of the fact that, of all three reception teachers in 
Harfleur, she was the most ready to acknowledge the potential therapeutic 
benefits of sociodramatic play. It helps them “to work out situations,” Ms. 
Swift commented, “such as if a child is going into hospital or something.” 
But could it be argued that aggressive play such as shooting and sword-
fighting might help children – especially boys (all three teachers said they 
had never witnessed this kind of play activity amongst girls) – to 
accommodate and make socially-acceptable aggressive and pugilistic 
desires and inclinations? Ms. Britten observed that, even though war play 
and war toys were not allowed in Harfleur, the boys still insisted on 
transforming “bricks and that, they’ll often make into guns and things.” Ms. 
Swift quickly added the comment, “But we always stop it, don’t we?” 
Indeed, researchers such as Carlsson-Paige and Levin (cited in Smith et al, 
1998, p. 188) would agree with Harfleur’s reception teachers about the 
negative effects of aggressive play, but academic opinion on the subject 
remains divided. Sutton-Smith, for instance, argues that war play is clearly 
pretence for children and quotes the child who, when his father asked him 
not to play with toy guns, replied, “But, dad, I don’t want to shoot anybody, 
I just want to play” (cited in Smith et al, 1998, p. 188). Arguably, if boys are 
continually exhibiting such an inclination for play where good overcomes 
evil (albeit with a level of pretend violence involved), then socially-
acceptable norms of morality are still, in the final reckoning, being 
reinforced and reasserted. Anti-social emotions such as aggression and 
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animosity are, moreover, being explored and, potentially, accommodated in 
a safe (because “unreal”) environment. 
  
The Literature Review chapter of this work discussed Piaget’s (1976) 
observations on society’s ability to pass on its moral code. As we noted, 
Piaget emphasised the sense of “order”, the importance of regularity and 
rule-governed behaviour in early childhood. Piaget saw this transference of 
society’s rules, regulations, attitudes and values as lying at the heart of 
children’s moral understanding (1976, p. 413). Indeed, Rubin (1980) also 
comments on sociodramatic play’s ability to practise, consolidate and 
strengthen children’s understanding of “rule and role conceptualisations” 
and he includes those of “social role behaviours” (p. 73). Throughout my 
data collection, the notion of observance of social rules, expectations and 
regularities was time and time again encountered. Indeed, the repetitive 
nature of much of the play was in itself, I would suggest, indicative of 
sociodramatic play’s facility to reinforce notions of socially-appropriate 
cycles of behaviour and expectation. Observe, for instance, this break-down 
of Jock and Jim’s Eating, Fire-fighting and Shopping play: 
 
0-3 minutes:  working (putting out fires) 
3-9 minutes:  eating 
9-11 minutes:  working (putting out fires) 
11-16 minutes: eating (Jock says it is “dinner-time”) 
16-18 minutes: working (putting out fires) 
18-22 minutes: eating (Jock says, “Let’s get eggs for tea”) 
22-28 minutes: shopping (Jim explains the boys’ failure to return  
immediately to work by saying, “It’s our day off 
today.”) 
28-29 minutes: working (putting out fires. Jock says, “This is the last  
fire we’re putting out today.”) 
29-32 minutes: shopping 
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Could it be that the boys’ quite rigid adherence to the cycles of work-and-
eating and work-and-eating-and-shopping is symptomatic of their induction 
into society’s norms, expectations and regularities? Is the play assisting in 
the boys’ enculturation not only into the cycles, rules and roles of their 
society but, along with this, their culture’s moral framework? Are 
culturally-desirable concepts such as work, working together and caring for 
one another being reinforced and reinstated in their sociodramatic play? In 
summary, is sociodramatic play – in all the examples cited in this section – 
conceivably assisting development in those overlapping areas detailed in 
section four of the Literature Review: in the children’s self-concept 
formulation, their emotional, intrapersonal growth and their increased moral 
understanding? My data would seem to suggest that this is, indeed, the case. 
 
5. Sociodramatic Play and Humour/Pleasure 
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of the play which I observed was how 
enjoyable it was for all the children who participated. Vygotsky himself was 
aware of the importance of pleasure in play and cautioned against 
overlooking this feature: “Theories which ignore [this] fact . . . result in a 
pedantic intellectualisation of play” (1978, p. 92). Before moving on to 
examine specifically the notion of humour and sociodramatic play, it may 
be worthwhile noting the extent to which the children’s curricular activities 
informed the content and nature of their play and the pleasure thereby 
reciprocally nurtured in the more “academic” aspects of schooling – a topic 
which I first visited in the Language Development section above. There is a 
commonsensical assumption that “work” and “play” are polar opposites, the 
one operating in extreme contrast to the other (Moyles, 1989, pp. 85-87). 
However, my recorded data from Elsinor School in particular but also from 
Harfleur (see my comments on Alice and Zelda’s Poorly Baby Sister 
episode above) repeatedly reveal the extent to which the children’s pretend 
play was facilitative of, and complementary to, the learning which had been 
encountered during more formal curricular activities. Time and time again, 
the children’s play re-enacted procedures such as making their own story 
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booklets, repeating the sounds and actions connected with particular letters, 
colouring and drawing activities, and also mathematically-based routines. 
Of course, it may be argued that this was because a significant proportion of 
the children’s play which I recorded in Elsinor – unlike Agincourt and 
Harfleur – was focussed upon the School table (although not all the pretend 
School play which I observed occurred in this location) but what appeared 
particularly significant was the extent to which curricular activities were 
engaged in with much greater enthusiasm and motivation during pretence 
than during “reality” – again, a feature I have commented on previously. 
Andrea, for instance, approached her writing with far more eagerness in the 
afternoon’s play than in the morning’s Literacy Hour – and it was as a result 
of her play activity that she was able to produce a completed booklet and 
show it to the rest of the class at the end of the following day. Ms. Parr, the 
class teacher, herself noted Andrea’s increased motivation for curricular 
work during play periods in the interview I conducted with her. She 
commented how, in play, Andrea had “really taken off with the routines of 
the class” and how, again in play, her “language is really coming out”. The 
pleasure engendered in pretend play, in other words, was arguably a greater 
motivational factor towards curricular activity than the mere activity itself. 
During play, literacy and numeracy activities seemed to acquire a meaning 
and a significance for the children not so readily apparent during their 
respective curriculum “Hours”. As Ms. Parr noted, if Andrea writes during 
play, it is because she genuinely wishes to communicate something to 
someone else; in Ms. Parr’s words, “The writing becomes important.” Potter 
made similar observations from her own research: “Young children, quite 
naturally, use pretend play to . . . practise their developing understanding of 
print and its uses” (1996, p. 14). These observations would seem to be 
commensurate with research findings in both England and Australia which 
concluded that play can encourage most under fives to engage 
enthusiastically in literacy-focussed activities (Hall, 1995; Reynolds, 1997; 
cited in David, 1998, p. 62). The pleasure and enjoyment nurtured through 
play, then, need not necessarily be regarded as a diversion and “escape” 
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from the more arduous, and the allegedly more “important”, curricular 
routines of schooling, but more accurately perhaps can be seen as a potential 
mechanism for deepening children’s engagement with aspects of the 
curriculum in a manner which has greater affective and motivational 
potency (Moyles, 1989, p. 86). 
 
However, although a number of parallels were drawn in the Literature 
Review chapter between play and humour – both are human, social, 
pleasurable, operate on two planes of reality and are highly rule-orientated – 
and, moreover, the central importance of pleasure to play has been 
continuously stressed, it may come as a surprise to note that, in all the 
research I have undertaken, the use of humour has, in each and every case, 
operated antagonistically to the continued, shared play. These results, it 
should be noted, are diametrically opposed to those of Bergen (2001) who 
found a considerable amount of humour during children’s play time and, 
most significantly of all, concluded that, “Social pretence had the most 
instances” (cited in Bergen, 2003, p. 48). To commence this aspect of the 
discussion, and my refutation of Bergen’s findings, it may be worth quoting 
at length a passage from my pilot research (1999) at Elsinor Primary School 
when the potential incompatibility of humour with social pretend play first 
began to make its presence felt3: 
 
While it is certainly true that the children manifestly enjoyed their 
joint play (indeed, “Hazel” cited as the reason why she did not wish 
to cease playing when it was time for dinner as “’Cause we were 
having a good game”) it is possibly significant that comedy as such 
was never used to enhance the pretence and, when it did appear, it 
was without exception to the danger and detriment of the continued 
play. The example of the Cat, Food and Foreign Chefs episode 
[where two boys were “feeding a cat”] is perhaps the clearest 
3 It is worth mentioning again that during this pilot research, and unlike all my later 
research, I did not use a video camera and, consequently, when transcribing the data I only 
had access to audio information. 
152 
                                                 
 
indication of this, although the examples and issues it gives rise to 
were by no means unique: 
   “Steven”   “Simon” 
1. You can’t have all this 
2. I’ll give you some chicken 
3. Where’s the chicken 
4. There. Chicken chicky chick 
5. Do you want some beans Ah 
6.     There you go 
7. I’ll get you some egg 
8.     Do you want a brush to eat 
    [Laughter] 
9. Do you want a brush to eat 
10. (Want) sssiiirrrr 
11.      Do you want some beer 
12.     Eh eh 
13. Do you want some more bread 
    [Laughter] 
14. I’m not doing anytheeeeng 
15. I not 
16. Errr. Wha’d’you waaant 
17. Do you want a orange 
18. Do you want some a orange 
19. Simon 
20. Do you want some a 
21. That is not a ball 
22. Do you want some tomatoes it’s a orange 
23. Do you want a piece of wood Want some a thees 
24. Do you want a piece of woood 
25. (Or) this? 
[Laughter] 
26. Do you want this 
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27. Do you want this 
28. Do you want some a brush 
[Laughter] 
29. Look. Look 
30. Do you want some cheese Da da da da 
31. I’ll put some cheese in da da da da 
32. Cheese cheese cheese cheese do do do de da 
33. And some do you want some 
34. biscuits. Bishy bishy  They’re carrots 
35. biscuits 
 
On line 8 Simon asks, “Do you want a brush to eat” presumably 
prompted by the presence of a brush. The question is clearly 
ridiculous within the context of the play (cats do not eat brushes) and 
is followed by laughter. Does this endanger the continuance of the 
pretence? On line 10 Simon then commences a stereotypical comic 
“foreign accent”. Again, is this to the detriment of the depth of 
engagement with the play? Indeed, at line 19 Steven appears to get 
annoyed with Simon’s clowning and exclaims, “Simon”. Simon, 
however, continues to play for comic effect until, at line 28, Steven 
seems to adopt an attitude of “if-you-can’t-beat-them-join-them” and 
even employs Simon’s earlier strategy of offering something 
inedible to the “cat”: “Do you want a piece of wood?”. The laughter 
continues and the pretend play soon breaks down completely having 
only lasted a total of 35 lines. When Simon and Steven recommence 
playing, the element of pretence is clearly unsustainable. The boys 
appear more concerned to continue the comedy and to utilise 
humour to encroach into taboo areas: for instance, “Oh my boobies” 
and “She’s scratching my bottom”. The question this possibly gives 
rise to, then, is: what is the function of comedy/humour in children’s 
sociodramatic play? Must it always be anarchic and subversive 
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(threatening the sustainability of the pretence) or does it positively 
assist social relationships? 
 
These observations from my pilot research about the possible 
incompatibility of humour and sociodramatic play would clearly appear to 
be at odds not only with Bergen’s research but also with Garvey’s 
observation that: “Children do indeed . . . often smile and giggle, signalling 
to each other their genuine pleasure in the play” (1990, p. 139). Note also 
Smith et al (1998): “In children . . . laughter and the associated ‘open mouth 
play face’ usually signals [sic] play” (p. 178). Is the distinguishing factor 
here between play in general and social pretend play? Is sociodramatic play 
in some sense a “more serious business” than other forms of play (such as 
rough-and-tumble which is “typically signalled by smiling and laughter” 
[Smith et al, 1998, p. 186])? Interestingly, whilst Bergen distinguishes 
between what she terms “serious make-believe” (where children endeavour 
“to replicate the real world”) and “joking make-believe” (during which 
children “distort the real world”) (2003, p. 47), she also goes on to state that, 
“There are presently no studies of social pretence that have separated 
observational data into categories of serious make-believe and joking make-
believe” (2003, p. 49). This work attempts to plug the gap by asking the 
question, “Is it sociodramatic play which is actually ‘serious make-believe’ 
as opposed to other forms of play which may be categorised, in part at least, 
as ‘joking’?” If so, why should this be the case? Does it, I wonder, have 
anything to do with the notion discussed in the Literature Review chapter 
about humour-as-a-safety-mechanism (i.e. joking, unlike sociodramatic 
play, being decidedly unempathetic?); or does it, perhaps, also have some 
connection – again as detailed in the Literature Review – with the fact that 
funniness is concerned with the breaking-and-marking of rules whilst shared 
pretend play necessarily involves their observation? 
 
Significantly, in the light of this discussion on sociodramatic play and 
humour (as opposed to pleasure), the single sustained passage I recorded 
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during my field work per se when laughter was most overtly striven for and 
obtained was a passage where the sociodramatic play was in constant danger 
of falling apart. It occurred in Elsinor when Edward and Colin attempted to 
join Andrea and Lizzy’s School play. Needless to say, Andrea wished the 
newcomers to accept pupil roles, “Edward can you two be the kids please?”. 
Edward immediately answered, “No” to this suggestion and proposed an 
adult male role for himself, “There needs to be a boy, boy one as well there 
needs to be Mr Meakin in this school so I’m Mr Meakin”. Shortly after this, 
Andrea then seemed to adopt an attitude of, “Well if I can’t get you to be a 
pupil in our play then I’ll try and make you laugh” and she did this by 
repeating her well-worn teacher’s phrase, but this time in a funny, staccato 
voice whilst simultaneously patting herself on the head: “Stop what you’re 
doing and show me that you’re listening”. This did, indeed, elicit laughter 
from the boys, presumably because – faced with the breakdown of her 
sociodramatic play – Andrea had both broken and marked implicit rules 
about acceptable behaviour for teachers: they don’t talk in funny voices and 
pat themselves on the head whilst addressing their pupils. Edward then 
continued with a variety of strategies to undermine the pretence and “play it 
for laughs”. For instance, at one point he appeared to adopt the role of 
compliant pupil by obligingly providing the requested apology, but then 
immediately revealed his true cards by calling the “teacher” by her own 
name: “Sorry, Andrea Yule”. Again, a rule of expected behaviour in school 
had been both breached and recognised: children do not call teachers by 
their first names. Although this display of wit is antithetical to the successful 
continuance of the play, it nevertheless displays a remarkable degree of 
quick thinking on Edward’s part: whilst apparently conforming to the 
teacher’s request, he was nonetheless simultaneously metacommunicating 
the message, “You might want to be the teacher and you might think I’m 
being a pupil but really you’re just plain old Andrea Yule and not really Ms. 
Parr at all”. Once again, then, it would appear that sociodramatic play and 
humour are inimical to one another. The rule observance essential to social 
pretend play would indeed appear to be antithetical to the rule-breaking-
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and-marking required for humour – an issue I first raised in the Literature 
Review – and, consequently, the two would appear to be incapable of 
operating simultaneously. Indeed, I made this observation to Ms. Murphy, 
one of the reception class teachers in Agincourt School and, on reflection, 
she admitted to never having witnessed the children laugh during social 
pretend play whereas bursts of laughter were frequent during other play 
activities. Whilst rule-orientation is fundamental to both humour and social 
pretend play, then, the differing requirements they have of rule-observation 
would appear, in part at least, to account for the fact that I have not 
witnessed sociodramatic play and humour co-existing in the research I have 
carried out. Sociodramatic play, it would seem, whilst being inherently 
pleasurable is also, surprisingly perhaps, inherently humourless. 
 
There is also, though, a second feature of sociodramatic play and humour 
which may account for their incompatibility and this concerns the notion of 
empathy, again discussed in the Literature Review. In adopting a role in 
sociodramatic play, children are, to a degree at least, adopting the 
viewpoints and characteristics of someone other than themselves. They are 
“making an imaginative leap from their actual situation or roles into a 
supposed one” (McGregor et al, 1977, p. 11). To play a role is to experience 
vicariously the world from another perspective – it is fundamentally 
empathetic. Laughter, on the other hand, as we have already seen, may be 
regarded as inimical to empathy. In making potentially dangerous situations 
“safe”, humour arguably distances us from the humanity in a human 
situation. It puts us on the “outside” rather than the “inside”. Bergson 
appears to be in agreement here: “I would point out . . . the absence of 
feeling which usually accompanies laughter. . . . look upon life as a 
disinterested spectator: many a drama will turn into a comedy” (1980, pp. 
63-4). Humour, in other words, appears to take the heat – the empathetic 
emotional engagement – out of a situation. As stated earlier, I may laugh at 
a joke about a starving African, a person with cerebral palsy, or someone 
with Down’s syndrome – but only so long as I refuse to see the situation 
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from their point of view or from the point of view of someone closely 
associated with them; only so long as the danger appears – to me at least – 
to be “not real” and, therefore, to use Morris’s words, does not need to be 
taken “seriously” (1967, p. 103). Sociodramatic play, on the other hand, 
forces me to adopt the perspective of a character within the drama: my 
viewpoint is not “safe” and from afar, it is from the inside-out. Might this 
dissimilarity, then, between sociodramatic play and comedy be another 
reason why I have been unable to observe them occurring simultaneously? 
For instance, in both examples cited above, neither Steven nor Edward is 
making any genuine, concerted attempt to “inhabit” the role they are 
supposedly portraying. Steven is not really attempting to be a “cat-feeder” – 
he is offering it a brush to eat. Edward is not really endeavouring to display 
the characteristics of a pupil – thus he calls the teacher by her full, and 
“real”, name. The lack of empathetic engagement with the role in each case, 
then, would seem to be facilitating the boys’ ability to “stand outside” of the 
situation and to “play it for laughs”. On the other hand, look at the 
“seriousness” and the deep sense of vicarious involvement exhibited as 
Alice strives to comfort and care for Zelda, the “poorly baby sister”: 
 
    Alice 
1. [all of the following is delivered in a very calm sotto voce:] 
2. Come on. Hold your handbag. I will hold your book for you if you 
3. hold that. Here you hold that and I will hold your dress. Sit on the 
4. chair first. Sit here. I’ll get your stuff packed. There. All right? 
5. Give me your handbag. Give me it. You’ll be better in the morning. 
6. ‘Cause it’s time to go to sleep. Now this is my bedroom. Sleep here 
7. on the floor. Shhhh.  
 
How possibly, one might ask, could Alice have been so deeply engrossed in 
the portrayal of a concerned and conscientious parent whilst simultaneously 
being involved in trying to make Zelda laugh? Surely, vicarious, empathetic 
engagement and joke-making cannot co-exist? Moreover, how can one 
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sustain and continuously apply the rules of maternal loving care in this 
instance whilst simultaneously breaking these rules and “sending them up”? 
One has only to think of a thousand instances in the rehearsal room of a 
professional theatre (and occasionally on stage as well) and remember those 
times when something has been said or done to shatter the theatrical illusion 
and the entire company has consequently “corpsed” and fallen about 
laughing. I can think of one occasion, for instance, when the actor playing 
Romeo forgot to bring on his dagger for the final scene in the Capulets’ 
sepulchre. The hapless Juliet, consequently, on waking to discover the dead 
Romeo, had nothing with which to commit suicide and so proceeded to 
enact a very unconvincing form of “self-strangulation”. Needless to say, 
genuine empathetic engagement – on the part of both the actors and the 
audience – was thereby sacrificed along with Juliet herself. In conclusion, 
then, and in opposition to the findings of Bergen (2003), my field work 
would seem to indicate quite conclusively that humour and social pretend 
play are not happy bedfellows and that the cause of this might well be two-
fold: (1) comedy is concerned with the breaking-and-marking-of-rules 
whereas sociodramatic play is concerned with rule-observation and rule-
extension; (2) sociodramatic play (indeed any kind of role play, including 
the work of a professional actor) is fundamentally empathetic in nature 
whereas humour necessitates its opposite: affective detachment from the 
object, the butt, of the joke. Consequently, comedy and social pretend play 
would appear unable to operate simultaneously. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The Contribution of this Thesis to Theory 
The discussion of the findings of my field work reviewed in the previous 
chapter might be held not only to support but even, on occasions, to further 
the claims for the value(s) of sociodramatic play detailed in the Literature 
Review. My data certainly indicated the potential benefit of social pretend 
play for abstract and conceptual thinking, including children’s ability during 
sociodramatic play to communicate implied, rather than overt, meanings and 
to transpose and transfigure event schemata from the “real” world into the 
imaginary. Creative thinking was manifested, especially, in the children’s 
employment of the non-literal and the invisible. Linguistic development was 
noted as children utilised other people’s vocabularies and registers and also 
demonstrated appreciation and understanding of certain literary genres. The 
“playing with language” recorded by numerous researchers, however – such 
a conspicuous feature of many other forms of play – was primarily 
noticeable by its absence in the children’s sociodramatic activities, probably 
because of sociodramatic play’s inherent insistence on rule-observance 
rather then the rule-breaking which is necessary for much playful linguistic 
exploration. Role play’s utility in nurturing a positive self-concept and in 
furthering children’s moral and emotional areas of understanding was a 
consistent and conspicuous feature of my field work. Children’s notions of 
right and wrong, of good and evil, of the importance of caring, empathetic 
behaviours, and the positive positioning of their own conception of 
themselves within their moral landscape, were all recurrent features of their 
pretend play. Finally, although pleasure was seen to be an ever-present and 
fundamental facet of sociodramatic play, overt humour only ever operated 
to its detriment. 
 
And so to return to the three research questions initially posed: 
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1. What types of development are nurtured through children’s sociodramatic 
play? 
2. How do these aspects of development manifest themselves during 
sociodramatic play? 
3. How might these various types of development interrelate during 
sociodramatic play? 
 
We might not only acknowledge the manifestation of these developmental 
features in social pretend play, but might also speculate that engagement in 
joint pretence is helping to further the children’s cognitive, affective, 
linguistic, moral and interpersonal abilities. Moreover, again as previously 
hypothesised, the overlap and interplay between these various strands of 
development would appear to be extreme, making it highly problematic to 
attempt to view the different facets as in any way discrete or self-standing.  
 
Certain of the developmental areas demarcated in this research and their 
relationships with sociodramatic play – especially the cognitive, the 
linguistic and the social – have already been researched extensively and my 
work, by and large, has primarily succeeded in reaffirming various extant 
findings. This is not to denigrate these aspects of the project, though – I 
have been at pains to stress throughout that many practitioners and policy-
makers need reminding of these potential benefits of social pretend play. 
However, it must also be noted that much preceding research has not 
focussed upon children’s play in naturalistic surroundings and – even more 
significantly in making claims for the contribution of this study to existing 
theory – relatively little research has focussed exclusively upon 
sociodramatic play. Other aspects of this work, and especially the elements 
concerned with sociodramatic play and humour, have a persuasive claim to 
originality and have arisen directly out of my field work as opposed to pre-
existent research. Sociodramatic play – in spite of the intense pleasure to be 
gained therefrom – has been seen to be, in certain respects, a very serious 
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business indeed. To behave frivolously during pretence is to superficialise 
the play and to jeopardise its continuance. 
 
Implications for Early-Years Practitioners 
With specific regard to my second research question – concerning how 
developmental aspects manifest themselves during social pretend play – it is 
perhaps worth contemplating the multifarious ways in which sociodramatic 
play and, presumably, its accompanying developmental attributes have been 
seen to be potentially optimised. With regard to the physical environment 
utilised to facilitate conjoined fantasy play, my research in Elsinor Primary 
School, in particular, has indicated the desirability of a broad range of good 
quality play props and costumes which are varied on an almost daily basis. 
It would also seem that to present these accoutrements in a way which 
thematically links objects together can help stimulate and direct the actual 
content of the children’s play. This might be a useful consideration if the 
teacher wishes to facilitate play of a particular kind for remedial or 
palliative purposes. However, as Broadhead (2004, p. 72) notes, such 
themed provision might actually militate against the stimulation and 
accommodation of alternative play scenarios – a point which I myself have 
earlier observed when discussing the need, because of a broken window, to 
focus upon sociodramatic play in Elsinor School beyond the boundaries of 
the Home Corner. With justification, consequently, Broadhead (2004, p. 72) 
suggests the provision of a “whatever you want it to be place” incorporating, 
perhaps, such items as empty boxes, fabrics, hats, cushions, a clothes horse 
and so on, with the intention of enabling children’s play across a much 
broader range of thematic areas. In addition, an environment relatively free 
from extraneous distractions – such as the atrium in Harfleur – would seem 
to be conducive to supporting both the depth and the durability of children’s 
social pretend play, unlike the restaurant corner in Agincourt which, whilst 
lacking novelty, also appeared to be subject to unhelpful noise and 
disruptions occurring simultaneously in other parts of the same classroom. 
Moreover, the stimuli materials – as well as being attractive and various – 
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should also include objects likely to promote the kinds of play favoured by 
boys as well as girls. My field work in Harfleur, for example, demonstrated 
– to the surprise of the teachers – the relative lack of “boy-friendly” props 
and costumes. The rather thorny issue of whether items should be provided 
which facilitate “violent” play – such as toy guns and weapons – remains a 
moot point and one which, in the current climate, is perhaps best avoided by 
not incorporating such items. Furthermore, time and space must be created 
for sociodramatic play including the availability – and the preparedness – of 
teachers and other adults to support, scaffold and progress the children’s 
play as and when appropriate. My research has quite clearly indicated that 
adult intervention, when it involves genuine, deep engagement with the 
characters and the content of the children’s play on the part of the grown-up, 
can certainly help develop and enrich the fantasy. This appears to be 
especially important when children are experiencing difficulties in 
achieving prolonged pretence with their peers: such an instance was seen in 
Ms. Murphy’s “take-away” play with Helen in Agincourt. Superficial and 
momentary adult intervention in the children’s play, however, as witnessed 
in Elsinor, can actually have a negative effect on the length and complexity 
of the pretence. Harfleur’s atrium again showed how children who are 
capable of quite autonomous social pretend play are also able to sustain, 
develop and deepen their mimetic activity for very lengthy periods when 
extraneous distractions and adult interventions are both minimised. 
 
Implications for Policy 
The preceding point necessarily brings us back to the central importance of 
“political will” if the potential benefits of sociodramatic play are truly to be 
realised within the formal educational sphere. Teachers, classroom 
assistants and others might be helped to recognise and understand the 
potential benefits of social pretend play through initial training and/or in-
service training. This would necessarily need to include guidance on 
particular types of interventionist strategies in the children’s play and when 
this might be advisable (and when not). Teachers might also be taught how 
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to observe and track children’s play for assessment purposes, relating 
attainment in play to more formal curricular advancements. Alice’s literary 
prowess displayed during my field work might, for instance, be related to 
her performance in Literacy Hour in order to provide a more holistic 
overview of her achievements in school. Once again, though, the necessary 
time and training required for teachers to be able to assess children’s play 
effectively must be acknowledged and provided for. 
 
The importance of the affective domain within children’s learning and 
development has been emphasised throughout this work and the central 
significance of, in particular, pleasure to human advancement has been 
continually highlighted. Arguably, a prime reason why the human race has 
survived and progressed for as long as it has is, ultimately, due to the sense 
of enjoyment and fulfilment to be gained from sex, certain foods, 
challenges, creative and curious endeavour, and so on (see, for example, 
Freud, 1990). Our emotions have guided our development in ways not 
always acknowledged. In like manner, the importance of pleasure and fun to 
formal educational learning has often been studiously avoided in both 
political pronouncements and curriculum documentation in spite of its 
pivotal role in stimulating children’s motivation and perseverance. 
Hopefully, a change of heart (and direction) is signified in the fact that a 
recent government publication in England is entitled, Excellence and 
Enjoyment (DfES, 2003). The pleasure to be achieved during and from 
sociodramatic play has consistently been seen in my research to provide a 
readily-available opportunity for nurturing and advancing children’s 
cognitive, linguistic, social, moral and emotional abilities in a productive, 
prolonged and progressive manner. Children enjoy sociodramatic play and, 
presumably, always have. The pleasure to be gained from such activity, 
therefore, might be held to indicate that the said activity has been providing 
developmental benefits since time immemorial. Why should we assume that 
our 21st century “brains” necessarily know better than our inherited 
“instincts”? Significantly in this regard, all six teachers whom I interviewed 
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expressed, in one way or another, a “gut feeling” or a simple sense of 
knowing that play – and the enjoyment contained therein – was, quite 
naturally, “good” for their children. 
 
Both the literature read and the field work undertaken in this study, then, – 
the “theory” and the “practice”, if you will – have helped to reinforce and 
broaden my belief that sociodramatic play possesses very definite potential 
gains for children in a variety of developmental areas. Interestingly, 
perhaps, this increased awareness and understanding of the value of 
sociodramatic play has also further reinforced and deepened my belief in the 
social importance of the professional theatre work in which I am involved. 
Just as my research has convinced me of the utility of social pretend play for 
children, so I believe that drama and theatre can help adults – as well as 
young people – to understand more about the social world of which they are 
a part and also to become more sensitive, more aware and more fulfilled 
human beings. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
To claim that sociodramatic play may well have benefits for child 
development in a diversity of domains should not, though, be held to imply 
that these developmental gains cannot be accrued by other means (Smith, 
1988, pp. 198-9). Further research surely needs to be undertaken to attempt 
to clarify whether social pretend play is particularly effective in nurturing 
development in the domains investigated or whether other activities are 
equally or more efficacious. As previously commented, such additional 
research is necessary in order to clarify whether sociodramatic play per se 
assists development across a number of areas or whether it is essentially the 
interaction among peers which occurs during social play (Piaget, 1962; 
Rubin, 1980) which is actually crucial for developmental gains. It could be 
the case that research into solitary pretend play might help clarify the 
potential benefits of symbolic pretence over and above that of simple peer 
interaction but this is dubious. Apart from the essentially cognitive gains to 
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be accrued from sociodramatic play (roughly, section 1 of my research), all 
of the other areas of development scrutinised in this work – the linguistic, 
the interpersonal, the emotional, moral and intrapersonal, and the humorous 
– possess an intrinsically social dimension. Hence the utility of a social 
constructivist paradigm of progress in the analyses undertaken. The study of 
children playing in isolation from others, therefore, would seem to have 
little potential benefit for this line of work. Comparative research, however 
– where children are investigated engaged in both social symbolic play and 
also other social non-symbolic activities (such as talking in the playground, 
brushing each other’s hair, eating together, and so on) – might be one 
fruitful way of deciding whether the developmental advantages of 
sociodramatic play occur solely as a result of social interaction (or not).The 
work of Pellegrini (1985) cited in the section on Sociodramatic Play and 
Language Development, where the linguistic benefits of social pretend play 
were advantageously compared with other forms of interpersonal contact, is 
just one example of such research. 
 
Methodologically speaking, my research has convinced me of the value of 
the latest technologies in this form of ethnographic work. The radio mics, in 
particular, allowed me to obtain first-class recordings – where literally every 
whisper was audible – in a surprisingly unobtrusive manner. The post-play 
semi-structured interviews with the children, however, were rather more 
problematic and the need to give these interviews as much time, space and 
forethought as any other aspect of the research became increasingly 
apparent. Ultimately, I believe I did succeed in creating a structure and 
process for these interviews which allowed me to obtain important data. 
 
However, whilst the latest technologies did, indeed, prove invaluable, it 
should also be acknowledged that, in terms of the literature I have 
incorporated into this work, I have not been afraid to utilise the writings and 
observations – not solely of educationists, psychologists, sociologists, and 
the like – but also of novelists, poets and dramatists drawn from across the 
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last four centuries. Arguably, their contributions to the discussions 
surrounding issues such as creativity, self-concept formation and children’s 
play can prove just as valid and valuable as those from more traditionally 
“academic” sources. 
 
Other areas for additional research which this work has touched upon en 
passant but which have been beyond the actual remit of the study are, of 
course, sociodramatic play and social class, and sociodramatic play and 
gender. Arguably, both these areas might benefit from further research. Of 
special import with regard to the relationship of play and, specifically, 
creativity, is the notion that sociodramatic play might possibly be even more 
significant for boys than girls. The research of Clark, Griffing and Johnson 
(1989), for instance, affirmed the durability of the relationship between play 
and creativity for their sample as a whole and for boys, but not for girls (p. 
87). In like manner, Hutt and Bhavnani (1976) also found gendered 
differences in their study of creativity and play (p. 218). If play is positively 
correlated with subsequent male creativity, and if boys are not given 
sufficient opportunity to engage in pretend play whilst young, might their 
creative abilities (unlike those of girls) be inhibited in later life? Might this 
be particularly disconcerting in the light of research which suggests greater 
attainment by girls than boys in so-called “creative” subjects, “particularly 
in dance, drama and music” (Mortimore et al, 1994, p. 140)? 
 
As mentioned, this research purposely avoided cross-cultural comparisons, 
again because of logistical considerations – hence one of the reasons for 
choosing three schools all with predominantly white European catchments. 
However, this must not be held to imply that the need for such research is 
any the less urgent. Comparative research into sociodramatic play across a 
variety of cultures is arguably vital in order to complement such extant work 
as Feitelson’s (1977) “Cross-Cultural Studies of Representational Play”. 
Indeed, such further research might be especially imperative in the light of 
findings by Gallas (1998) who, whilst acknowledging play’s ability to allow 
167 
 
children to experiment with social possibilities, also discovered that racial, 
socio-economic and cultural differences might militate against shared 
exploration during imaginative play (cited in Chafel, 2003, p. 220). Such 
additional research, therefore, might well have implications for the 
desirability of sensitive adult intervention when racial and social differences 
work antagonistically towards the furtherance of co-operative pretend play 
(Chafel, 2003). 
 
It is also worth remembering that my field work occurred exclusively in 
formal educational environments. Research into aspects of social pretend 
play may well profit from further studies in non-“educational” settings such 
as the home, garden and playground. After all, “we should never assume 
that children play as they do here [i.e. in classrooms] when they are in other, 
non-institutional environments” (Broadhead, 2004, p. 88). This kind of 
methodological approach might be of particular utility in the light of my 
findings in Agincourt School where the children experienced problems with 
the social aspects of pretend play. Might there be desirable interventionist 
strategies for children whose opportunity for play outside of formal 
educational settings is limited and/or not encouraged? Might there be 
implications for new policies on parenting in order to optimise all children’s 
access to social symbolic play in domestic and recreational environments? 
Certainly, the findings of this research – albeit drawn from a relatively 
narrow catchment – would indicate the need for such issues to be addressed 
through further empirical study. 
 
My field work, moreover, as well as taking place solely in formal 
educational settings, also only involved children of broadly the same age 
range (less than twelve months). However, certain research suggests that 
greater cognitive and prosocial gains might be made through play in a 
mixed-age environment where children encounter opportunities to interact 
with both more and less advanced peers (Gmitrova & Gmitrov, 2004). In the 
light of these findings, surely further research is required into mixed-age 
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sociodramatic activity in order to further our understanding of optimal play 
conditions. 
 
One might continue to argue for further research to establish the 
developmental benefits of sociodramatic play but – in view of the wealth of 
evidence currently in existence to this end – perhaps the most pressing need 
is for politicians and policy-makers to read and act upon the research which 
is already extant. I include in such a catalogue, this piece of work itself 
which underlines social pretend play’s utility in fostering a range of 
interlocking abilities and “key skills”. In order for this utility to be 
optimised for all children, however, those with political power in our society 
must demonstrate a preparedness to afford play a profile and prestige 
currently lacking. Sociodramatic play must be generously resourced within 
formal educational spheres in terms of: the training provided to teachers and 
other facilitators; the environments supplied to stimulate and facilitate 
uninterrupted pretence; and the props, toys and costumes proffered to 
initiate and sustain focus for high-quality play amongst both boys and girls. 
Finally, and just as importantly, adequate curricular time must be afforded 
to such a valuable, enjoyable and essentially human facet of development. 
 
169 
 REFERENCES 
ANDRE, T. (1989) “Problem Solving and Education” in MURPHY, P. and 
MOON, B. (eds.) Developments in Learning and Assessment, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
BAILEY, R. (2002) “Playing Social Chess: children’s play and social 
intelligence”, Early Years: Journal of International Research and 
Development, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 163-173. 
BALL, S. J. (1993) “Self-doubt and Soft data: social and technical 
trajectories in ethnographic fieldwork” in HAMMERSLEY, M. (ed.) 
Educational Research – Current Issues, London, Paul Chapman Publishing. 
BARNES, D. (1989) “Knowledge as Action” in MURPHY, P. and MOON, 
B. (eds.) Developments in Learning and Assessment, London, Hodder and 
Stoughton. 
BARRS, M. (1994) “Genre Theory: What’s it All About?” in STIERER, B. 
and MAYBIN, J. (eds.) Language, Literacy and Learning in Educational 
Practice, Clevedon, The Open University. 
BATESON, G. (1976) “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” in BRUNER, J., 
JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in Development and 
Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
BAX, M. (1977) “Man the Player” in TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, D. (eds.) 
Biology of Play, London, Heinemann. 
BELL, J. (1993) Doing Your Research Project (2nd ed.), Buckingham, Open 
University Press. 
BENNETT, N., WOOD, L. and ROGERS, S. (1997) Teaching Through 
Play, Buckingham, Open University Press. 
BERG, L-E. (1999) “Developmental play stages in Child Identity 
Construction: An Interactionist Theoretical Contribution”, International 
Journal of Early Childhood, vol. 31, pp. 11-24. 
BERGEN, D, (2003) “Theories of Pretence, Mental Representation, and 
Humour Development” in SARACHO, O. and SPODEK, B. (eds.) 
Contemporary Perspectives on Play in Earl Childhood Education, 
Connecticut, Information Age Publishing. 
170 
 
BERGSON, H. (1980) “Laughter” in SYPHER, W. (ed.) Comedy, 
Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press. 
BEST, D. (1992) The Rationality of Feeling: Understanding The Arts in 
Education, London, Falmer Press. 
BIRD, M. (1996) “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Methods: a Case Study of the Implementation of the Open College Policy” 
in Open University E835: Educational Research in Action, Offprints 
Reader, Milton Keynes, The Open University. 
BLAKENEY, E. H. (ed.) (1910) A Smaller Classical Dictionary, London, 
Dent and Sons. 
BRETHERTON, I. (ed.) (1984) Symbolic Play: The Development of Social 
Understanding, New York, Academic Press. 
BRITTON, J. (1989) “Vygotsky’s Contribution to Pedagogical Theory” in 
MURPHY, P. and MOON, B. (eds.) Developments in Learning and 
Assessment, London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
BROADHEAD, P. (2003) email communication with author, 16 May. 
BROADHEAD, P. (2004) Early Years Play and Learning: Developing 
Social Skills and Cooperation, London, RoutledgeFalmer. 
BROWNELL, C. A. and CARRIGER, M. S. (1998) “Collaborations Among 
Toddler Peers: Individual contributions to social contexts” in 
WOODHEAD, M., FAULKNER, D. and LITTLETON, K. (eds.) Cultural 
Worlds of early Childhood, London, Routledge. 
BRUNER, J. (1983) Child’s Talk – Learning to Use Language, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
BRUNER, J. (1985) “Vygotsky: a cultural and historical perspective” in 
WERTSCH, J. (ed.) Culture, Communication and Cognition: Vygotskian 
perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
BRUNER, J. (1989) “The Transactional Self” in MURPHY, P. and MOON, 
B. (eds.) Developments in Learning and Assessment, London, Hodder and 
Stoughton. 
171 
 
BRUNER, J. (1991) “Nature and Uses of Immaturity” in WOODHEAD, 
M., CARR, R. and LIGHT, P. (eds.) Becoming A Person, London, 
Routledge. 
BRUNER, J. and SHERWOOD, V. (1976) “Peekaboo and the Learning of 
Rule Structures” in BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: 
Its Role in Development and Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) (1976) Play: Its Role in 
Development and Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
BUCKINGHAM, D. (1994) “Media education: The Limits of a Discourse” 
in STIERER, B. and MAYBIN, J. (eds.) Language, Literacy and Learning 
in Educational Practice, Clevedon, The Open University. 
CARR, W. (1993) “What is an Educational Practice?” in HAMMERSLEY, 
M. (ed.) Educational Research – Current Issues, London, Paul Chapman. 
CAZDEN, C. B. (1976) “Play with Language and Meta-Linguistic 
Awareness: One Dimension of Language Experience” in BRUNER, J., 
JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in Development and 
Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
CHAFEL, J. A. (2003) “Socially Constructing Concepts of Self and Other 
through Play”, International Journal of Early Years Education, vol. 11, no. 
3, pp. 213-222. 
CLARK, P. M., GRIFFING, P. S. and JOHNSON, L. G. (1989) “Symbolic 
Play and Ideational Fluency as Aspects of the Evolving Divergent Cognitive 
Style in Young Children”, Early Child Development and Care, vol. 51, pp. 
77-88. 
CLARK, J. and GOODE, T. (1999) Assessing Drama, Newcastle, National 
Drama Publications. 
DANSKY, J. L. and SILVERMAN, I. W. (1976) “Effects of Play on 
Associative Fluency in Pre-School Children” in BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. 
and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in Development and Evolution, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
DAVID, T. (1998) “Learning Properly? Young children and desirable 
outcomes”, Early Years, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 61-65. 
172 
 
DfES (Department for education and Skills) (2003) Excellence and 
Enjoyment, London, DfES publications. 
DICKENS, C. (1861) Great Expectations, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
DOCKRELL, W. (1996) “Ethical Considerations in Research” in Open 
University E835: Educational Research in Action, Offprints Reader, Milton 
Keynes, The Open University. 
DOCKETT, S. (1998) “Constructing Understandings through Play in the 
Early Years”, International Journal of Early Years Education, vol. 6, no. 1, 
pp. 105-116. 
DONALDSON, M. (1978) Children’s Minds, London, Fontana. 
DORSCH, T. S. (1965) Classical Literary Criticism, Middlesex, Penguin. 
DUNN, J. (1988) The Beginnings of Social Understanding, Oxford, 
Blackwell. 
DUNN, J. (1998) “Young Children’s Understanding of Other People: 
evidence from observations within the family” in WOODHEAD, M., 
FAULKNER, D. and LITTLETON, K. (eds.) Cultural Worlds of Early 
Childhood, London, Routledge. 
DUNN, J. and WOODING, C. (1977) “Play in the Home and its 
Implications for Learning” in TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, D. (eds.) Biology 
of Play, London, Heinemann. 
EISNER, E. (1993) “Objectivity in Educational Research” in 
HAMMERSLEY, M. (ed.) Educational Research – Current Issues, London, 
Paul Chapman. 
FEIN, G. (1991) “The Self-Building Potential of Pretend Play, or ‘I got a 
fish, all by myself’” in WOODHEAD, M., CARR, R. and LIGHT, P. (eds.) 
Becoming A Person, London, Routledge. 
FEITELSON, D. (1977) “Cross-Cultural Studies of Representational Play” 
in TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, D. (eds.) Biology of Play, London, 
Heinemann. 
FISCHER, E. (1973) The Necessity of Art, London, Penguin. 
FISKE, A. P. (2002) “Socio-Moral Emotions Motivate Action to Sustain 
Relationships”, Self and Identity, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 169-175. 
173 
 
FORBES, D. and YABLICK, G. (1984) “The Organisation of Dramatic 
Content in Children’s Fantasy Play”, New Directions for Child 
Development, vol. 25, pp. 23-36. 
FREIRE, P. (1989) “The Politics of Education” in MURPHY, P. and 
MOON, B. (eds.) Developments in Learning and Assessment, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
FREUD, S. (1990) The Pleasure Principle, New York, Norton Library 
Books. 
GARDNER, H. (1993) Frames of Mind (2nd ed.), London, Fontana. 
GARDNER, H. (1994) “The Theory of Multiple Intelligences” in MOON, 
B. and SHELTON MAYES, A. (eds.) Teaching and Learning in the 
Secondary School, London, Routledge. 
GARVEY, C. (1976) “Some Properties of Social Pretend Play” in 
BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in 
Development and Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
GARVEY, C. (1977) “Play with Language” in TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, 
D. (eds.) Biology of Play, London, Heinemann. 
GARVEY, C. (1990) Play (2nd ed.), London, Fontana. 
GIFFIN, H, (1984) “The Co-ordination of Meaning in the Creation of a 
Shared Make-Believe Reality” in BRETHERTON, I. (ed.) Symbolic Play: 
The Development of Social Understanding, New York, Academic Press. 
GMITROVA, V. and GMITROV, J. (2004) “The Primacy of Child-Directed 
Pretend Play on Cognitive Competence in a Mixed-Age Environment: 
possible interpretations”, Early Child Development and Care, vol. 174, no. 
3, pp. 267-279. 
GOLEMAN, D. (1996) Emotional Intelligence, London, Bloomsbury. 
GOLOMB, C. and KUERSTEN, R. (1996) “On the Transition from 
Pretence to Reality: What are the Rules of the Game?”, British Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, vol. 14, pp. 203-217. 
GONCU, A. (1998) “Development of Intersubjectivity in Social Pretend 
Play” in WOODHEAD, M., FAULKNER, D. and LITTLETON, K. (eds.) 
Cultural Worlds of Early Childhood, London, Routledge. 
174 
 
GONCU, A. and KESSEL, F. (1984) “Children’s Play: A Contextual-
Functional Perspective”, New Directions for Child Development, vol. 25, 
pp. 5-22. 
GREIG, A. and TAYLOR, J. (1999) Doing Research with Children, 
London, Sage. 
GUHA, M. (1988) “Play in School” in BLENKIN, G. V. and KELLY, A. V. 
(eds.) Early Childhood Education: A Developmental Curriculum, London, 
Paul Chapman. 
GUIMARAES, S. and McSHERRY, K. (2002) “The Curriculum 
Experiences of Pre-school Children in Northern Ireland: classroom practices 
in terms of child-initiated play and adult-directed activities”, International 
Journal of Early Years Education, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 85-94. 
HADLEY, E. (2002) “Playful Disruptions”, Early Years: Journal of 
International Research and Development, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 9-17. 
HANNIKAINEN, M. (2001) “Playful Actions as a Sign of Togetherness in 
Day Care Centres”, International Journal of Early Years Education, vol. 9, 
no. 2, pp. 125-134. 
HAWKES, T. (ed.) (1969) Coleridge on Shakespeare, Middlesex, Penguin. 
HICKLING, A. K., WELLMAN, H. M. and GOTTFRIED, G. M. (1997) 
“Preschoolers’ Understanding of Others’ Mental Attitudes Towards Pretend 
Happenings”, British Journal of Developmental Psychology, vol. 15, pp. 
339-354. 
HUIZINGA, J. (1977) “Play and Contest as Civilising Functions” in 
BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in 
Development and Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
HUTT, C. and BHAVNANI, R. (1977) “Predictions from Play” in 
BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in 
Development and Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
KANTOR, R., ELGAS, P. M. and FERNIE, D. E. (1998) “Cultural 
Knowledge and Social Competence Within a Preschool Peer-Culture 
Group” in WOODHEAD, M., FAULKNER, D. and LITTLETON, K. (eds.) 
Cultural Worlds of Early Childhood, London, Routledge. 
175 
 
KING, S. (1993) Nightmares and Dreamscapes, London, Hodder and 
Stoughton. 
KING, S. (2000) On Writing, London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
KITSON, N. (1997) “Adult Intervention in Children’s Socio-Dramatic 
Fantasy Play”, Education 3 to 13, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 32-36. 
LACEY, C. (1993) “Problems of Sociological Fieldwork: a Review of the 
Methodology of Hightown Grammar” in HAMMERSLEY, M. (ed.) 
Educational Research – Current Issues, London, Paul Chapman Publishing. 
LEFRANCOIS, G. R. (1994) Psychology for Teaching (8th ed.), California, 
Wadsworth. 
LIGHT, P. and PERRET-CLERMONT, A. (1991) “Social Context Effects 
in Learning and Testing” in LIGHT, P., SHELDON, S. and WOODHEAD, 
M. (eds.) Learning to Think, London, Routledge. 
LOWENFELD, M. (1972) “Drama and Childhood Play” in HODGSON, J. 
(ed.) The Uses of Drama, London, Eyre Methuen. 
LUNZER, E. (1989) “Cognitive Development: Learning and the 
Mechanisms of Change” in MURPHY, P. and MOON, B. (eds.) 
Developments in Learning and Assessment, London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
McGREGOR, L., TATE, M. and ROBINSON, K. (1977) Learning Through 
Drama, Oxford, Heinemann. 
MASON, J. (1996) Qualitative Researching, London, Sage. 
MEAD, G. H. (1934) Mind, Self, and Society, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 
MEAKIN, P. (1998) “Neo-Vygotskian Approaches to Learning: 
Lessons for the Drama Teacher” in Drama Now!, London, National Drama. 
MEASOR, L. and WOODS, P. (1991) “Breakthroughs and Blockages in 
Ethnographic Research – Contrasting Experiences during the Changing 
Schools Project” in WALFORD, G. (ed.) Doing Educational Research, 
London, Routledge. 
MELLOU, E. (1993) The Relationship Between Dramatic Play and 
Creativity in Young Children, unpublished Ph.D. thesis no. DX 178317, 
University of Bristol. 
176 
 
MERCER, N. (1995) The Guided Construction of Knowledge, Clevedon, 
Multilingual Matters Ltd. 
MEREDITH, G. (1980) “An Essay on Comedy” in SYPHER, W. (ed.) 
Comedy, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press. 
MERTTENS, R. (2002) “Teaching vs. Play”, Child Education, October, p. 
7. 
MILLER, A. (1965) “The Family in Modern Drama” in BOGARD, T. and 
OLIVER. W. (eds.) Modern Drama: Essays in Criticism, New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
MORRIS, D. (1967) The Naked Ape, London, Corgi. 
MORTIMORE, P., SAMMONS, P., STOLL, L., LEWIS, D. and ECOB, R. 
(1994) “Teacher Expectations” in MOON, B. and SHELTON MAYES, A. 
(eds.) Teaching and Learning in the Secondary School, London, Routledge. 
MOYLES, J. R. (1989) Just Playing?, Milton Keynes, Open University 
Press. 
NASH, W. (1985) The Language of Humour, London, Longman. 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CREATIVE AND 
CULTURAL EDUCATION (1999) All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture 
and Education, Suffolk, DfEE Publications. 
NELSON, K. and SEIDMAN, S. (1984) “Playing with Scripts” in 
BRETHERTON, I. (ed.) Symbolic Play: The Development of Social 
Understanding, New York, Academic Press. 
OFSTED (Office for Standards in Education) (2003) The Education of Six 
Year Olds in England, Denmark and Finland, London, Ofsted Publications. 
OPEN UNIVERSITY (1991) E820: Child Development in Social Context, 
Milton Keynes, The Open University. 
OPEN UNIVERSITY (1994a) E819: Curriculum, Learning and Assessment 
(2nd ed.), Milton Keynes, The Open University. 
OPEN UNIVERSITY (1994b) E825: Language and Literacy in Social 
Context, Milton Keynes, The Open University. 
OPEN UNIVERSITY (1996) E835: Educational Research in Action, Milton 
Keynes, The Open University. 
177 
 
OPEN UNIVERSITY (1999) ED840: Child Development in Families, 
Schools and Society, Milton Keynes, The Open University. 
PERLMUTTER, J. C. and PELLEGRINI, A. D. (1987) “Children’s Verbal 
Fantasy Play with Parents and Peers”, Educational Psychology, vol. 7, no. 4, 
pp. 269-281. 
PIAGET, J. (1962) Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
PIAGET, J. (1976) “The Rules of the Game of Marbles” in BRUNER, J., 
JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in Development and 
Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
PIAGET, J. (1991) “Advances in Child and Adolescent Psychology” in 
LIGHT, P., SHELDON, S. and WOODHEAD, M. (eds.) Learning To 
Think, London, Routledge. 
POLLARD, A. (1994) “Towards a Sociology of Learning in Primary 
Schools” in POLLARD, A. and BOURNE, J. (eds.) Teaching and Learning 
in the Primary School, London, Routledge. 
POTTER, G. (1996) “From Symbolic Play to Symbolic Representation in 
Early Literacy: Clarifying the Links”, Early Years, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 13-16. 
PURDIE, S. (1993) Comedy: The Mastery of Discourse, Hemel Hempstead, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM AUTHORITY (2000) 
Curriculum Guidance for the Foundation Stage, London, QCA. 
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM AUTHORITY (2001) Planning 
for Learning in the Foundation Stage, London, QCA. 
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM AUTHORITY (2003) 
Foundation Stage Profile, London, QCA. 
RAYNOR, J., MEEGAN, J. and RAND, J. (1989) “Curriculum 
Chronologies” in MOON, B., MURPHY, P. and RAYNOR, J. (eds.) 
Policies for the Curriculum, London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
ROSENBLATT, D. (1977) “Developmental Trends in Infant Play” in 
TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, D. (eds.) Biology of Play, London, Heinemann. 
SCHAFFER, H. R. (1996) Social Development, Oxford, Blackwell. 
178 
 
ROSS, A. (1998) The Language of Humour, London, Routledge. 
RUBIN, K. H. (1980) “Fantasy Play: Its Role in the Development of Social 
Skills and Social Cognition”, New Directions for Child Development, vol. 9, 
pp. 69-84. 
RUSS, S. W. (2003) “Play and Creativity: developmental issues”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 291-303. 
SELF, W. (1997) Great Apes, London, Penguin. 
SHAKESPEARE, W. (1972) King Lear, in MUIR, K. (ed.), London, 
Methuen. 
SHAKESPEARE, W. (1979) A Midsummer Night’s Dream, in BROOKS, 
H. F. (ed.), London, Methuen. 
SIMCO, N. and WARIN, J. (1997) “Validity in Image-based Research: an 
elaborated illustration of the issues”, British Educational Research Journal, 
vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 661-672. 
SMITH, P. K. (1977) “Social and Fantasy Play in Young Children” in 
TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, D. (eds.) Biology of Play, London, Heinemann. 
SMITH, P. K. (1988) “The Relevance of Fantasy Play for Development in 
Young Children” in COHEN, A. and COHEN, L. (eds.) Early Education: 
The Pre-school Years, London, Paul Chapman. 
SMITH, P. K., COWIE, H. and BLADES, M. (1998) Understanding 
Children’s Development (3rd ed.), Oxford, Blackwell. 
SOLER, J. and MILLER, L. (2003) “The Struggle for Early Childhood 
Curricula: a comparison of the English Foundation Stage Curriculum, Te 
Whariki and Reggio Emilia”, International Journal of Early Years 
Education, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 57-68. 
STEINER, G. (1963) The Death of Tragedy, London, Faber and Faber. 
STENHOUSE, L. (1996) “The Teacher as Researcher” in Open University 
E835: Educational Research in Action, Offprints Reader, Milton Keynes, 
The Open University. 
SUOMI, S. and HARLOW, H. (1976) “Monkeys Without Play” in 
BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in 
Development and Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
179 
 
SUTTON-SMITH, B. (1980) “Children’s Play: Some Sources of Play 
Theorising”, New Directions for Child Development, vol. 9, pp. 1-16. 
SYLVA, K. (1977) “Play and Learning” in TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, D. 
(eds.) Biology of Play, London, Heinemann. 
SYLVA, K. and LUNT, I. (1982) Child Development: A First Course, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
SYPHER, W. (ed.) (1980) Comedy, Baltimore, John Hopkins University 
Press. 
TAN-NIAM, C. (1994) “Thematic fantasy Play: Effects on the Perspective-
Taking Ability of Preschool Children”, International Journal of Early Years 
Education, vol. 2, pp. 5-16. 
TAN-NIAM, C. (1998) Social Interaction and Theory of Mind in Children’s 
Pretend Play, unpublished Ph.D. thesis no. DX 205640, University of 
Nottingham. 
THYSSEN, S. (2003) “Child Culture, Play and Development”, Early Child 
Development and Care, vol. 173, no. 6, pp. 589-612. 
TIZARD, B. and HUGHES, M. (1991) “Reflections on Young Children 
Learning” in WALFORD, G. (ed.) Doing Educational Research, London, 
Routledge. 
TREVARTHEN, C. (1998) “The Child’s Need to Learn a Culture” in 
WOODHEAD, M., FAULKNER, D. and LITTLETON, K. (eds.) Cultural 
Worlds of Early Childhood, London, Routledge. 
UMEK, L. M. and MUSEK, P. L. (2001) “Symbolic Play: opportunities for 
cognitive and language development in preschool settings”, Early Years, 
vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 55-64. 
VAN OERS, B. and HANNIKAINEN, M. (2001) “Some Thoughts About 
Togetherness”, International Journal of Early Years Education, vol. 9, no. 
2, pp. 101-108. 
VANDENBERG, B. (1980) “Play, Problem-Solving, and Creativity”, New 
Directions for Child Development (1980) vol. 9, pp. 1-16. 
VASSILOPOULOU, C. (2000) “Imagination in Action”, Broadsheet: The 
Journal for Drama in Education, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 51-59. 
180 
 
VYGOTSKY, L. S. (1976) “Play and its Role in the Development of the 
Child” in BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in 
Development and Evolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
VYGOTSKY, L. S. (1978) Mind In Society: The Development of Higher 
Mental Processes, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. 
VYGOTSKY, L. S. (1991) “Genesis of the Higher Mental Functions” in  
LIGHT, P., SHELDON, S. and WOODHEAD, M. (eds.) Learning to Think, 
London, Routledge. 
WARD, H. (2003) “Infants May Get More Play Time,” Times Educational 
Supplement, no. 4533, 23 May 2003. 
WEIR, R. (1976) “Playing with Language” in BRUNER, J., JOLLY, A. and 
SYLVA, K. (eds.) Play: Its Role in Development and Evolution, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
WHITE, L. (1977) “Play in Animals” in TIZARD, B. and HARVEY, D. 
(eds.) Biology of Play, London, Heinemann. 
WILLETT, J. (ed.) (1964) Brecht on Theatre, London, Eyre Methuen. 
WILSON, C. and POWELL, M. (2001) A Guide to Interviewing Children, 
London, Routledge. 
WINNICOTT, D. W. (1971) Playing and Reality, London, Routledge. 
WOOD, D. (1998) How Children Think and Learn (2nd ed.), Oxford, 
Blackwell. 
WORDSWORTH, W. (1936) Poetical Works, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
WRAGG, T. (1999) “The Fine Art of Bluffication”, Times Educational 
Supplement, no. 4322, 30 April 1999. 
181 
 APPENDICES 
Examples of Research Instruments 
A. Letters 
B. Field Notes 
C. Semi-structured Interviews 
D. Transcriptions 
E. Research Diary 
182 
 APPENDIX A: Illustrative Examples of Letters 
183 
 
East View 
37, Green Lane 
Ockbrook 
Derby 
DE72 3SE 
 
Ms T. Parr 
Elsinor Primary School 
Elsinor 
Derby 
 
25 October 2000 
 
Dear Ms Parr, 
 
As a significant part of my Doctorate in Education programme which I am 
currently undertaking with the Open University, I have to conduct an initial 
research study which will serve as a foundation for my research work to be 
conducted over the following two years. The focus of the research is the 
connection between “child development” and “pretend play”. I regard this 
as being an extremely important area for research as the intellectual, 
linguistic, emotional and social benefits of play have, arguably, been 
somewhat overlooked in recent years as the school curriculum has become 
increasingly utilitarian, vocationally- and technologically-orientated, and 
“literacy”- and “numeracy”-driven. 
 
I would, therefore, like to ask your permission to conduct my pilot research 
with a small number (around 6-8) of your children in your class during the 
second part of this autumn term. I would, of course, wish to work closely 
alongside you, consulting and responding to your suggestions and guidance 
at all stages. The results and findings of the pilot research would, needless to 
say, be made available to all members of the school community in the hope 
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that the school, as well as myself, might benefit from the work. Anonymity 
of individuals in the written report is assured. 
 
The research methods will involve the radio micing and videoing of small 
numbers of children involved in active play so that their activities can later 
be transcribed and analysed. I would seek the permission of the relevant 
parents and/or guardians before carrying out this procedure. 
 
I do hope that you will allow me to work with you and your pupils for the 
above purposes and I hope that the research work will prove mutually 
beneficial and enjoyable to all concerned, 
 
   Yours, 
 
 
 
    Pete Meakin BA, MA, PGCE, MAEd 
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East View 
37, Green Lane 
Ockbrook 
Derby 
DE72 3SE 
 
John Allsop 
Chair of the Board of Governors 
Agincourt Primary School 
Agincourt 
Derby 
 
17 January 2002 
 
Dear John, 
 
As a significant part of my Doctorate in Education programme which I am 
currently undertaking with the Open University, I have to conduct a third 
phase of data collection and analysis which will serve as a further 
contribution to my research work which has been conducted for the past two 
and a half years. The focus of the research is the connection between “child 
development” and “pretend play”. I regard this as being an extremely 
important area for research as the intellectual, linguistic, emotional and 
social benefits of play have, arguably, been somewhat overlooked in recent 
years as the school curriculum has become increasingly utilitarian, 
vocationally- and technologically-orientated, and “literacy”- and 
“numeracy”-driven. 
 
I would, therefore, like to ask your permission to conduct my research in the 
Reception Class of your school during the second part of this spring term. I 
would, of course, wish to work closely alongside the class teachers, Ms 
Pollard and Ms. Murphy, consulting and responding to their suggestions at 
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all stages. The results and findings of the research would, needless to say, be 
made available to all members of the school community in the hope that the 
school, as well as myself, might benefit from the work. Anonymity of 
individuals in the written report is assured. 
 
The research methods involve the radio micing and videoing of small 
numbers of children involved in active play so that their activities can later 
be transcribed and analysed. I would seek the permission of the relevant 
parents and/or guardians before carrying out this procedure. 
 
I do hope that you will permit me access to your school for the above 
purposes and I hope that the research work will prove mutually beneficial 
and enjoyable to all concerned, 
 
   Yours, 
 
 
    Pete Meakin BA, MA, PGCE, MAEd 
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Dear Parent/Guardian, 
I am conducting some research in Ms Pollard’s/Ms. Murphy’s classroom 
during the course of next week. This research study contributes towards my 
doctorate in education. The focus of the research is the connection between 
“child development” and “pretend play”. I regard this as being an extremely 
important area for research as the intellectual, linguistic, emotional and 
social benefits of play have, arguably, been somewhat overlooked in recent 
years as the school curriculum has become increasingly constrained by other 
government priorities. 
 
In order to collect the data required, I need not only to observe the children 
at play but also to audio-record and video-record their play for later 
analysis. To enable me to do this, we will connect small “radio mics” to the 
children and set up a video camera in the classroom. Radio mics are 
harmless and relatively unobtrusive.  
 
I would, therefore, like to ask your permission to record your child’s play in 
the classroom in this manner. Any information that I collect, plus the results 
of my findings will, of course, be freely available to you. I shall not use the 
actual names of the children in writing up the report, thereby ensuring  
 
 
 
Pete Meakin 
East View, 37 Green Lane, 
Ockbrook, 
Derby DE72 3SE 
01332 662523 
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anonymity of individuals. I would be grateful if you could fill in and return 
the reply slip to Ms. Pollard/ Ms. Murphy to let me know whether or not 
you agree to your child participating in this research. Many thanks to you 
(and your child!) for your help and co-operation, 
 
Yours, 
 
Pete Meakin BA, MA, PGCE, MAEd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Ms. Pollard/Ms. Murphy, 
I am the parent/guardian of (child’s name)___________________________ 
and I agree/do not agree* to my child participating in Mr. Meakin’s research 
into pretend play. 
 
Signed______________________________________Date______________ 
 
Name (in block capitals)_________________________________________ 
*delete as applicable  
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Dear Parent/Guardian, 
Many, many thanks for allowing to me to record your child whilst engaged 
in pretend play at school. I will now be spending most of the Easter holiday 
period transcribing and analysing the data I’ve collected and, when I have 
written up the findings, I will be more than happy to let you have a copy 
should you want one. 
 
From my own point of view, I can only say what a delight it was to be 
working in Mrs. Pollard’s/Mrs. Murphy’s class. The children are quite 
evidently so happy there: they are well-motivated and well-focussed, and 
everything is carried out in a secure and caring atmosphere. I really enjoyed 
participating in so many of the class activities and hope it won’t be too long 
before I can once again lend a hand in Asterdale. 
 
At the risk of repeating myself, many thanks for your help and co-operation 
(and your child’s!) in my research project, 
 
    Yours, 
 
 
     Pete Meakin 
 
Pete Meakin 
East View, 37 Green Lane, 
Ockbrook, 
Derby DE72 3SE 
01332 662523 
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 Pete Meakin 
East View, 37 Green Lane, 
Ockbrook, 
Derby DE72 3SE 
 
John Allsop 
Chair of Governors 
Agincourt Primary School 
Agincourt 
Derby 
 
Dear John, 
 Many, many thanks for allowing me to collect data in your 
Reception Class and to be part of some of its activities. I thoroughly enjoyed 
my time in your school and can only say that I am full of admiration for the 
outstanding work conducted by Ms Pollard and Ms Murphy. Their 
professionalism, patience and dedication to their children are truly 
exemplary. The school, as I am sure you are aware, is very fortunate to have 
them. 
 
 In the meantime, if there is any way in which I can be of assistance 
to your school, please do not hesitate to contact me. Many, many thanks 
once again, 
 
    Yours, 
 
 
     Pete Meakin 
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 Pete Meakin 
East View, 37 Green Lane, 
Ockbrook, 
Derby DE72 3SE 
 
Janet Murphy 
Agincourt Primary School 
Agincourt 
Derby 
 
Dear Janet, 
  Many, many thanks for all the assistance you gave me in 
collecting data for my doctorate. I thoroughly enjoyed the time I spent in 
your class and only hope that I can be of help to you in the future. During 
the brief period I was privileged to be part of your class I grew very fond of 
your children and I was thoroughly impressed by your own professionalism, 
patience and dedication to your children. 
 
I have also included “thankyou” letters to the 
parents/guardians of all children who were given permission to participate 
in my research (a copy of which I include for your approval) and I hope you 
won’t mind distributing them for me. Once again, many thanks for all your 
help and I hope to see you again before too long, 
 
    Yours, 
 
 
     Pete Meakin 
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 APPENDIX B: Illustrative Examples of Field Notes
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 APPENDIX C: Illustrative Examples of Semi-Structured 
Interviews and Two Versions of Questions Asked 
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 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
[N.B.: Earlier version] 
Questions for the teacher 
1. How do you facilitate your pupils’ pretend play? 
 
2. What do you think some of the educational benefits are for children 
engaging in pretend play? 
 
3. What are some of the educational benefits of your interventionist 
strategies in children’s pretend play? 
 
4. Are there any educational benefits to be gained through non-teacher-
intervention in children’s pretend play? 
 
5. Would you wish your pupils to be able to spend more or less time in 
pretend play activities? 
 
6. Why? 
Questions for the pupil 
• I saw you playing at ________. What did you enjoy about playing at 
that? 
 
• At one point in your play with [name] _____________________, I 
noticed _________________. Why was this? 
 
• Do you prefer playing on your own or with your friends? 
 
• Are there some things at school which seem like work and some which 
seem like play? Which are they? Which do you prefer? 
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 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
[N.B.: Final version] 
Questions for the teacher 
• How do you facilitate your pupils’ pretend play? 
• What do you think some of the educational benefits are for children 
engaging in pretend play? 
• What are some of the educational benefits of your interventionist 
strategies in children’s pretend play? 
• Are there any educational benefits to be gained through non-teacher-
intervention in children’s pretend play? 
• Would you wish your pupils to be able to spend more or less time in 
pretend play activities? 
• Why? 
Questions for the pupil 
• When __________________ you created _________. Why did you do 
this? 
• I noticed you said ___________. Why? 
• I saw you playing with _____________. Who do you enjoy playing with 
most? Why? 
• At one point in your play with [name] _____________________, I 
noticed _________________. Why was this? 
• At ______________ the play broke down. Why do you think this was? 
• I saw you playing at __________. Do you prefer playing “goodies” or 
“baddies”? Why? Who is your favourite character? 
• I saw you playing at ________. What did you enjoy about playing at 
that? If you enjoyed it so much, why weren’t you laughing? 
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 APPENDIX D: Illustrative Examples of Transcriptions 
including Coding Conventions Employed
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 APPENDIX E: Illustrative Extract from Research Diary
206 
 RESEARCH DIARY - extract 
20th June 2000 
First used the periodicals room at Derby University library – very pleased 
with the number of relevant journals they stock. 
 
8th July 2000 
E-mailed my tutor – I’m now beginning to realise that many of the things I 
was seeking to “prove” about pretend social play have, in fact, already been 
“proven” – the way it assists and develops children’s perspective-taking 
abilities (Hickling, Wellman and Gottfried, 1997; Tan-Niam, 1998), how it 
helps construct identity (Berg, 1999), and so on. What’s interesting about 
the studies I’ve read so far, however, is that they all appear to approach the 
subject from an essentially psychological, empirical perspective. Can my 
study seek to discover how these concepts and aids to development are, in 
actuality, operationalised? What does perspective-taking really look like 
during children’s sociodramatic play? What instances are there of children 
constructing identities? 
 
13th July 2000 
Received an email from my tutor – and the above approach seems to be 
acceptable. Great. I think one of the things I’ve now got to do is constantly 
to log which research fits into which pigeon-hole: both substantively (i.e. 
which look at perspective-taking, which at cognitive growth, which at 
identity construction, etc.) and methodologically (i.e. which adopt the 
essentially empirical approach and which, if any, utilise the ethnographic 
approach which I am proposing [I hope none do!]). 
 
6th September 2000 
E-mailed my tutor re. progress on PRO2 and detailed the five “play and 
development” categories which appear to be arising out of my reading. 
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